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CIRCABOOK 1

For Michael Stamm

Soren K. A.

Foucault

Thank you for Foucault's American publisher (Random House)
Michel Foucault was born in Poitiers in 1926. He studied at
the Ecole Normale and subsequently received degrees from the
Sorbonne in philosophy (1948), psychology (1950) and Psycho-
Pathology (1952). He lectured at the University of Uppsala
for four years and in 1959-60 he was Director of the Institut
Français in Hamburg. He then became the Director of the Institute
of Philosophy at the university in Clermont-Ferrand. In 1971 he assumed
the Chair in the History of Systems of Thought at the Collège de France
for the Centre de la Recherche Scientifique. Foucault has lectured
in universities and cities all over the world. He writes
frequently for French newspapers and journals. For many years
he was an editor of Critique, an important journal founded
by Georges Bataille. Foucault has written books and articles
on the history of discourse and institutions as well as on
figures ranging from Rousseau and Hölderlin to Magritte and
Roussel. He has founded two new modes of analysis: the
archeology of knowledge and political anatomy. Foucault is
the cassava in Western civilization -- the decisive break with
the past, the liberator of the future.

Ches Foucault is a workbook I tinkered together for teachers and
students in the humanities, social sciences and natural sciences.
I have not tried to give an exhaustive account of the riches in
Foucault or the Archive. In preparations I limited my citations
to works available in English and to films readily accessible. I
was highly selective, and every time I read the Syllabus I think of
five or more books, films, observations that I should have included.
For example: Rimbaud "Be modern" or Antonio des Mortes (Brazil)
or Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged. The Applications comprise six
essays which are outlines of books I will never write. The essays
were composed in the light of a remark by Foucault. For example,
"Mother" was prompted by Foucault's response to a question about
women's liberation. "Don't forget," he pointed out, "women have
had enormous power in Western society. They have reared the
children." The focus of Ches Foucault is Power. Like
Machiavelli, Hobbes and Marx, Foucault has provided an unprecedented
definition and analysis of power which heralds the birth of a
new epoch, The Age of Dispersion.

*The Applications are available separately.
For a complete bibliography of Foucault's works see
Magazine Littéraire, Foucault issue, 1976. Since the
bibliography was compiled Le Volonté de Savoir (the first
volume of the History of Sexuality) has been published in France
and an English translation of Surveiller et Punir (1975) has
been published in England and America as Discipline and
Punishment (1977). Foucault has given two important interviews
for Le Nouvel Observateur on crime and politics (1976) published
In November, 1977, Foucault delivered an important address to the
Venice Biennale entitled The Rights of the Governed.

In Chos Foucault I have translated directly from the French editions
of the works, but I have limited quotations from Foucault to
a minimum since I wished only to make a workbook and not a
condensed Foucault.

I am lost.
A good sign.

why?
You have to be lost when you are young. You are not really
trying unless you are lost.

But I want roots.
It's good to go out on a limb.

I yearn for an answer.
There are no answers.

I need a solution.
There are no solutions.

I feel so lonely when he goes out with someone else.
Then you find someone else to go out with.

You mean open contract.
Not contract -- a stale residue from Rome. Why imitate marriage?

Can't I expect reciprocity?
Not in the sense you give me this and I'll give you the equivalent.

Then what kind of reciprocity?
Asymmetrical. Don't expect to receive what you give.

Sometimes old-fashioned coupling seems so cozy.
Why? You have the key to happiness. You are free. You can
be open to a variety of intense relationships which enrich each other.

What did you think of your performance on TV?
I could not have gone a minute further without bursting out
laughing at the absurdity of it all.

Don't you want others to see you as a person?
I am not a person.
All right, as a human being.
That's worse.
Then what are you?
Just an ordinary man.

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You read Proust here in Sambó's Coffeeshop? A perfect place. Balbec! Look at the Mercedes just arriving. That you wouldn't see in Europe. Look at the diners. They are all dressed alike, talking about the same things in the same manner, eating the same kinds of food. Why is there so much sameness in America? In America there are so many firestations: the major myth in America is fire, but in California it is earthquake.

You have to visit California to understand why people who live in California never say they are from the United States, but from California. The Golden Gate Bridge a symbolic link to the USA as California drifts further and further across the Pacific toward the East. No, Europe does not practice yoga. In this respect, as in others, Europe is far behind California.

Yes, I have heard Americans scoff at American friendliness, "being nice," but they are mistaken. Why buy hostility with your groceries. We spend a good part of our lives with strangers, why not enjoy it. Antagonism against each other only saps the energy which could be directed against the systems of power which oppress and dominate us.

American TV? A moral sermon! So many shows about death. Why are Americans so obsessed these days with death?

I vote; agreed, elections don't bring the revolution, but are you sure you want the revolution. Don't be a political bitch.

---------

I went to five publishers, who said the book was mad, before a friend succeeded in getting it published for me. But that is a very old book now.

You seem to know more about my books than I do.

I have not read my books.

You do not need to read my books.

Books will not change the world.

Books are merely boxes of tools from which one takes what one needs.

He writes too many books. Write a few good books and leave the rest to your students. Otherwise you have no time to get to know the world.

Books are a very old-fashioned mode of communication.

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The stars are raining down upon me. I know this is not true, but it is the truth.

I have always moved from love to knowledge to truth.

Intellectuals do not need to tell the people what to do. The people know the truth.

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Do not become enamored with power.

Genet prefers laughter to sex.

Music is our theology.

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We are our bodies -- and something else.

We are difference.

We are what has been said.
DIALOGUE ON POWER

Michel Foucault and a group of students
Los Angeles, May, 1976

Student: I want to ask about the relation between discourse and power. If discourse is the center for some independent power, the source of power -- if source is the right word -- how are we to find that source? What is the difference between what you are doing in your analysis of discourse and what the traditional phenomenological method seeks to do.

Foucault: I do not want to try to find behind the discourse something which would be the power and which would be the source of the discourse as in a phenomenological type of description or any method of interpretation. We start from the discourse as it is! In a phenomenological description you try to find out from discourse something about the speaking subject; you try to find the intentions of the thinking thought of the speaking subject from the discourse. The kind of analysis I make does not deal with the problem of the speaking subject, but looks at the ways in which the discourse plays a role inside the strategical system in which the power is involved, for which power is working. So power won't be something outside the discourse. Power won't be something like a source or the origin of discourse. Power will be something which is working through the discourse, since the discourse is itself a piece of a strategical system of the power relations. Is that clear?

Student: Suppose you write about such a system of discourse. Does the text that you write capture the power? Does it replicate or repeat the power? Would those be the words? Or would you want to say that it intends that power or meaning -- has the power as its meaning?

Foucault: No, the power is not the meaning of the discourse. The discourse is a series of elements which work inside the general mechanism of power. So, you have to take the discourse as a series of events such as political events through which power is conveyed and conducted.

Student: I'm worried about the historian's text. What in fact does the historian say about the discourse of the past? What is the relation between power and the historian's text?

Foucault: I do not understand exactly why you speak of the discourse of historians. But may I take another example which for me is more familiar? The problem of madness, of discourse about madness and what has been said in certain periods about madness. I do not think the problem is to know who noted this discourse, what was the way of thinking or even perceiving madness in the consciousness of people during a particular period, but to look at the discourse about madness, the institutions about madness, the law and the legal system about madness, the way in which people were excluded since they had no jobs or since they were homosexual, etc. All these elements belong to a system of power in which discourse is only a piece related with the
others. Elements which are partnerships. The analysis consists in describing the relations and the reciprocal relations between all those elements. Is that clearer?

Student: Thank you.

Student: Last night you mentioned that you have just finished a book on penal reform and legal systems, the exclusion that operated in that framework. I'm interested in knowing if you can develop a model of power in terms of the prison system. How do you see what is being done to prisoners? Is it punishment and rehabilitation?

Foucault: Well, I think that I have found the figure for this kind of power, of this system of power. I've found it very well described in Bentham's Panopticon. We can describe very generally the system of exclusion of madness in the 17th and 18th century. At the end of the 18th century society brought forth a mode of power which was not based on exclusion, as we still say, but inclusion inside the system in which everybody should be located, surveyed, observed during the day and night, in which everybody would be linked to his own identity. You know that Bentham has dreamed of the perfect prison--well, of the kind of building which could be either a hospital or a prison or an asylum or a school or a factory--in which there will be a central tower with windows all around. Then a space with nothing in it and another building with cells all around and with windows here, and here, and here. [Foucault sketched on the blackboard a picture of Bentham's model prison] In each of these cells there will be either a worker or a madman or a schoolboy or a prisoner. You need only one man located here in the central tower to observe exactly what they are doing all the time in these small cells. In Bentham that's the real ideal for all those guys in institutions. In Bentham I have found the Columbus of politics. I think one finds in the Panopticon a kind of mythological motif of the new kind of power system our society uses nowadays.

Student: Do you consider yourself a philosopher or a historian?

Foucault: Neither.

Student: Isn't history the major subject of your work? What is the basis of your notion of history?

Foucault: My program has been an analysis of discourse, but not with the perspective of the 'point of view'. Nor is my program grounded in the methods of linguistics. The notion structure has no meaning for me. What interests me in the problem of discourse is the fact that somebody has said something at one moment. I do not wish to stress the meaning, but the function of the fact that this thing has been spoken by somebody at this point. That is what I call the event. For me the problem is to take discourse as a series of events and to make relations
and to describe relationships between these events, which we can call discursive events, with the other events in the field of economic system or in the political, or in institutions and so on. Discourse from this point of view is nothing more than an event like the others, but of course discursive events have specific functions among the others. A similar problem is to note what constitutes the specific functions of discourse and to look at particular kinds of discourse among other ones. I also study the strategic functions of particular kinds of discursive events in a political system or in a poor system. Is that enough?

Teacher:

How would you describe your vision of history? How does the dimension of history come into discourse?

Foucault:

Since I consider discourse as a series of events then we are automatically in the dimension of history. The problem is that for fifty years most historians have not chosen to study and describe events, but structures. There is now a kind of coming back to events in the field of history. What I mean is that in the 19th century what historians called an event was a battle, a victory, the death of a king, or something like that. Against this kind of history, the historians of colonies or societies, and so on, have shown that in history there have been a lot of permanent structures. The task of the historian was to make these structures clear. We can see that aim in France in the work of Lucien Febvre, Marc Bloch, and so on. Now historians are returning to the events and trying to note the ways we can speak of economic evolution or demographic evolution as an event.

As an example I will take a point which has been studied for many years now. The operation of the birth control in the sexual life of Western society is still very enigmatic. This phenomenon is a very important event from the standpoint of economics and from the biological point of view. You know that birth control has been practiced in England and France for many centuries. Of course the practice of birth control occurred mostly among small, aristocratic circles, but it also occurred among very poor people. We know now that in the south of France and in the countryside they have practiced birth control systematically since the second half of the 18th century. That's an event.

Let's take another example. Since a particular time in the 19th century the rate of protein in the food has been growing and the rate of the gristle has been diminishing. This constitutes a historical, economic, biological event. The historian is now engaged in studying these processes as new kinds of events. I think that this is something people like me have in common with historians. I am not a historian in the strict sense. But we share an interest in the event.

Student:

What in this new type of historical inquiry is the place of what you call the archaeology of knowledge? Does your use of the phrase archaeology of knowledge refer to a new type of methodology or is it a simple analogy between the techniques of archaeology and history?
Foucault: Let me backtrack for a moment and add something to what I was saying about the event as the main object of research. Neither the logic of meaning nor the logic of structure are pertinent for this kind of research. You don't need the theory and logic of meaning, we don't need the logic or method of structure, we need something else.

Student: I understand. Now would you comment on whether archaeology is a new method or simply a metaphor.

Foucault: Well . . .

Student: Is it central to your conception of history?

Foucault: I use the word archaeology for two or three main reasons. The first is that we can play with the word archaeology. 'Arche' in Greek means beginning. We also have the word 'arche' in French. The French word signifies the way in which discursive events have been registered and can be extracted from the archive. So archaeology refers to the kind of research which tries to dig out discursive events as if they were registered in an arché. The second reason I use the term relates to a particular aim of mine. I wish to reconstitute a historical field in its totality with all the political, economic, sexual connections and so on. My problem is to find out what to analyze, what has been the fact itself of discourse. In this way I don't intend to be a historian but to know why and in what ways connections occur between discursive events. If I do this it is because I would like to know just what we are now, nowadays. I wish to focus on what is happening with us today, what are we, what is our society. I think that our society and what we are has a deep historical dimension and in this historical space the discursive events which have taken place centuries ago or years ago, are very important. We are interwoven into these discursive events. In a way we are nothing else but what has been said centuries and months and weeks ago and so on.

Student: It seems to me that any theory of power whether it's based on structures or functions always implies a qualitative feature. If you're going to study the structure and function of power events in a particular society, for instance, France's Spain or Mao's People's Republic, you have qualitatively different structures and uses of power. In that sense I think any theory of power has to address itself to its ideological underpinnings. In that sense it's very difficult to establish the kind of events or explanations about the structures or function of power apart from their political connotations. Therefore you see its ideologically not free.

Foucault: I cannot say anything more than I agree.

Student: But if you agree don't you think this is a serious limitation on the attempt to construct a paradigm of power which is based on one's political convictions?

Foucault: That's the reason why I don't intend to depict a paradigm of what power is. I would like to note the ways different mechanisms of power are at work in our society, among us, inside us, outside us. I would like to know the ways in which our bodies, our daily
behavior, our sexual behavior, our desire, our scientific and theoretical discourses are linked with several systems of power which are themselves linked each with one another.

Student: How would your position be different from a person who had adopted a materialist interpretation of history?

Foucault: I think that the difference is that in historical materialism you have to locate at the base of the system the political forces, then the relations of production and so on, until you find the structure, the juridical and ideological super-structure, and finally what will deepen our thinking as well as the consciousness of poor people. I think that power relations are simpler but at the same time much more complicated. Simple in the sense that you do not need these pyramidal constructions; much more complicated since you have a lot of reciprocal relations between, for instance, the technology of power and the development of productive forces.

You cannot understand the development of productive forces unless you perceive in industry and society a particular type or several types of power at work, at work inside the productive forces. The human body is a productive force, we know that, but the human body does not exist like that, like a biological article, like a piece of material. The human body is something which exists in and through a political system. Political power gives you some room, room to behave, to have a particular attitude, to sit in a certain way, to work the whole day long and so on. Marx thought, and he has written, that work constitutes the concrete existence of man. I think that is a typical Hegelian idea.

Work is not the concrete essence of man. If man works, if the human body is a productive force, it is because man is obliged to work. He is obliged to work because he is invested by political forces, because he is inserted into power mechanisms and so forth.

Student: Really what bothers me is how does this position falsify the basic Marxian premise. Marx thought that if people are obliged to work we are therefore obliged to enter into some kind of socialisation to carry out that process of production. As a consequence of this we have what is called structural relationships. If one is to understand the kinds of social relations which exist in a particular society then one has to investigate the kinds of power structures which are linked to the processes of production. And I don't think it's a determinate relationship, I mean I really think it's a reciprocal relationship, a dialectical relationship.

Foucault: I don't accept this word dialectical. No, no! Let me make this very clear. As soon as you say dialectical you begin to accept, even if you don't say it, the Hegelian schema of thesis/antithesis and a kind of logic that I think is inadequate for making a real concrete description of those problems. A reciprocal relation is not a dialectical one.

Student: But if you only accept reciprocal to describe these relationships you take away any kind of contradiction. That's why I think the use of the word dialectical is important.
Foucault: Well, let's examine the word contradiction. But first let me say that I am glad you have asked this question. I think it's very important. You see, the word contradiction has a particular meaning in the field of logic. In the logic of propositions you really know what contradiction is. But when you look at reality and seek to describe and analyze a lot of processes, you find that those zones of reality don't contain any contradictions.

Look at the biological field. You find a lot of antagonistic reciprocal processes, but this does not mean you have found contradictions. This does not mean that one side of the antagonistic process is positive and the other negative. I think that it is really important to understand that struggle, antagonistic processes, and so on do not mean contradiction in the logical sense as the dialectical point of view presupposes. There is no dialectic in nature. I beg to differ from Engels, but in nature—-and Darwin has shown it very well—there are a lot of antagonistic processes, but they are not dialectical. I think that this sort of Hegelian formulation will not hold water.

If I continually insist that there are such processes as struggle, fight, antagonistic mechanisms, etc., it is because you find these processes in reality. They are not dialectical ones. Nietzsche spoke a lot about these processes and even more often than Hegel. But Nietzsche described these antagonisms without reference to dialectical relations.

Student: Can we apply this to a specific concrete situation? If one considers the subject of work in industrial society let us say in relation to a worker's specific problem, is this relationship reciprocal or antagonistic or what? If I analyze my own problems in this society, do I see them as reciprocal relationships or as antagonistic relationships?

Foucault: It is neither one or the other. Now you are invoking the problem of alienation. But you see, there are a lot of things we can say about alienation. When you say my problems, don't you bring in the major philosophical, the main theoretical questions, for example, what is property, what is the human subject? You said my problems. Well, that would be another discussion. The fact that you have work, and that the product of work, of your work, belongs to somebody else, that's something. It's not contradiction, it's not a reciprocal combination, it's a matter of a fight, a struggle. Anyway, the fact that what you have been working at belongs to somebody else does not take on a dialectical shape. This does not constitute a contradiction.

You might believe that it morally indefensible, that you cannot bear it, that you have to struggle against this fact, yes, that's it. But this is not a contradiction, it is not a logical contradiction. And, I think that dialectical logic is really very poor, it's very easy to use it, but it's really very poor if you want to formulate very precise meanings, descriptions and analyses of power processes.

Student: What, if any, normative concerns underlie your research?

Foucault: Is that not a question that we spoke about yesterday evening, when somebody asked me what we should do now?
Student: Well no, for example, your choice of subjects. What leads you to that choice instead of another?

Foucault: Well, that is very difficult to answer. I could answer on a personal level, I could answer on a conjunctural level, or I could try to answer on a theoretical level. I will concentrate on the second one, the conjunctural. I had a discussion with somebody yesterday evening. He said, 'You are working in such fields as madness, penal systems, etc., but all this has nothing to do with politics.' Well I think that he was right from a traditional Marxist point of view. This means that during the sixties problems like psychiatry or sexuality were considered quite marginal when they were compared to the great political problems, the exploitation of workers, for example. Among the Leftists in France and in Europe no one at that time looked at such problems as psychiatry and sexuality because they were considered marginal and unimportant. But I think that since de-Stalinization, since the sixties, we have discovered that a lot of things that we thought as unimportant and marginal are really very central in the political field because political power does not only lie in the great institutional forms of the state, what we call the state apparatus. There is no single place in which power is at work, but many places: in the family, in sexual life, in the way and people are treated, in the exclusion of homosexuals, in the relations between men and women and so on. These are all political relations. If we want to change society we cannot do it without changing these relations. The example of the Soviet Union has been decisive. The Soviet Union is a country in which we can say that since the Revolution the relations of production have changed. The legal system of property was changed. Also the political institutions have been changed since the Revolution. But all these small and very minute power relations in the family, in sexuality, in the factory, among the workers, etc., all these relations are still in the Soviet Union what they are in other Western countries. Nothing has really changed.

In your recent work on the penal code and penal system, you refer to the importance of Bentham's Panopticon. In your Discourse on Language you stated that you were going to examine the effects of psychiatric discourse on the penal code. Now I'm wondering whether you consider Bentham's model prison part of psychiatric discourse or whether you just consider it evidence relating to the way psychiatric discourse influenced the penal code?

Foucault: I would say the second. That is I think that Bentham has given this kind of issue not only a figure but also a text. It was really for him a new technology of power that could be applied to mental illness as well as much else besides.

Do you think then that Bentham's specific work exerted an influence on its own or was it just representative of general influences on scientific discourse?

Foucault: Of course Bentham had a huge influence, and you can really discern the effect of his direct influence. For instance, the way in which the prisons have been built and administered in Europe and
in the States is derived directly from Bentham. In the beginning of the 20th century in the U.S.A., but I do not remember where, a particular prison was considered a wonderful model with certain minor modifications for a mental hospital. If it has been the case that such a dream as Bentham’s Panopticon, that such a paranoic in a exerted enormous influence it was because at the same moment a new technology of power was being built up in all society. For instance, the new system of surveillance in the army, in the school the way in which children were surveyed every day by the teacher, etc.

All this was happening at the same time, and the whole process can be found in the paranoic dream of Bentham. It is the paranoic dream of our society, the paranoic truth of our society.

Student: Getting back to reciprocal influences and your disillusionment with the attention that has been directed to the speaking subject, would it be incorrect to single out Bentham? Was not Bentham influenced by the practices of the schools, the army surveillance, etc., at the time. Should we not say that it is improper to focus on Bentham per se but to direct our attention to all these influences radiating out of the society?

Foucault: Yes.

Student: You said that we are obliged to work. Do we want to work? Do we choose to work?

Foucault: Yes, we desire to work, we want to work, we love to work, but work is not our essence. To say that we want to work is very different from defining our essence in terms of our desire to work. Marx said that work is the essence of man. This conception is essentially Hegelian. It is very difficult to integrate it into the class struggle in the 19th century. You might know that Lafargue, the son-in-law of Marx, wrote a small book which nobody speaks about in Marxist circles. The neglect of Lafargue’s book amuses me. The indifference to it is ironic but more than ironic, it is symptomatic! He has written a book in the 19th century on man’s love of leisure. For him it was really impossible to imagine that work is the essence of man. Between man and work there is no essential relation. It’s something that we do.

Student: What’s that?

Student: Work!

Foucault: Sometimes.

Student: Would you clarify the rapport between madness and the artist? Perhaps with reference to Artaud. How can we relate Artaud the madman to Artaud the artist, if we can or should?

Foucault: Really, I cannot answer this question. I would say that the single question that concerns me is why is it possible that from the end of the eighteenth century to the present-day madness has been for us and continues to be something related to genius, beauty, art, and so on. Why do we have this curious idea that if somebody is a great artist then there must be something mad about him. We could say the same about crime.
people don't think he might be something of a genius, that there might be madness at work. The relation between madness and crime, and beauty and art and so on, is very enigmatic. I think that we have to try to understand why we think of these relations as something very evident. But I don't like to treat these questions directly—questions such as are artists mad, in what way are artists or criminals mad? The assumption that these relations are evident persists in our society. We treat these relations as cultural and very typical.

Last night you called Sartre the last prophet. You suggested that the task for the intellectual now is to develop the tools and techniques for analysis, to understand the various ways in which power manifests itself. Are you not a prophet? Don't you predict events or the ways in which your ideas will be used?

Then are you saying that what is done with the tools and disclosures which intellectuals make is not their province? Are you suggesting that the problem of what to do with the work of intellectuals belongs to the workers, to the people? Can you not anticipate the ways in which your tools and analyses might be put to use? Can you foresee ways they might be used which you would not condone?

No, I cannot anticipate. What I would say is that I think that we have to be very modest about the eventual political use of what we are saying and what we are doing. I do not think there is such a thing as a conservative philosophy or a revolutionary philosophy. Revolution is a political process; it is an economic process. Revolution is not a philosophical ideology. And that's important. That's the reason why something like Hegelian philosophy has been both a revolutionary ideology, a revolutionary method, a revolutionary tool, but also a conservative one. Look at Nietzsche. Nietzsche brought forth wonderful ideas, or tools if you like. He was used by the Nazi Party. Now a lot of Leftist thinkers use him. So we cannot be sure if what we are saying is revolutionary or not.

This is, I think, the first thing we have to recognize. It doesn't mean that we are simply to make very beautiful, or useful, or funny tools and then choose which ones to put on the market in case somebody wants to buy them or use them. All that is fine, but there is more to it than that. If you are trying to do something, for example, to make an analysis or formulate a theory, you have to know clearly how you want it to be used, for what purposes you want to make use of the tool you are building up—you—and how you want your tools to relate to the others which are being fashioned just now. So that I think the relations between the present conjunctive situation and what you are doing within a theoretical framework is really important. You have to make those relations very clear in your own mind. You cannot make tools for any purpose, you have to make them for one purpose, but you have to realize that maybe these tools will be used in other ways.

The ideal is not to build tools, but to make bombs, because when you have used up your own bombs, nobody else can use them.
And I must add that my dream, my personal dream, is not exactly to build bombs, because I don't like to kill people. I would like to write book-bombs; that means books that are useful just at the moment in which they are written or read by people. Then they would disappear. Books would be such that they would disappear soon after they have been read or used. Books should be a kind of bomb and nothing else. After the explosion people could be reminded that the books made a very beautiful fireworks display. In later years historians and others could recount that such and such a book was useful as a bomb and was beautiful as fireworks.

Well, I want to thank you very much. I have been very glad to be here and to hear and answer your questions. I have been very interested and impressed by all that you have said and what you know about my poor work. I feel that I don't deserve the attention, but I am grateful you know so much. Anyway I would really like to meet you again.

A GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND NAMES
(use with the Dialogue of Power)

archeology of knowledge -- the title of one of Foucault's major works (1969, English translation, 1972) and the name of a new discipline of knowledge established by Foucault to analyze the history of discourse as opposed to the history of mind. Foucault penetrates into discursive formations just as the field archeologist burrows into the visible remains of ancient societies. Foucault has published books and articles on
1. the archeology of psychiatry (Madness and Civilization, 1961)
2. the archeology of clinical medicine (The Birth of the Clinic, 1963)
3. the archeology of the human sciences (The Order of Things, 1966)
4. the archeology of criminology ( Discipline and Punishment; the Birth of the Prison, 1975)
5. the archeology of sexuality (The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge, and six more volumes in preparation)

Just as the field archeologist begins with ancient monuments so the archeologist of knowledge initiates research by grouping together important texts and statements which concern similar objects of knowledge. The archeologist of knowledge calls such a terrain an archive. Examples: in the archeology of psychiatry Foucault focuses on the work of two founders of the discipline -- Tuke and Pinel -- and on the texts of well-known practitioners such as Freud, Janet, and Charcot.

Rather than counting on the discovery of complete structures, more often the field archeologist must rely on buried foundations and fragments of pottery. The archeologist pieces together the bits of evidence to determine the face of the civilization under review. In like manner the archeologist of knowledge searches for fragments of discourse cutting across many different zones of knowledge.

Examples: in the archeology of sexuality Foucault compiles statements drawn from medical and psychiatric discourse, juridical decisions, novels and poetry, pedagogy, administrative decrees, moral treatises, religious practices, sexologists.

Field archeologists do not limit themselves to examining artifacts, but also analyze soil samples, vegetation, climate. Similarly the archeologists of knowledge study the non-discursive conditions surrounding the emergence of a discursive formation.

Example: in the archeology of criminology Foucault emphasizes the birth and history of the prison as the institution which made criminology possible by creating a criminal class as an object of knowledge. Foucault also brings in economic, political and sociological developments relevant to the discursive field under
knowledge leaves much to other disciplines such as literary criticism, psychoanalysis, and phenomenology.

Field archeologists are interested in determining the underlying system which makes possible the dispersion of cultural practices. In a similar manner the archeologists of knowledge try to decipher the unconscious rules which give rise to and govern discursive practices.

Example: In the archeology of the human sciences Foucault demonstrates how three new discursive formations -- the disciplines of biology, political economy, and philology -- arose at the same time according to similar rules.

Example: The founders of the respective disciplines discovered life; in a sense they invented 'life'.

1. Cuvier rejected the classical understanding of living things which rested on the classification of visible characteristics (Linnaeus) and established a new definition of life as the product of the inter-relationships of the invisible functions of inner organs.

2. Bopp rejected 'general grammar' and discovered that languages develop like organisms. Before Bopp it never occurred to the students of language that the Romance languages were derived from Latin.

3. Ricardo replaced the classical 'science of wealth' with a new labor theory of value grounded in the notion of labor as the wearing away of the life of the worker. Thus he founded political economy (1817) on the calculations concerning the feeding of the working class.

Field archeologists do not need to know who built what, or what particular artisan made something. Equally, the archeologist of knowledge is not so much concerned with who said something, but what was said, not so much with interpreting the meaning of the text or determining the intentions of the speaker, but with how it was possible for such a thing to have been said, how did it relate to other things that have been said and are being said, what prevented something else from being said at that particular moment.

Example: In the archeology of the human sciences, Foucault does not ferret out Ricardo's intentions for writing the Introduction to Political Economy (whether Ricardo aimed to justify the poverty of the workers or capitalists' profits or whether Ricardo hated workers and sought to curry favor with the rich) nor does he look for buried meanings in Ricardo's text, but takes what Ricardo said at face value, analyzes it, and compares it to statements in other disciplines. Not that meaning and intention lack interest or significance, just that the archeologist of
Artaud, Antonin (1896-1948), French seer, began as a poet
(“les étoiles mangent”), in 1925 he became involved in the
Surrealist movement as a writer and organizer, created the
Theater of Cruelty (reliance on cry, catharsis, scream, gesture,
ritual, dance rather than traditional plot and dialogue), in
1936 visited Mexico and participated in the peyote cult of
the Tarahumar Indians (“who have the means to revitalize Europe”)
and when the same world engaged in total war Artaud was a patient in an
asylum for the insane. Artaud wrote many books, essays and fragments
such as Address to the Dalai Lama, Van Gogh Suicided by Society, and
The New Revelations of Being in which he observed that nature is
falling down round us, that the torturer is the revealed, and
that the future will be peopled by madmen and recluses. The best
rendering of Artaud in English: The Artaud Anthology, City Lights Press.

Bentham, Jeremy (1748-1832), English jurist and philosopher, chief
architect of the modern capitalist ethic. Each day Bentham
reserved two brief periods for physical stimulation: a short walk
and a twenty-minute eye massage administered by one of his students.
Otherwise Bentham was entirely devoted to intellectual pursuits
ranging from the modest ambition to reform the whole corpus of
English law according to ‘rational’ principles to the sober task
of reforming the entire world according to the following principles:

1) the greatest happiness principle -- the aim of society should
be the promotion of the greatest happiness for the greatest
number of people.

2) the happiness enumeration principle -- in administering the
greatest happiness principle each man should count as one,
therefore in every case the happiness of the majority is
sovereign.

3) the democratic principle -- the best way to determine the
happiness of the majority is by open elections of representatives to
a national legislature according to the principle of one man
(adult male) one vote. The legislature should act towards
satisfying the desires of the people according to the most
efficient means rather than attempting to dictate to the
people what they should want.

4) the pleasure principle -- normal people act to minimize pain and
to maximize pleasure according to a hedonistic calculus used
well or badly depending on the individual’s intelligence.
Happiness consists in minimum pain combined with maximum
pleasure over the whole course of one’s life. Bentham invented the
terms ‘maximum’ and ‘minimum’ and the phrase ‘hedonistic calculus’.

5) the principle of delayed gratification -- sacrifice present
pleasure in light of possible painful consequences or in terms
of greater pleasure promised by the future.

6) the principle of violated expectations -- the worst pain is
insecurity since we cannot be sure that our sacrifices will be
rewarded and our hopes and plans fulfilled. Therefore the
greatest good is security guaranteed by the rights of property,
the rule of law, and the swift punishment of those who break the law.

7) the social welfare principle -- the state has the responsibility of
caring for the welfare of society according to four
determinations listed in descending priority:
(a) security i.e. the rights of property, military power
(b) affluence i.e. the gross national product  
(c) subsistence i.e. that everyone eats so that they can work  
(d) the reduction of inequality -- not the production of equality because that is utopian, but the long-term erosion of inequality through the pressures of education and 'rational' social legislation.

(8) the work principle -- work is the purpose of life and the bulwark of the State. On the basis of this assumption the Benthamites pushed through a new Poor Law (1834) in England whereby no man would receive assistance unless he entered a work-house which in Edwin Chadwick's words were to be "uninviting places of wholesome restraint." The Benthamite Poor Law purported to be humane and modern when in actual fact it caused considerably more misery and resentment than the previous Poor Law (1801) which was hardly a model of benevolence.

(9) the capitalist principle -- Bentham adopted without qualification the 'dismal science' founded by Adam Smith, Malthus and Ricardo. He claimed that all relationships eventually reduce themselves to the 'cash nexus', J.B. Mill, one of his most influential disciples, maintained that only three groups avoid obsession with money: the rural class, who live close to the earth, the intellectual class, who esteem learning, and the leisure class, who are rich enough to do what they want. Mill hoped that the three classes would be protected against commercialism in order that diversity might prevail.

(10) the principle of self-reliance -- against conservative doctrine (Burke, Coleridge, Southey) of paternalism (charity to the masses in exchange for deference to the elites) Bentham upheld self-reliance; against conservative reverence for old institutions Bentham engineered 'rational' institutions; against conservative elitism Bentham backed democracy. But neither conservative or liberal ever doubted the necessity of institutions and leadership for controlling people or ever expected more than a subsistence standard of living for the working classes.

(11) the utilitarian principle -- moral and political behavior must be judged according to consequences and not the intentions of the agent. A good act promotes happiness and a bad act causes pain. A good law or policy is judged in terms of its utility, that is to say its usefulness in reducing pain, which is the best way to promote happiness.

(12) the education principle -- individuals must be educated by schools, the press, the family, the government to work for the good of the whole society rather than being content to indulge their own immediate desires or to follow their own immediate self-interest (which David Hume called "confined generosity," in 1731); the latter constitutes the 'natural' course of action, so education and other disciplinary institutions should encourage an 'artificial' mode of action which consists in the utilitarian principle. The capitalist system rests on a delicate balance of 'natural' and 'artificial' modes of action.

(13) the reform principle -- each generation is charged with the task of correcting the mistakes of the past according to the progress of reason and the lessons of experience.

QUESTIONS:

(1) How do you prevent the tyranny of the majority in a democratic system?  
(2) In a democracy what other influences determine social policy besides electoral politics?  
(3) What is the difference between desired and desirable?  
(4) What are the similarities between Benthamism and Fabian Socialism?
conjuncture -- a term frequently employed in the "new history" represented
by such historians as
(1) Marc Bloch, Peasal Society
(2) Lucien Febvre, The Age of Rabelais
(3) F. Brandel, The Mediterranean World
(4) E. Hobsbawm, Captain Swing
(5) E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class
(6) Lawrence Stone, Sex, Marriage and the Family
(7) Peter Laslett, The World we Have Lost
(8) Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life
(9) C. Hill, The Seventeenth Century
(10) Peter Burke, ed., A New Kind of History

Some disclosures from the 'new history':

(1) Febvre demonstrated that it was impossible to be an atheist during the Age of Rabelais: such an intellectual mutation could not occur in the cognitive framework of the Renaissance.

(2) Bloch discovered that French peasants in the twentieth century were still using agricultural techniques that their forefathers used in the Middle Ages. Thus economic revolutions, e.g. industrialism, are limited in reach and scope.

(3) E. P. Thompson found a working-class culture in England that began as early as the eighteenth century, long before the institution of the factory system. Thus the Marxist assumption that the factory created a working-class ethic was shattered. Many other forces besides modes of production, e.g. religion, politics, argot, give rise to a sense of community.

(4) Lawrence Stone uncovered three different types of family structure in England between 1500-1800.

(5) Smelser showed that the working class fought against Child Labor laws since they wanted their children to work with their parents in the factories.

(6) Braudel deciphered many deep-seated structures, e.g. trade routes, commodity markets, methods of crop rotation, demographic and meteorological conditions, which change slowly and according to a different scale than that which characterizes political and intellectual events.

(7) Alfred Lord toured the Balkans where he discovered an oral tradition similar in content, structure, and transmission to the Homeric hymns. The bardic tradition was virtually untouched by social and intellectual events between the legendary Homer and the present.

(8) Dumézil revealed the unity of Indo-European culture on the basis of language alone. Thus the Sanskrit word for king 'raj' is slightly transformed into Latin as 'rex' and can be found as far away from India as Celtic Ireland as 'regn' rendered into English as 'regina', e.g. Elizabeth Regina. Thus it can be argued that politics is derived from language.

Before the twentieth century historians viewed the past as a pattern of events unfolding according to a single law of development which guaranteed a foreseeable destiny.

(1) Christian historians called it providence
(2) Voltaire and Condorcet called it progress
(3) Hegel called it the Absolute Spirit
(4) Fichte called it the creation of the Nation-State
(5) Spencer called it evolution, the law of development from homogeneity to heterogeneity
(6) Tonnies called it the movement from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft

The 'new history' sees a multiplicity of historicities each developing according to different pressures and in terms of different time-scales. A conjuncture is the intersection of many different historicities.

Thus Foucault does not use the word cause, but 'make possible'. He seeks to determine what circumstances conjoin in such a way to make possible a particular event or to exclude a particular occurrence.

QUESTIONS:
(1) How do governments, political parties, and socio-economic classes use the myth of uniform historical development to justify their power or enhance their prestige?
(2) What is teleology and in what sense is traditional history teleological?
(3) How would you explain St. Augustine's definition of time as the moving image of eternity?
(4) How does the 'new history' confirm Karl Popper's observation that change changes?
dialectic -- a reductive mode of logic developed by Hegel and Fichte in
the early nineteenth century and employed by
(1) Marx, Capital
(2) Engels, Anti-Dühring
(3) Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness
(4) Lenin, State and Revolution
(5) Stalin, Marxism and the Nationalities Problem
(6) Adorno, Negative Dialectics
(7) Sartre, Critique Of Dialectical Reason
(8) Lefebvre, Homo, Dialectical Materialism
(9) Mao Tse-Tung, On the Contradictions Among Peoples
(10) Althusser, Reading Capital

Before Hegel 'dialectic' referred to the question and answer form of
dialogue used by Socrates and others to attain truth. Hegel sought to
demonstrate that the art of disputation is in fact the fundamental
dynamic of history, logic and life.

Start with x which generates its contrary y; then x and y intersect
to produce a new formation xy which incorporates part of each term
though the new synthesis cannot be reduced to its original constituents.

Example: In the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel described a stage in the
history of the Roman Empire when the institution of lordship
called into being the slave class. The slaves (y) work hard
and thereby achieve parity with the masters (x), and the new
synthesis (xy) consists in a totally new concept and experience of
manhood, in philosophy called Stoicism practiced by
the emperor Marcus Aurelius and the slave Epictetus, in religion
called Christianity in which all men are children of God.

Karl Marx applied the dialectic to economic development, thus
dialectical materialism.

Example: Industrial capitalism (x) managed by and for the
bourgeoisie (the owners of capital) calls into being factory
workers (y) who join together to overthrow the masters
and establish communism (xy) based on cooperation and mutuality
(the ethic learned by the workers in the factory) but also
the factory system (created by the bourgeoisie).

Dialectical reasoning assumes that one thing comes into existence by
contradicting something already in existence out of which it draws
something to make a synthesis leading to another contradiction
ad nauseam until the ultimate synthesis resolves all contradictions
and thereby terminates history.

QUESTIONS:
(1) Why was the Age of History (1800-1975) so susceptible to the
dialectical mode of thinking?
(2) What does Foucault propose to replace dialectics?

discourse -- one of the most important terms in Foucault's vocabulary.

Discourse comprises any oral or written communication. The atoms
of discourse are statements. enunciative functions which are not to
be confused with
(1) sentences constructed by linguists
(2) propositions formulated by logicians
(3) speech acts analyzed by philosophers

Statements and do coincide with sentences, propositions and
speech acts, but the regularity of statements, that it to say
their coherence, does not depend on the laws of a language or
logic, but on the nature of the discursive formation of which they are
part. Discourse is not a construction, but consists in a dispersion of
co-existent statements which are characterized by their similar
modality of existence.

A discursive formation emerges when a set of anonymous, unconscious
rules come into play and bring forth
(1) objects of thought
(2) modalities of expression
(3) concepts of knowledge
(4) themes and strategies and models of thought

EXAMPLE: in the archeology of psychiatry Foucault described the
play of rules which brought forth
(1) the group of individuals confined in the asylum and served
up as the object of treatment and research
(2) the manner in which the early treatment of the asylum inmates
expressed itself, a style of speech which initiated medical
discourse while it rested on moral assumptions, e.g. the
inviolability of the nuclear family as the norm
(3) new concepts such as 'schizophrenia' invented by Bleuler
or 'fliibot' used by Freud
(4) themes emerged such as developmental psychology, transference
and repression/regression

The rules of a discursive formation delimit as much as they make
possible. Thus the notion of "being in the truth."

EXAMPLE: The discipline of biology is a discursive formation which
took shape in the early nineteenth century. Later in the
nineteenth century when Mendel established the science of
genetics he was ignored by biologists. Why? Because Mendel
deviated from expected objects, modalities, concepts and themes of
biology even though he effectively employed the scientific
method. He was not "in the truth." A generation later biologists
stumbled upon genetics and then realized the injustice meted
out to Mendel.
The ensemble of anonymous rules which engender discursive formation is called a positivity. A positivity allows certain statements to be positioned at a particular time. The rules are unconscious in the sense that the practitioners within a particular discursive formation are not aware that they are operating within a limited frame of reference however dispersed the objects and concepts of their discourse may be. Without a network of rules which control the proliferation of statements we would have no science. But science (connaissances) is part of a larger truth (savoir) which is part of an even larger truth (experience i.e. the individual mutations which make possible change and the survival of the species). The positivity is anonymous in the sense that no particular person or detectable group of people are responsible for the rules of discursive formation. Minds form a field of energy within which a dispersed set of facts come into existence.

EXAMPLE: In the early nineteenth century a new positivity gave birth to three new discursive formations -- biology, political economy, and philology/linguistics. All three are sciences. All three are governed by the same rules of formation (of objects, of styles, of concepts, of strategies). Goethe stated one of these rules ("To produce is divine") as did Heine ("Life is the revolution") as did Hegel ("Philosophy is the history of philosophy") though neither Goethe, Heine nor Hegel were aware that they were producing rules of discursive formation, nor were the biologists, political economists, or philologists necessarily aware of Goethe, Heine or Hegel. What biologists, economists, or linguists today are aware of Artaud's statement "Life is withdrawing from us"? Artaud's observation constitutes an anonymous, unconscious rule of discursive formation in contemporary biology, economics, and philology/linguistics.

QUESTIONS:
(1) What is the difference between the history of mind and the history of discourse?
(2) What does "to discourse" mean?
(3) Can you find other examples of important discoveries rejected or ignored by the practitioners of a particular discursive field and later adopted or rediscovered?

exclusion -- a distinctive principle of social life and discourse. For its application to discourse see the Synopsis of the Discourse on Language. Here I will limit my remarks to society. In society exclusion is one of the major techniques for handling deviant individuals who stray from dominant norms and codes. Forms of exclusion range from execution, the most extreme, to exile. Since the sixteenth century the major type of exclusion practiced in Western civilization is confinement. In this respect European and American civilization is unique in the history of human society.

EXAMPLE: The first group to suffer exclusion from European society by means of confinement were the lepers in the Middle Ages. The reason for confining the lepers was not medical. At that time Europe had no notion of infectious disease or the presence of germs. The lepers were confined in the leperaria for religious reasons. Christians considered them cursed by God and therefore unfit for society.

The second group to succumb to the technique of confinement were the mad. In the Middle Ages the mad were treated as divine apostates. Thus the wise fool in Shakespeare's plays (see King Lear for instance). As the medieval religious positivity began to break down and the rise of modern life called for a new kind of social discipline the mad came to be seen as a social problem rather than as divine oracles (see Werner Herzog's The Mystery of a-b-a Hause with Bruno S.).

Sometimes the mad were placed on ships and sent away (see Hamlet). The association of water and purification rites is evident here. The concept of traveling to find one's true self, to gain one's good sense also manifests itself in this practice. Thus Europe launched the Ship of Fools.

During the Age of Reason (1660-1795) the principle of exclusion realized in confinement took hold of European civil society. Social authority legitimated by religious and moral thinkers and codes excluded many groups from the privileges of social life by locating them in workhouses and hospitals. The poor, unemployed, the mad, the homosexuals, the libertines, the prodigals, the blasphemers were caged.

By 1680 over one-fifth of the population of Paris were incarcerated. With this statistic alone one should be able to grasp the significance of Foucault's statement that what the Soviets have been doing for fifty years with their concentration camps, asylums, and pogroms, European civilization has been doing for four hundred years. The Soviets just speeded up the process. Confinement by means of exclusion and normalization (schools, media, family, barracks, factory, office, etc.)

Thus the Age of Reason brought into being the Other, the invisible multitude subjected to the tyranny of the houses of confinement because they did not fit into the 'rational' scheme of things (see Piranesi's etchings of prison interiors beginning in 1760).

The Age of Reason reason equals non-being therefore the unreasonable do not really exist, therefore individuals who broke social, economic and language codes were confined out of sight.

In the houses of confinement the mad (as opposed to other groups confined in the same place) were treated as animals, chained, whipped into submission, put on display for the amusement of the populace. The 'human' Age of Reason had no difficulty
justifying brutality perpetrated on the mad. For them man=reason, 
animals=machine (see Descartes) therefore unreasonable = machines 
and machines have no feelings.

At the end of the Age of Reason during the period of 'liberation' 
known as the Era of the Democratic Revolution, many groups of 
innovators and prodigals for release (the Marquis de Sade was however unsuccessful), by the 
demands of ascendent indians for laborers, and by the alterations in the 
orders of knowledge as well as by the new political enthusiasm for 'freedom' and equality.

For a time the mad were left alone in the hospitals. But not 
for long. The medical profession led by Philippe Pinel and Samuel Tuke 
took the mad under its care. In 1794 Pinel with dramatic panache removed 
the chains from the mad at Charenton. Traditionally, this action 
has been viewed as the liberation of the mad from the sordid conditions 
of the madhouse, a triumph of humanitarianism, and the maturing of 
psychiatry out of the primitive notions of the Age of Reason (e.g. 
Burke's Anatomy of Melancholy) into the scientific precision of 
the Age of History, i.e. modernity.

In Madness and Civilization Foucault shatters all three myths. 
The mad simply traded one form of confinement for another, the 
madhouse for the asylum. At least in the eighteenth century they were 
allowed to rage freely in their dungeons. In the new asylum the 
mad surrendered to new chains, called Duty, while losing none of 
their mute objectivity as the Other. No one listened to the mad 
until Freud. Thus psychiatric discourse inherited the critical 
attitude toward madness, the condescension toward madness 
originating in the late Middle Ages and consolidated in the Age of 
Reason, only to re-enforce it with the arrogance of positivism and 
moralism. The tragic attitude toward madness, though evident in 
isolated figures such as Buchner (Lenz), Dostoevsky (The Idiot), 
and Strindberg (The Dream Play), was lost upon the profession of 
psychiatry.

The new therapy administered in the new asylums mirrored the 
values and expectations of the triumphant bourgeoisie and industrial 
capitalism and the military hierarchy. Samuel Tuke, a devout Quaker, 
subjected the mad to the discipline of a religious retreat. Philippe 
Pinet took the model of the nuclear family as a setting for the cure 
of mental illness (e.g. mock dining with Father played by the 
psychiatrist, Mother and siblings played by other inmates or 
psychiatric assistants). For the nineteenth century and for 
the Freudsians therapy meant socialization and reintegration into the 
capitalist codes of a steady job, acquisition and accumulation, 
sexuality consummated in marriage, family responsibility, the 
glory of civilization, the culture ideal, and what Freud called 
ordinary human unhappiness.

Sigmund Freud and his school of psychoanalysis replaced the 
asylum with the prison of the psychiatrist's couch and the 
mutual strangulation (called transference) of psychiatrist and patient. 
Psychiatry -- its discourse, techniques, and institutions -- 
have chiefly served as machine of normalization rather than agents of 
care and diversity. It has been argued, even demonstrated, that 
confine creates conditions under which original individuals 
are driven to rage, despair, dependency, and the subterfuge of 
eccentricity. It might also be argued that confinement has 
made possible conditions which afford great discoveries in 
human relationships, the arts, speech, and love. Thus the 
dignity, the profundity of the confined. See Stroetz (the Ballad 
of Bruno Z), or Wally (Igor Stravinsky), or Condemned (Ronald Coleman), or Cuckoo's Nest. 
In a recent conversation Foucault referred to Madness and 
Civilization as a very old book now.

QUESTIONS:
(1) What other forms of confinement flourish in Western civilization? 
    How are they similar to the asylum?
(2) How did the institution of the asylum make possible the creation 
    of the discourse formation known as psychiatry?
(3) Besides confinement what other forms of exclusion are current?
(4) How have other societies reacted to madness or code-breakers? 
    The American Indians for example, or the natives of the 
    Caribbean or Africa, or Oriental civilizations.
episteme -- one of the most significant of Foucault's new terms, designates a cluster of positivities which hang together and dominate a particular epoch in the form of an unconscious network of rules and regularities which make possible discursive formations.

An episteme is not
(1) a theory
(2) an ideology
(3) a worldview
(4) a mentality
(5) a climate of opinion
(6) the spirit of an age
(7) a deep structure

An episteme resembles an electro-magnetic field in which statements co-exist and coagulate. An episteme might be compared to a liquid or gas in which solid particles (statements) are suspended. An episteme is similar to a hologram, a galaxy, a cybernetic system, or a rhizome running this way and that but connecting widely dispersed stems, bulbs, roots. The archeology of knowledge, which studies epistemes, resembles systems analysis.

Any one epoch can comprise more than one episteme, though recently in Western civilization single epochs have been dominated by one episteme to the point where contemporary civilization calls its singular episteme 'the truth'.

Foucault has distinguished five successive epistemes in Western civilization, which are for the most part discontinuous.

1. The Renaissance generated coherent statements according to the rules of correspondence and similitude, which took four forms: adjacency, analogy, emulation and sympathy. For the Renaissance the universe is a great Book and the purpose of discourse is exegesis and hermeneutics.

2. The Age of Reason (1650-1775) riveted to the rules of classification, mathesis, representation, and the search for origins. The transitional period during which the Renaissance mutated into the Age of Reason (the Classical Age) is called the Bourgeois Era (1580-1660) characterized by the break down of theory and the exchange of correspondence between things and the flamboyant play of similitudes (Montaigne, Hermin, Shakespeare, Velasquez, Cervantes).

3. The Age of History (the Modern Age), separated from the Age of Reason by a period of transition (the era of the democratic revolutions 1775-1825) was governed by the rules of representation, philosophical anthropology (as men as the empirico-transcendental duality, the ground of knowledge and the glorious terminus of evolution), functionalism, historicism, and structuralism. All the rules of the modern episteme are compatible and re-enforce each other.

4. The Age of Language, the new epoch upon us, in which
(a) philosophy dissolves into the analysis of language
(b) mathematics is seen as a type of language
(c) literature discovers the Being of Language ("Who speaks?" Nietzsche asks, "The word!" Mallarmé answers.)
(d) geography, rather than biology or economics, provides the chief models for the human sciences
(e) new sciences of language emerge (e.g. archeology of knowledge, ethnoscience)
(f) the unity of languages is deciphered by means of Chomsky's theory of transformational grammar
(g) the move to protect endangered languages is initiated
(h) there arise the recognition that language is a way of experiencing the body
(i) there emerges the acknowledgement that language has become in modern civilization a command rather than information, language a coding and re-coding process rather than a means of communication

Foucault's discovery of the episteme enables us to understand a lot of questions and problems which were hitherto baffling. Examples:

1. Why was William Petty's discovery in the late seventeenth century of the application of statistics to social phenomena ignored throughout the Age of Reason even though Petty's works were widely read?
2. Why did the discourse of magic and the occult disappear in England almost overnight at the inception of the Age of Reason? (see the work of Hugh Thomas on the history of magic in England)
3. Why did the discourse of the Levellers and the Diggers go uncodified throughout the Age of Reason and why was it then unearthed during the era of the democratic revolutions?
4. Why did Puritanism suddenly change into Dissent?
5. Why did the traditional high mass for the dead change into a simple memorial service during the eighteenth century? (see Peter Laslett's work on the history of death)
6. Why did America outlaw the ancient art of shiatsu after the conquest of Japan in 1945?
7. Why was Wilhelm Reich's discovery of orgone energy mocked by twentieth century scientific and political communities? Why was he imprisoned and his books burned by American authorities in the 1950's? (for pictures of the book burnings see the film "The Mysteries of the Organism"
8. Why has it taken the life sciences thirty years to pay any attention to Georges Cuvier's theory of the phenomena of the propitious moment (i.e. that each individual has his/her own energy cycle, dependent on time and place of birth, psychology, work, environment)?
9. Why is Foucault's concept of the episteme consistently misinterpreted and rejected by most scientists and commentators?
10. Why did Buffon laugh when he read Aldrovandi's History of Serpents (published 1647)? Why did Foucault laugh at Borges' Chinese dictionary? Why do we laugh at nineteenth century psychiatry?
In an important document, "Response to a Question," published in May, 1968, and propitiously coinciding with the May Movement in France, Foucault answers the following question: What does your discovery of the episteme and the formulation of the archole of knowledge have to do with progressive politics? A brief paraphrase of the response:

1. Rather than relying on hollow ideals, univocal determinations, the free play of individual initiative, progressive politics should recognize the historical conditions and specific rules of practice.
2. The archole of knowledge defines a practice of possibilities of transformation where other modes of analysis retain a misguided confidence in uniform abstraction of change or the magical power of genius.
3. Not man, or consciousness, or the originating subject, or the universal operator of all transformations, but we must define plans, strategies, tactics, and different functions that subjects can occupy in a domain which has certain specific rules of formation.
4. Science, literature, philosophical and political discourse form a practice articulated on other practices.
5. Nowadays, political choices bear upon scientific discourse in many ways (e.g. the uses and institutionalization of knowledge). Therefore, analysis of the history and mutations of positivities is very important for practical politics.
6. We must ascertain how diverse scientific discourses in their positivities relate in a system of correlatives with other practices.
7. The time of discourse is not the time of consciousness: we must achieve an understanding of the relationships between discourse and consciousness.

QUESTIONS:
1. Distinguish between a world view and an episteme.
2. What other characteristics of the Age of Language can you see emerging?
3. How does the archole of knowledge resemble systems analysis?
4. Can you detect any other implications for progressive politics related to the archole of knowledge and its analysis of the episteme?

Foucault cautions us to beware the everyday seductions of fascism, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire precisely what dominates us.

QUESTIONS:
1. How did Chile succumb to fascism?
2. Is anarchism the opposite of fascism?
3. Can we exercise power without inducing fear?
4. Could we analyze fascism in terms of degree and scale of rigidity?
5. How can we speak of body-armor? How can we dismantle body-armor?

READING:
1. Adorno, The Authoritarian Personality
2. Breman, The Spanish Labyrinth
3. Reich, Listen Little Man
4. Alan Bullock, Hitler
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Freidrich (1770-1831), German philosopher and intellectual historian for whom the final synthesis of knowledge and the full realization of human consciousness meant the end of history (struggle and uncertainty) and the full manifestation of God ("love disporting with itself"). Hegel believed that his was the first mind to achieve complete self-consciousness, the signal that humanity would soon attain ultimate wisdom and control. At the same time the Prussian state, which Hegel worshipped and served well as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Berlin, had likewise reached perfection and thereby had established the permanent models and laws of equity and economic productivity while Europe at large had accomplished the perfection of family structure, social propriety and the incentives toward boundless creative energy.

Hegel formulated the new dialectical logic so dear to the Age of History as well as the consolidation of the discipline of Intellectual history (originating with Vico, Voltaire, and Condorcet) wherein he traced the evolution of the Subjective Spirit (philosophy, art and religion) and the Objective Spirit (economics, politics and institutions) acting and re-acting to produce the reign of the Absolute Spirit (God).

Hegel stressed
(1) the power of the negative (i.e. the necessity for contradiction), a useful idea for both conservatives and revolutionaries depending on one's notion of the negative
(2) the cunning of reason (the uses of pain and evil in the world, e.g. plague for controlling population, wars for creating new states)
(3) world-historical leaders (charisma), books, events
(4) the cumulative progress of consciousness (the slow manifestation if not creation of God)

Hegel's formulas are very seductive.

Example: Ancient Egypt = the triumph of matter over mind
          Ancient Greece = the equipoised matter and mind
          Modernity = the victory of mind (spirit) over matter

Hegel's tributes are very beautiful.

Example: Hegel to Goethe: "When I survey the course of my intellectual development I see you everywhere woven into it and would like to call myself one of your sons; my inward nature received from you nourishment and strength to resist abstraction and to set its course by your images as by signal fires."

Hegel made the prophecy that the imminent end of history and the full manifestation of God would ensure the universal supremacy of European man and the efflorescence of lyricism (music and poetry) in the orbit of the welfare state.

The English and Americans have never particularly cared for Hegel. J.S. Mill (putative T.G. the highest recorded, learned ancient Greek when he was five) claimed that he could not understand Hegel and Bertrand Russell enjoyed mocking Hegel. There was a St. Louis Hegelian Society in mid-nineteenth century America, but otherwise American intellectuals ignored him.

At the end of his Inaugural Address to the College de France Foucault declared that though we feel that the new age rises on the ruins of Hegelian philosophy, nevertheless our anti-Hegelianism is probably a trick he is playing on us and when all is done we shall find him there waiting for us.
human sciences -- disciplines of knowledge which take for an object man as an empirical entity. The human sciences comprise

1. psychology
2. sociology
3. literature and the study of myth
4. history

Some commentators have confused Foucault's conception of the human sciences with the sciences of biology, economics, and linguistics.

**Example:** On the back of the widely-used English paperback edition of the Order of Things the editor refers to the human sciences as biology, economics and linguistics/philoogy. The editor is mistaken.

The distinction between the human sciences and the sciences of life (biology), language (linguistics/philology), and labor (economics) is crucial to understanding the modern episteme.

At once the question arises: do not biology, economics, and language study man as an empirical object? In one sense, yes, since man lives, labors, and speaks. But so do other creatures. Biology focuses on living systems, linguistics on communication systems, and economics on environmental systems. Humans are only a part of these three systems.

Moreover, the sciences of biology, economics, and linguistics look at man from the outside as he is subject to laws and conditions not necessarily of his own making.

**Examples:**
1. In economics many laws have been discovered e.g. the law of diminishing returns, which cannot be altered by man, only adjusted to
2. Languages develop by means of slight sound mutations according to the particular language (the body, tongue, environment, needs of the community of speakers) much in the same way an organism develops. Languages have a life of their own and change without particular speakers being aware that it is not so much a person speaking as a language speaking.

In the last chapter of the Order of Things Foucault constructs a model of the modern episteme. The model is a simple trihedron, a geometric figure open in three dimensions. Each side designates a large discursive formation.

Side I = Philosophy, or the Thought of the Same
Side II = Mathematics, and the Physical Sciences, a deductive and linear linking of evident propositions
Side III = The Sciences of Life (Biology), Language (Philoogy and Linguistics), and Labor (Economics)

At the place where one side meets another the modern episteme has produced new discursive formations.

**Examples:**
1. the fusion of Philosophy with the Sciences of Life, Language and Labor has engendered
   a. the philosophy of life (e.g. Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea)
   b. the philosophy of symbolic forms (e.g. Cassirer, Suzanne Langer)
   c. the philosophy of alienated man (e.g. Marx's 1844 Paris MANUSCRIPTS)
2. the synthesis of Mathematics and Philosophy (i.e. Logic), see for example Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead's Principia Mathematica
3. The crossing of Mathematics with the Sciences of Life, Labor and Language leading to the formalization of the latter disciplines

The three sides of the trihedron enclose two large discursive formations:

1. The Human Sciences
   1. sociology = the study of man as he labors
   2. psychology = the study of man as he lives
   3. literature/myth analysis = the study of man as he speaks
   4. history = the narration and analysis of human events

**Note:** Each of the human sciences inside the trihedron correlate with the sciences defining Side III

1. biology (the science of living systems) :: psychology (the science of man as a lives and thereby alters his living system)
2. economics (the science of productive systems) :: sociology (the science of man as a producer who affects energy systems)
3. linguistics (the science of communication systems) :: literature (the science of man as he speaks and thereby transforms his language)

The sciences and discursive formations on the surface of the trihedron stress structure/laws whereas the sciences floating freely within the trihedron should concentrate on praxis since the human species frequently changes the way it speaks, labors, and lives.

We are suspended between DESIRE (the play of forces within the trihedron) and LAW (the dynamic structures forming the trihedron) within the encompassing reality of DEATH (the flow of time which absorbs everything).
II. The Countersciences which explore the Unconscious (the Unthought), the conditions which make life, language, labor and thought possible

(1) psychoanalysis which burrows into the individual unconscious by means of transferance (talk, projection, bloomergetics, tableau) between analyst and patient in order to free us from (a) obsessions, by showing how and when we lost the object of our desire thereby liberating us to find new objects of desire
(b) the fear of death, by revealing to us that we will in fact die one day, thereby releasing us from the night of the living dead

(2) ethology (cultural anthropology) which penetrates the social unconscious by deciphering structures and conditions which make possible myths (collective hallucinations) and social relationships (the great ethnologist Levi-Strauss maintains that ethology dissolves man)

(3) the archaeology of knowledge, which uncovers the unconscious network of rules and regularities creating discursive formations

The human sciences continually borrow methods, models and procedures from the outer crust of the tribecron (philosophy, mathematics and the sciences of life, labor and language) as well as from the countersciences.

Two great perils persist in the modern epistemes:

(1) the human sciences do not recognize that they are borrowing models and insisting that they have achieved a scientific understanding of man which is exactly the same as the scientific understanding of planets, plants, or the formal procedures of the human mind (i.e. logic) or nature (Mathematics). Thus the danger of sociologism or psychologism. Thus the danger of fixing a creature called man like pinning a butterfly on a wall

(2) the countergauges are mistakenly called upon to provide a philosophical anthropology (a philosophy or definition of man) when in fact they do just the opposite (they dissolve man) by showing the unconscious networks which make possible at a particular time, in a particular place a particular man, woman, speaker, worker, mythographer, writer, scientist etc.

The founders of the human sciences thought they had discovered a figure called man, but in fact they invented the creature according to the following bi-polarities:

(1) function and norm
(2) conflict and rule
(3) signification and system

This set of terms is fundamental not only to the human sciences but to the countergauges as well as to the sciences of life, labor and language.

During the nineteenth century, which brought into being all three groups of sciences under review, the bias was toward the sovereignty of function, conflict and signification. Freud shifted the focus to norm, rule and system. The human sciences did likewise. Thus we have the notion of 'normal' man

(1) in psychology they speak of 'abnormal' psychology
(2) in sociology they speak of 'deviant' behavior
(3) in literature they speak of 'standard' speech

Likewise the notion of the supremacy of rules (e.g. consensus politics) and the omnipotence of system (e.g. the current rage for structuralism).

Freud and the normalization/standardization bias of the human sciences are presently under attack by political anatomy, schizoanalysis, and other new disciplines and practices.
Ideology -- system of beliefs held by a particular social group or economic class. Napoleon invented the word in the early nineteenth century to designate a group of intellectuals (the Ideologues, Destutt de Tracy for example) who wished to change society by the propagation of progressive ideas and the institution of the science of signs (semiotics).

In the German Ideology (1845) Marx and Engels used the term in a pejorative sense to describe the entire corpus of legal, religious, and intellectual codes generated by an economic class to justify and protect its own self-interest.

Karl Mannheim (Ideology and Utopia, 1933) applied the term to the belief system of any class which attempts to conserve it power as opposed to utopian thinking which comprises the ideas and policies of a class which seeks to gain power.

Today the term has largely relinquished its original pejorative connotation. In contemporary journalism 'ideology' is used to denote an intellectual code justifying or describing a particular social system or way of life e.g. Chinese ideology, revolutionary ideology.

See John Plamenatz, Ideology.

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Lenin (Nikolai Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov) (1870-1924), Russian Marxist, co-founder with Trotsky of the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) and head of the Soviet Union (1917-1924). Lenin transformed Marxism into a program for violent revolution in defense of the left wing principles:

1) the Proletarian Revolution -- the overturning of the established state-power system (i.e. government, legal structure, economic modes) by and for the industrial workers

2) the leadership of the communist avant-garde -- in opposition to his contemporary Rosa Luxemburg, the leader of the German Communist Party assassinated in 1917 during the abortive Spartacus uprising. Lenin believed that history and human nature could not wait for the whole working-class to awake and join hands; therefore the avant-garde (composed mostly of intellectuals) must assume leadership of the working-class and the Revolution and then force the workers to be free

3) the dictatorship of the proletariat -- the control of the state by the communist party representing the interests of the working class i.e. the masses

4) the abolition of the lumpenproletariat -- the misfits, undesirables, perverted, shiftless, eccentric, criminal classes who resist the discipline of industry, administration, science, and engineering

5) the disgrace of 'infantile intellectuals' who hold utopian or anarchistic views and who refuse to submit to the Marxist science of dialectical materialism

6) the philosophy of materialism -- the only reality consists in practical needs and satisfactions, everything else is delusion or subversion

7) the supreme objective of economic productivity

8) the collectivization of the peasantry

9) the collectivization of the workers into respective vocational systems (e.g. industry, construction, transportation, mining)

10) nationalization of banks and property

11) the destruction of Indigenous regions, dialects and customs

12) strengthening and streamlining the institutions of marriage, education, medicine, technology: thus the proliferation of public schools, wedding palaces, hospitals, prisons, asylums, supervised centers of historical and scientific research

13) the elimination of religious sects (many churches were eventually turned into indoor swimming pools)

14) confiscation of art works which are placed in museums and government offices

15) state control of the press and media

16) institution of police force, spy network, surveillance systems, and concentration camps to protect the dictatorship of the proletariat
(17) The establishment of an invincible war machine to protect
the dictatorship of the proletariat from foreign intrusion
(18) The conversion of the world to Soviet Marxism

Reading:
(1) Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago
(2) Marcuse, Soviet Marxism
(3) David Shub, Lenin
(4) Trotsky, The Russian Revolution
(5) Deutscher, Trotsky

Questions:
(1) Are there any similarities between fascism, communism, and
capitalism?
(2) What is the Gulag Archipelago?
(3) What is the Cold War?
(4) What are the ways in which the contemporary Soviet Union
corresponds to Lenin's ideals and principles?

Mao Tse-Tung (1893-1976) -- the chief agent of transmission of Marxism
into China, the leader of the Communist Revolution in China, and
the subsequent master of China until his death. Mao's
polities were similar to Lenin's with some differences mostly in
matters of emphasis:

(1) Adoption of Trotsky's notion of 'permanent revolution' by which
privilege, elites, and standardized practices are from time
to time challenged and overturned.
(2) Abolition of hunger the first priority
(3) Insistence that the professional, bureaucratic, and intellectual
groups spend a few years working on farms or in factories
(4) Unwavering loyalty to the example and teachings of the leader
(5) Respect for education in schools, newspapers, farms, factories
(6) Combination of Western science and technology with traditional
Chinese medical, horticultural practices
(7) Supreme priority of food production, collectivization of
the peasantry followed by stress on heavy industry in the name
of national defense
(8) More insular than imperial
(9) Continual stress on the foreign menace, particularly Russia
and America (the paper tiger)

Before the Cultural Revolution Mao allowed some philosophers in
China to compare him to Confucius.

In the last years of his life and since his death the principles
of Mao, particularly permanent revolution and the participation of
elites in manual labor, have been drastically tempered by policies and
measures which emphasize industrial productivity, Western
science and technology, modus vivendi with Russia and America, and
a stationary state. Any attempt to challenge the status quo is
labelled terrorism and attributed to the intrigues of the
Gang of Four led by Ma's widow Chiang Ching at present under
house arrest.

Some evidence of intellectual, political and artistic dissent
has recently come out of China. Substantial evidence of
large concentrations camps and rigid controls and sophisticated
surveillance systems is available (see 'I Was a Prisoner of Mao,' though
for some time the book is hard to come by in America, also see
excellent reporting during the last two years in the New York Times).

Questions:
(1) What are some other differences between Leninism and Maoism?
(2) What are some traditional Chinese practices that continue to
survive in Communist China?
(3) Why did Nixon and Mao suddenly embrace after years of hostility?
Is it possible that Nixon and Mao have anything in common?
(4) Is Chinese influence in Asia comparable to Russian power over
Eastern Europe or the power of the United States in Latin America
or Europe in Africa?
(5) How successful is China in food production and distribution?
(6) Why was a teacher in China recently sentenced to life in prison
for making love to one of his students?
(7) Why is there a contemporary drive against masturbation in China?
Marx, Karl (1818-1883) -- German philosopher, historian, journalist, economist, and father of modern communism (in collaboration with Engels). Marx moved through several stages of intellectual development:

The Early Marx: In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (the Paris Manuscripts) and the German Ideology, which he wrote with Engels (1845) Marx offered a critique of the ruling class and the Hegelian philosophy. He stressed (1) the primacy of social relationships (man as a species being) (2) the alienation of the working class (3) the alienation of the working class (a) from their products since the division of labor means that the individual worker never makes a whole product, consequently he gains no satisfaction from his work (b) from their production since the working class does not enjoy the benefits of the goods and services they provide (c) from each other since there are so many obstacles to the unification of working people (d) from their species since the working class cannot fulfill the requirements of species life, that is to say the sense of mutuality and co-operation in practical endeavors such as work and play, consequently the working class is dehumanized (4) an attack on private property as the sanctity of inequity which dooms the masses to poverty (5) a critique of religion ("the sigh of the oppressed, the opiate of the people"), the legal structure, the moral codes and the intellectual products of Europe as the ephemeron of the power of the ruling class (6) adoption of the general point of view of Feuerbach, a humanitarian philosopher who wished to demystify the human condition ("man is what he eats," "God is nothing more than the projection of man's needs and desires")

The Mature Marx: beginning with The Communist Manifesto composed with Engels in 1848 Marx entered wholeheartedly into the political struggles of the working class particularly the artisans and literate workers who attempted to form unions, co-operative societies and revolutionary programs. At the same time Marx wrote history and polemics in service of the proletariat revolution. At one time he worked as a correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune, but chiefly he labored in the library of the British Museum where he produced his magnum opus (see Capital), the first sketches appearing in 1859 and the first volume in 1867, with Engels editing the second and third volumes after Marx's death.

Some of the rallying points in the mature Marx are as follows: (1) workers of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your chains. (2) economic determinism -- all beliefs, laws and institutions are but the superstructure of economic systems (which, according to the contemporary Marxist philosopher Althusser, are the determining factor only in the last instance). (3) a philosophy of history called dialectical materialism: four great epochs in the history of civilization (Engels examined pre-civilization in the Origin of the Family) (a) ancient -- characterized by slavery, producing epic literature (b) feudal -- characterized by peonage, producing romance languages and literature (c) capitalism -- the mercantile system based on trade, money, and cottage industry followed in time by the industrial system based on the factory, both stages produce literature for and about the commercial classes, for instance the novel (d) communism -- the dictatorship of the proletariat grounded in the aim to give to each according to his needs, expect from each according to his abilities (4) accumulation of capital the means by which the bourgeoisie gains power (5) creation of surplus value which is the wealth generated by the co-operation and expertise of the working class, but siphoned off by the ruling class in the form of profit, that is to say the capitalist pays the worker only enough to subsist then takes the remaining wealth created by industrial society (6) the irrationality of the capitalist system -- caught between the ineluctable development of monopoly and the ideology of small business, between the law of diminishing returns and the drying up of markets, between the waste and inefficiency of competition and the corruption and collusions of corporate monopolies, the capitalist system eventually fails to deliver the goods and begins to fall apart (7) the dehumanization of the workers -- the more irrational the capitalist system becomes, the more the workers suffer deprivation and the more society relies on each other and the techniques of co-operation and self-reliance learned in the factory and the working class communities (8) explanation of the failure of the Revolutions of 1848 -- premature effort on the part of the working-class and unable to cooperate with the liberal wing of the middle-class -- the latter will go only so far, the former not united enough to any further alone -- the power of the capitalist state to enlist the conservative panassty and the lumpenproletariat (9) the eventual victory of the working-class -- after the irrationalities of capitalism have forced the majority of the middle-class into the proletariat (i.e. the steady proletarianization of the society) the few remaining capitalists reap the whirlwind and the working class takes over the factories and the economic system, administers the system according to the principles of mutuality and equality (10) the end of history and the reign of reason and freedom -- the new order based on co-operation rather than competition, grounded in the truth of science and nature, will produce universal affinity and enable each individual to combine adequate leisure with responsible work and family life.
Late Marx -- mellowed by his experience with the internecine battles within the working class movement, horrified by the rise of the working-class union movement (which joined the capitalist system in return for certain benefits) and impressed by the tenacity of capitalism Marx reached some new conclusions:

1. The capitalist system would continue for an indefinite time to create new markets and exploit the natural resources and manpower of the undeveloped world.
2. The failure of the Paris Commune 1870 indicated on the one hand the power of the workers to stage a violent revolution yet the inability of the workers to consolidate their power -- Marx overwhelmed by the event, could not figure out (whereas the great French historian Michelet died from the shock of seeing the workers of Paris murdered by the French army) the necessity of a long transition stage once the working class assumes sovereign power -- communism will have to wait, in the meantime, the workers will continue to be rewarded on the basis of their work effort and slowly the resistance to the discipline of the dictatorship of the proletariat will be wiped out.

Just before he died Marx was preparing to write a book on Balzac.

Reading:
George Lichtheim, *Marxism*
I. Berlin, *Karl Marx*

Questions:
(1) Why did Marx rely so heavily on the industrial workers to save the world from capitalism?
(2) Did Marx accurately describe the make-up of the lumpenproletariat which played such an important role in putting Napoleon III in power?
(3) In what ways did Marx deviate from Ricardo in his understanding of the science of political economy?
(4) On what grounds can Foucault state that the debates between the Marxists and the Manchester School (the followers of Ricardo) amount to children’s battles in paddling pools?
(5) What did Marx mean by dehumanization?

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm (1844-1900) -- German philosopher. After a precocious foray into the discipline of philology (the origin and meaning of words) which earned him a full professorship at an early age, Nietzsche abandoned the university to devote himself to music and creative thought ("evocant everything"). On a small annuity from his university job Nietzsche lived in a number of cities in Switzerland and Italy where he wrote a sequence of world-historical books beginning with the *Birth of Tragedy* and moving in quick succession throughout the 1870's from *Beyond Good and Evil* to the *Genealogy of Morals*, *The Gay Science*, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, *Twilight of the Idols*, *The Anti-Christ*, and his late writings posthumously brought together under the title *The Will to Power*. His final cry before surrendering to delirium ten years before his death: "I am Dionysus, I am Christ!"

For Nietzsche everything can be reduced to the will to power.

Nietzsche used an aphoristic style.

Examples:
(1) Live dangerously
(2) Take risks
(3) Amor Fati
(4) Good to live under the sword of Damocles; one learns to dance.

Nietzsche declared that we have killed God and thereby extinguished man since without God there can be no image of man.

For Nietzsche the four great human errors are:
(1) man always saw himself incompletely
(2) he endowed himself with fictitious attributes
(3) he placed himself in a false order of rank in relation to animals and nature
(4) he invented ever-new tables of values and accepted them for a time as eternal and unconditional

Nietzsche explained that if we remove the four errors we also remove humanity, humanness and human dignity.

Thus man is only a bridge to a future Ubermensch, the man-beyond-man, the artist-tyrant who lives apart, who understands the pathos of distance, who exults in a life of freedom and creativity.

Questions:
(1) How did the Nazi’s interpret Nietzsche concept of the Ubermensch?
(2) Do you agree with Nietzsche’s assertion that the majority of men lack ‘intellectual conscience’, that is to say that the majority are not interested in struggling toward the truth?
(3) How does Foucault’s explanation of the death of man differ from Nietzsche’s?
Panopticon -- the name Bentham coined to designate the model prison he concocted replete with good sanitation, individual cells for each prisoner, total surveillance by a guard on a watchtower rising above each circle of cells, and enforced discipline and regimentation toward the aim of reforming each prisoner by teaching them to notice time, to work hard, and to obey rules.

Bentham worked on his pet project during the 1790's to the point of obsession. He exhausted his financial resources in an attempt to persuade Parliament to construct a new prison network based on the panopticon model, but to no avail. Bentham attributed his failure to the control of Parliament by vested interests and ignorance. He decided that Parliament did not really represent the people otherwise how could such an enlightened scheme go unrecognized.

Thereupon Bentham joined the democratic movement, which he had hitherto rejected, and quickly became a chief spokesman for democratic principles.

The Panopticon was proposed by Bentham as a humanitarian reform, but in fact it was instrumental in the creation of the prison system.

1. Was Bentham really humanitarian?
2. What assumptions did the Panopticon project rest upon?
3. What are the structural similarities between modern prisons based on the Panopticon and other institutions such as the mental asylum, the public school, the factory, the barracks, the office, the concentration camp?

Paranoia -- in conventional psychiatric discourse defined as a chronic mental disorder characterized by systematized delusions of persecution and of one's own greatness, sometimes with hallucinations.

In *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari put paranoia into a new perspective. They contrast the two extremes of contemporary human behavior.

At one extreme lies moral fascism, at the other revolutionary schizophrenia. Paranoia accompanies fascism:
1. Fear the body
2. We vs. them
   a. We = my race, my organization, my club, my family, my religion, my lifestyle, my country
   b. Them = other races, organizations, families, religions
3. Paranoia of conspiracy around every corner
4. Delusions of grandeur (e.g., my country right or wrong)

For examples of fascist paranoia see *Dr. Strangelove*, the *Battle of Chile*, *State of Siege*, and *Z.*, and the *Battle of Algiers*.

Questions:
1. Does Emile de Antonio's film *Milhouse* reveal anything about paranoia?
2. In what ways are all organizations susceptible to fascism and paranoia?
3. How can you dispel paranoia in others? in yourself?
4. What are some social, economic and ecological consequences of paranoia?
5. Why are there so many contemporary jokes about paranoia?

Reading:
1. Kafka, *The Burow*
2. Freud, *The Case of Judge Schreber*
3. Binswanger, *The Case of Ellen West*
4. Lauter, *The Politics of Experience*
phenomenology — in 1781 Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher who took
a walk at the same time everyday in his hometown of Königsburg
except for one day when he forgot to take a walk because he
was so absorbed in reading Rousseau's *Emile* (published in 1762).
Eventually he built an epistemology to justify the conclusions
of Rousseau's *Emile*, which he considered the *Principia Ethica*
of civilization.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) Kant made a distinction
between the *Noumenon* (a word he coined) and the *Phenomenon*.

(1) *Noumenon* = the kingdom of ends comprising freedom, God,
immortality, the human soul — we only know its existence
because we know we are free — the faculty of Reason intuits
our freedom, our experience proves it — since we are free
in spite of the exigencies of the empirical world, we must
treat every other individual as free spirits otherwise we
do an injustice to human reason and dignity — therefore the
chief injunction in life is to treat every individual as an
end-in-itself, as a citizen of the kingdom of ends, rather
than as a means to one's own ends — Kant called the supreme
rule of life the categorical imperative: everything you do
make a law out of it, that is to say universalize your particular
act, and if you cannot imagine your act as a rule for mankind
then what you have done or what you are doing is wrong —

(2) *Phenomenon* = the kingdom of means comprising the empirical world
accessible to scientific understanding and governed by the
law of cause and effect

Kant's distinction has exercised an enormous influence on modern
thought. He made it possible to posit a transcendental world
interwoven with the empirical world; thus man is an immanen-
transcendent double; thus the capacity to judge science from the
standpoint of existence.

But it was Hegel who actually created phenomenology. In the
*Phenomenology of Mind* he sought to demonstrate that the
phenomenal world in fact comprises the noumenal: God/mind/freedom
are engendered in time. Thus Hegel moved Kant out of the
Age of Reason into the Age of History.

Beginning in the late nineteenth century 'phenomenology' emerged
as a school of thought.

Examples:

(1) Husserl — stressed the deep-seated intentions of the subject
in perceiving the objective world of phenomena
(2) Merleau-Ponty — language and perception as discovery of the body
(3) Bachelard — man is the dreaming animal (e.g. fire not domesticated
for cooking or warmth but for revenge, see the *Psychoanalysis of Fire*)
(4) Heidegger — Being and Time — the discipline of keeping silent
(5) Binswanger — Being-In-the-World
(6) Foucault — Studies in Human Time
(7) Starobinski — *The Invention of Liberty*
(8) Ricoeur — hermeneutics (science as interpretation)

(9) Sartre transcribed Husserl's phenomenology into existentialism,
a philosophy of life which stresses

(a) the absolute freedom of the subject to choose his/her way
of life within the limits of facticity i.e. the brute
circumstances of birth
(b) inauthenticity or bad faith constitutes the attempt to
excuse or justify one's life on the grounds that it has
been given to you rather than chosen by you
(c) the capacity of the human species to change and develop
according to its own rules and knowledge (praxis)

(10) R.D. Laing applied existentialism to psychiatry and established
the following guidelines:

(a) distinction between the real, ontological (ontology = the
science of being or reality) self with the social self
(the roles one is expected to play, the code imposed by
family and society)
(b) ontological insecurity appears when an individual cannot
be sure whether he/she is acting out imposed roles or
whether one is really being true to one's own experience of life
(c) the double bind = ambivalent communication (e.g. the voice
says do this but the tone of voice or accompanying gesture
says the opposite)
(d) schizophrenia = (1) the disintegration of a personality torn by
double binds (2) the strategies such a personality uses to
cope with double binds and ontological insecurity
(e) the politics of the family = the tendency of family members
(particularly the affectionate nuclear family) to project
a dream family onto the real family leading to familial
ontological insecurity and the envy of other families
resulting in the unconscious selection of a scapegoat, usually
the weakest member of the family i.e. the child, who in
turn will sometimes adopt a schizophrenic strategy to cope
with the intolerable situation
(f) social norms and expectations do violence to each individual's
experience by attempting to force thought and behavior into
stereotyped patterns and roles
(g) traditional psychiatry = the attempt to break down the
resistance of the patient, and re-integrate the patient back
into conventional patterns of behavior and belief and speech
(h) "we are all murderers and prostitutes"
(i) established Kingsley Hall in the East End of London as a
care center where indiguals could go and have a breakdown
and talk to sensitive people who do not use psychiatric nostrums
or dispensing thorazine

Questions:

(1) What are some similarities between ontological insecurity and
inauthenticity?

(2) What are some examples of the double bind?

(3) What kinds of dreamfamilies do we find portrayed in the media?
political anatomy -- a term Foucault first employed in Discipline and
Punishment to refer to the mechanisms of power which create,
modify, dominate, exploit, supervise, discipline the body as well
as in the mode of analysis which examines the ways in which the
body is created and modified by the social organism.

In connection with political anatomy Foucault has devised a new
vocabulary including such terms as

(1) micropowers (micropouvoir) -- as opposed to macropowers (molar
phenomena such as classes and states) Foucault emphasizes
the minute forces of power manifest in specific relationships
between individuals and small groups e.g. warden and
prisoner, mother and child, psychiatrist and patient, floor
manager and clerk, pharmacist and consumer, policeman and suspect

(2) microphysique -- as opposed to a macrophysique which would study
the body from the standpoint of global conditions (e.g.
food supply, meteorological changes) Foucault analyzes
the tiny movements of the body in terms of the institutions,
working conditions, anxiety attacks in which the body resists
with external and internal modifications (e.g. gestures, cries,
armor, incessant talking), and all the spaces within
which the individual moves and has its being.

(3) surplus power (surpouvoir) -- individuals and groups who
hold power, any kind of power, exercise for greater power
than their immediate tenure would give us to believe. Marx's
notion of surplus value is instructive here. Foucault shows
how the emergence of modern institutions has enabled
individuals and small groups through the methods of
discipline, surveillance and discourse to gain enormous
power far beyond what one would expect from the minute
periphery of their actual control. Just as the factory
and the office make possible surplus value, so the institutions
of discipline, surveillance, punishment and knowledge
make possible surplus power.

In the Will to Knowledge (the first volume of the projected seven volume
History of Sexuality) Foucault makes it clear that by power he does not
mean:
(1) the sovereignty of the state or an ensemble of institutions in a
given society
(2) the rule of law in contestation with violence
(3) a general system of domination such as class hegemony

Rather he uses the term to refer to the multiplicity of forces which
are imminent to the domain where they are exercised.

Therefore:
(1) power not encapsulated in any police or by any group, but power is
omnipresent, it comes from everywhere
(2) state, law, class are only the terminal ends of power

(3) power emerges from innumerable micro-points, not a central point
(4) power is the moving base of the relationships between forces which
are always local and unstable but which form themselves into
chains and sequences
(5) power comes from below as a rapport of multiple forces
(6) relations of power are intentional, but not subjective; rational
only in the sense that they are traversed by calculation in the
tactics explicit at the level where they are employed
(7) hence the local cynicism of power
(8) power and knowledge (pouvoir/savoir) are always yoked since
relations of power institute the possible objects of knowledge
and the latter enforce the mechanisms of power.
sexuality -- in many societies sexuality constitutes a part of a highly developed ars erotica (the art of making love) which occupies a pre-eminent place in the life of the society.

Written accounts of such practices are rare and sketchy (e.g. the Kama Sutra and tantric yoga from India) because the ars erotica are transmitted from master to initiate as secret wisdom which can only be reached through practice.

The secret wisdom of ars erotica leads to the mastery of the body, unique orgasmic bliss, the banishment of time, the elixir of long life and the exile of death.

By contrast Western civilization beginning with the troubadours and culminating in sexology has produced a prolix discourse about sexuality. To be more precise civilization invented sexuality. Foucault's History of Sexuality is an archaeology of this discourse.

Conventional wisdom has it that Western civilization suffers badly from repressed sexuality. Foucault seeks to prove just the opposite. We are obsessed with sexuality. We love to talk about it. The economic structure is grounded in it. We have created a science of sex, an enterprise to prompt wonder and laughter in most other societies, in the pre-civilized.

Doctors, mothers, psychiatrists, pedagogues, criminologists, advertising executives, media purveyors etc. have created an enormous literature and imagery about sexuality to the point where sexuality is viewed as the very essence of being. To have good sex has become the primary injunction in life. Freud came to identify all desire (the libido) with genital sexuality in its heterosexual procreative form (calculated interest in others forms of physical stimulation e.g. oral, anal considered repressive and immature).

For two centuries now children have been under constant surveillance to keep them from masturbating. Children are surrounded by experts anxious to tell them about sex or to shamed them from sex.

Why have we reached the point where all physical pleasure is related to sexuality?

Could we have made a huge mistake and confused the pleasurable stimulation of the body with the act of sexual procreation?

Why is the pleasurable stream of energy through the body, the ars erotica which assure vitality and long life, identified with sexuality?

How has the invention of sexuality affected relationships between parents and children, teachers and adolescents, manager and worker, psychiatrist and patient, warden and prisoner? How have these power mechanisms in turn made possible the emergence of sexuality as a discursive formation?

schizophrenia -- a term coined by Bleuler in the early twentieth century to designate loss of contact with the reality principle and the disintegration (schiz = to split) of the personality.

In Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze/Guattari use the term to refer to the opposite extreme of fascism. As opposed to body-armouring and rigidity of values, the schizophrenic is characterized by fluidity of desire, resistance to codes, and the splitting into selflets.

According to Deleuze/Guattari human history comprises three stages:

1. the wild (sauvage) or tribal stage marked by heavy coding (e.g. kinship systems, taboo) and an oral culture
2. the barbarian stage which follows the institution of the State (the decisive caesura in history) by which tribal codes remain in tact but are subject to overcoding by a central authority (taxation, organized war, hierarchy) which encourages the creation of written language and codified codes (e.g. the institutes of Justinian)
3. the capitalist stage which destroys all codes in the name of money (thus driving everyone crazy) but re-codes for the purpose of control (thus setting up the delirium between revolutionary schizophrenia and moral fascism): civilization recodes a la barbarian

Schizoaanalysis opposes itself to Freudian psychoanalysis. The latter attempts to reintegrate the schizophrenic into the reality principle by setting up the triangulation of the nuclear family (Mama/Papa/Me) as the norm of social relationships and explaining the desiring machine in terms of the norm. Thus Freudian psychiatry and its derivatives are part of the re-coding process of capitalism. Many psychiatrists get rich re-coding individuals who are torn apart by the double binds engendered by the capitalist reality principle.

Schizoaanalysis enables individuals to get through the wall (the reality principle) and to keep on truckin. The schizoaanalytic works for the molecular revolution, deterritorialization, rhizomes.

The psychotic manages to get through the wall, but the task is so exhausting or traumatic that he/she remains immobilized and unable to cope with the reality principle once the liberation is complete. The psychotic is the tragic hero of schizoaanalysis. See the life and works of Holderlin, the paintings of Friedrich and VanGogh, Buchner's Lenz, and Herzog/Brüno's The Mystery of Kaspar Hauser, and the works of Duchamp and the plays of Richard Wilson and the music of Stockhausen.
The neurotic knows about the Wall (get money or die) but submits to re-coding and withdraws into the colonial territory of Self where he/she lives in a state of anxiety induced by paranoia, insecurity, body armor, disillusionment, confusion, double binds, and loneliness.

The perverse establish artificial paradises along the Wall.

Descriptions of psychoses, neuroses, perversity and revolutionary schizophrenia abound in modern literature, art and science.

Examples: on psychosis see Artaud, on neurosis see prime time television, on perversity see Malcom Lowry's Under the Volcano, for revolutionary schizophrenia see Beckett, Genet, George Jackson's Prison Letters or Angela Davis' Autobiography.

Two descriptions of the Wall:

Kafka, The Great Wall of China: "I can still remember quite well us standing as small children, scarcely six on our feet, in our teacher's garden, and being ordered to build a sort of wall out of pebbles; and then the teacher, girding up his robe, ran full tilt against the wall, of course knocking it down, and scolded us so terribly for the shoddiness of our work that we ran weeping in all directions to our parents. A trivial incident, but significant of the spirit of the time." (translation by Willi and Edwin Muir, The Complete Stories of Kafka, Schocken, New York)

Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago: "We have been happily born -- or perhaps have unhappily dragged our weary way -- down the long and crooked streets of our lives, past all kinds of walls and fences made of rotting wood, rammed earth, brick, concrete, iron railings. We have never given a thought to what lies behind them. We have never tried to penetrate them with our vision or our understanding. But that is where the Gulag country begins, right next to us, two yards away from us." (translation by Thomas Whitney, vol. I, Harper and Row, New York)

structuralism -- a school of thought which emerged in the twentieth century as a critique of the generic point of view: the latter searches out origins and stages of development whereas the structuralist penetrates underlying patterns, usually binary

Examples:

(1) In his book On Racine Roland Barthes demonstrates that Racine's plays pivot on bivalent structures (for example 'inside/outside'), which are only evident upon close analysis of the texts

(2) Levi-Strauss, one of the founders of the structuralist school, shows how binary oppositions (e.g. red/green or raw/cooked) underlie all social codes

(3) Edmund Leach (in an article in Structuralism, ed. David Robey) argues that the consistent pairing and contrast of Jesus and John the Baptist so structures the New Testament that the popularity of Christianity might be attributed to the satisfying pattern of the text rather than to any particular message conveyed by the text

(4) Dumézil discovered the same tripartite structure in the religious myths of Europe

Foucault does not deny that the structuralist techniques and assumptions apply very effectively to dreams, myths, literature and social codes, but he himself nor the disciplines he founded do not use the structuralist approach since they are concerned with the dispersion of statements which compose a discursive formation. Moreover, Foucault stresses the principle of discontinuity which results from the mutation and dispersal of structures and the incursion of unstructured experience into the historical field. Not laws of construction but conditions of existence!

Questions:

(1) Why do Foucault's critics and commentators continually label him as a structuralist when time and again he denies any association with the school or their techniques of analysis?

(2) Was Marx a structuralist?

(3) How can structuralism be used in a conservative political strategy?

(4) Why does Foucault emphasize the notion of the 'event'?

(5) How has Foucault demonstrated the principle of discontinuity at work in human history?
A Presentation of the Discourse on Language (1971)

Rules of exclusion which constrain and rarely discourse from the exterior:

(1) prohibited words
   examples: political or sexual words disallowed in particular places, epochs, groups

(2) division between reason and madness
   examples: in Shakespeare the fool is wise, in psychiatry the fool is sick

(3) the will to truth
   examples: since the seventeenth century scientific discourse (empirical, systematic, experimental, quantifiable) has assumed the pre-eminent place in Western civilization as the standard of truth

Notes:

(1) psychoanalysis has revealed that speech not only manifests desire, but serves as the very object of desire
   examples: people talk about sex or violence because the speech language of sexuality and conflict satisfies them (for the observation "people talk to hear themselves talk"

(2) historians have shown that speech does not merely verbalize conflicts, but can serve as the very object of conflict
   examples: J. P. Faye has demonstrated that German Nazism was in part a consequence of centuries of racist speech

(3) before Plato true discourse for the Greeks elicited respect and terror, but after Plato what became important for Western Civilization is not what discourse does but what it says
   examples: for the Sophists, who were routed by Socrates, education amounted to learning how to make effective speech and powerful arguments rather than attaining 'truth'

(4) in Western civilization the first two rules of exclusion from the exterior of discourse (i.e. prohibited words and the division between reason and madness) have more and more devolved into the last (the will to truth)

   examples: the psychiatrist or psychologist insist that they are scientists producing true discourse

(5) Nietzsche, Artaud and Bataille are "signposts of our future work" because they sought to turn the will to truth against truth at the point where truth seeks to justify the distinction between reason and unreason, at the very place where truth attempts to exclude madness in the name of sanity

Rules of exclusion which operate within discourse:

1. Set (One)
   (1) commentary -- the attempt to limit chance in discourse by postulating the notion of identity in the form of repetition

and sameness -- the commentary principle assumes that every text possesses a hidden meaning which can be penetrated by exegesis and other methods of interpretation

   examples: literary critics comment on texts with the aim of revealing the repetition of myths (e.g. the Adamis myth) and the sameness of themes and structures (the theme of hubris or the structure of the epic)

(2) the author function -- limits chance by positing the identity in the form of the individual ego or the 'I'

   examples: literary critics assume that a single personality writes a sequence of plays or poems -- on the basis of such an assumption the critic seeks to reconcile contradictions manifest in a particular author and to make the personality and style of the writer coherent and subject to development

II. The Second Principle of Constraint = Disciplines of knowledge, a means of control within discourse operating in the following manner:

   (a) conceptual tools of a well-defined type
   (b) propositions designating specific objects
   (c) establishment of a certain kind of theoretical field
   (d) permanent reactivation of rules of discursive formation
   (e) uselessness of errors since mistakes often lead to truth

III. Third Set

   (1) ritual -- gestures, range of signs and symbols, conditions which must accompany discourse for it to have the desired effect upon the recipients (e.g. religious, juridical, pedagogical rituals)

   (2) fellowship of discourse -- closed communities which determine regulations of discourse (e.g. political parties, the AMA, the Rosicrucians)

   (3) doctrine -- allegiance of individuals under an accepted truth or faith -- the rules and creeds of such groups (e.g. Catholicism)

   (4) techniques of social appropriation of discourse -- the institutional agencies, media which control the diffusion of discourse (e.g. schools, newspapers)

Four major methodological principles:

   (1) reversal: reverse the conventional perspective (i.e. the principles of control of discourse are agents of plenitude of expression) by showing that the principles of control of discourse actually rarefy discourse and do not constitute fundamental and creative action

   (2) discontinuity: just because discourse is rarefied does not mean that limitless discourse exists in the never region of the unsaid -- rather concentrate on the dispersion of what was in fact said and the gaps between discursive formations

   (3) specificity: discourse not a face which can be deciphered -- rather discourse a violence to things, a practice imposed upon things -- consequently each discursive formation must be analyzed in terms of its specific conditions and rules of formation

   (4) exteriority: the archaeologist of knowledge does not dig into hidden meanings, but remains on the outside of discourse
examining its conditions of appearance and its principles of regularity and dispersion

Three decisive concepts in the archaeology of knowledge:
(1) chance -- when are statements possible
what part does chance play in the mutation of discursive formations
why are chance statements feared and excluded
consult the works of Raymond Roussel (where language has been reduced to powder by systematically fabricated chance) -- see Foucault's book on Roussel)
(2) discontinuity -- what are the conditions for discontinuity in the history of discourse
why do some doctrines and disciplines of knowledge resist the principle of discontinuity
what is the similarity between the principle of discontinuity and the 'quantum leap' in physics
(3) materiality -- why is the notion of the transcendental ego so enticing
materialism mean materialistic
how can we speak of the materiality of discourse

Directions of research:
I. Group I = Critical: processes of rarefaction, consolidation and unification in discourse -- studies constituting a critique by putting into play the reversal - principle (e.g. taboo in language)
II. Group II = Genealogical: puts into play the three remaining methodological principles -- difference from critical task
not one of object or field, but point of attack -- the genealogical group concentrates on the formation rather than the rarefaction of discourse (e.g. archaeological analysis of political knowledge attempting to show that political behavior suffused with a specific discursive practice)

UTOPIA: "the lyrical dream of talk reborn, fresh and innocent at each point continually reborn in all its vitality, stimulated by things, feelings and thoughts."

Discipline and Punishment: the Birth of the Prison
A Transcription based on the original French edition, Surveiller et Punir (1976)

Foucault begins with the contrast between two styles of punishment:
(1) the execution of Damisiens, who attempted to assassinate the King of France in 1757
(a) the execution was prolonged over four days
(b) the body of the victim subjected to different forms of torture and mutilation
(c) the execution served as a spectacle for the edification of the people of France
(2) the daily regimen of a juvenile detention center in France in 1838
(i) punishment by imprisonment
(ii) each hour of the day allotted to a specific task such as work, schooling, eating
(iii) constant supervision and surveillance

The execution of Damisiens exemplifies the distinctive characteristics of the mode of punishment employed in the ancien régime (early modern Europe):
(1) the chief object of punishment is the body
(2) the chief method of punishment is a mark on the body (e.g. branding, lashing, limbs broken on the rack)
(3) confession of guilt elicited by physical pain
(4) punishment in public (e.g. the parade to Tyburn in London)
(5) the mark on the body a sign of the authority of the king and his duty to wreak revenge on the individual who attacks his sovereignty by disobeying the laws
(6) the jail used for three purposes
(a) to hold the body until punishment meted out (thus the emergence of habeus corpus)
(b) to hold women, children, aristocrats and debtors as exceptions to the rule of corporal punishment
(c) to secure heretics and political rivals until execution safe on their threat has passed
(7) enormous body of laws which were frequently ignored and violated by all members of society, particularly the commercial classes who gained power by violating the laws protecting monopoly, taxation and the like
(8) the absence of a criminal class -- highwaymen, particularly smugglers often protected and esteemed by the people
(9) the reality of trials, apprehensions, punishments and executions
The distinguishing characteristics of the penal style in modern western civilization (since the age of the democratic revolutions):
(1) disappearance of torture as official practice
(2) disappearance of the body as the chief object of punishment
(3) disappearance of the affliction of physical pain during the course of trial and confinement
(4) standardization of the criminal code with stress on crimes against property and propriety
(5) creation of the prison for the rehabilitation of law-breakers
(6) the new reformatory and penitentiary works in the following ways:
   (a) regimentation of the body to accustom it to work, family responsibility and the routines of social life in the civilized system
   (b) transformation of the mind through the benefits of discipline and the actions/words/discourse/exemplary behavior of guards, wardens, parole officers, psychologists, educators, psychiatrists, all manner of humanitarians and law-abiding citizens who serve or work in the prison
   (c) total surveillance to prevent escape and to ensure rehabilitation
   (d) cell blocks and solitary confinement
(7) capital punishment no longer a public spectacle but hidden within the confines of the prison
   (a) use of 'humane' methods beginning with the guillotine and culminating with the gas chamber (see Susan Hayward in 'Want to Live') and electric chair
   (b) ministrual care, a fancy feast and tranquilizers for the condemned before execution
   (d) pardoning system whereby politicians can exercise their power by demonstrating their humaneness in delaying or preventing a particular execution from taking place
(9) creation of the police force in London in 1784 by the blind brother of the novelist Henry Fielding; first Prefect of Police in Paris the notorious underworld figure Vidocq
(10) creation of a huge administrative apparatus to employ and enforce the criminal code -- judges, lawyers, secretaries, wardens, parole officers, bail officers
(11) creation of an enormous underworld whose members move in and out of prison and who are bribed, paroled etc. if they will spy, traffic in drugs and prostitution, serve as police and secret intelligence agents
(12) emergence of penology and criminology as disciplines of knowledge

Foucault shows how the penal style of the ancien regime mutated into the penal code of the modern age,
(1) first punitive prison in Amsterdam (1566)
(2) links between the Christian techniques of discipline (monasteries, 'brothers of the Common Life') to modern penal techniques of discipline

(3) Beccaria's *Of Crime and Punishments* (1763) initiates a quick succession of books calling for the reform of the penal system employed by the ancien regime
(4) most important era of transformation (1775-1825) with the emergence of two concepts of the prison
   (a) Penal City envisioned by the Ideologues
      (1) based on the notion of the power of signs in provoking fear, reverence, joy
      (2) prison as a sign of punishment: built in middle of town, imposing edifice, parade of prisoners, total visibility
      (3) no longer symmetry of vengeance as in ancien regime but the transparency of the sign
   (4) semi-technique (semiotics + the science of signs)
      (a) minimal quantity -- since crime is taking an advantage must link crime to a greater disadvantage
      (b) sufficient ideality -- since worst pain is psychological therefore the representation of pain more important than pain itself
      (c) rule of lateral effects -- it suffices to make others believe that the law-breaker has been punished
      (d) rule of certitude -- written and public codes
      (e) rule of common truth -- penal code must be homogenous with all truth (psychiatry for example -- see Foucault's *Pierre Riviere*)
   (f) rule of optimal specialization
      (1) code sufficiently precise so that each type of infraction is clearly present
      (2) individualization of the criminal and the crime is necessary to determine the profound nature of the criminal (the nature of his will) and to match appropriate method of reform to the particular criminal
   (5) see for example F.M. Vernell's *Essay on reformation of criminal legislation* (1781):
      (a) those who abuse public liberty will be deprived of theirs (b) theft :: confiscation
      (c) libel :: humiliation
      (d) murder :: execution
      (e) the worst crime is patricide therefore hang the offender in a cage above the public square and keep him there as a living sign of the worst crime and punishment
   (b) The System of Correction (prison as reformatory and penitentiary)
      (1) La Maison de Force de Gend (Flanders) -- organized prison around economic imperatives -- give prisoner taste for work since laziness causes crime
      (2) New Prison in Gloucester (England) -- after losing American War England could not longer deport law-breakers to America (e.g. Georgia) and began to think about uses of the jails for putting people into isolation for soul-searching and reconstruction of conscience and desire to work
      (3) Walnut Street (1790) -- in Philadelphia, continually
reformed until 1830 -- founded by Quakers to reconstruct
their own man -- in all their benevolence the Quakers invented
solitary confinement so that the 'hardened' could be alone
to discover the inner light -- the 'crime' kept secret, known
only to the wardens and the invention of the criminal dossier
(reports on the prisoners, accumulated in a file for use
of wardens, police, parole officers, future employers) -- like
all the prison reformers' the Quakers wanted most of all to
prevent recidivism -- Quakers frequently had a lot of property
(e.g. the Cadbury's in England)

Conclusion: the modern prison a synthesis of the concepts and
practice of the penal city and the correction system

Note: recidivism, the size of the underworld or what some would
call the criminal class, has steadily increased since the
establishment of the prison system -- at the same time
the police force and the secret intelligence agencies have
increased in exact proportion as the criminal class

Questions:
(1) Why does the prison system continue to exist after it has
been demonstrated over and over again that the prison system fails
to accomplish what it is supposed to i.e. rehabilitation,
control of recidivism, sign of efficient and equitable punishment,
an open society
(2) Does confinement ennoble human beings?
(3) What is the nature of surveillance on the watched?
(4) Why do we necessarily associate crime and punishment?
(5) Who design the prisons?
(6) What are the different kinds of prisons in America?
(7) What other methods of punishment do you find in other societies?
(8) Is the concept of plea-bargaining under attack?
(9) Is the concept of parole under attack?
(10) What are the differences between the Gulag Archipelago in the
Soviet Union and the Prison System in Europe and America?
(11) Why does the California prison have a higher number of prisoners within its borders?
the act of divisions

discipline or line with distribution of individuals in space
(a) closure - enclosure (cloister) - eg., factory - prevent
        theft, supervision, economical, etc.
(b) quadrangle - to each place in each emplacement an
        individual - avoid groups - can watch each, presence and
        absence, discipline organizes an analytic space.
(c) functional placing - useful space to be
        -enforced hospital the model first only medicine then
        solutions for the sick - thus tableau of administrative
        and elementary space, articulated on a therapeutic one
        -infinitaries which expand at end of 18th more complex division
        of labor - role, prestige, importance, etc., watched
(d) each place interchangeable - not unit of territory (unit of
        dimension) nor unit of residence - place but rank in order
        colleges of the Jesuits: small groups, Roman Catholics - ie.,
        for grades; hierarchy of knowledge and capacities (before
        study worked with a teacher and then off on his own) now control
        of each and simultaneous work of all - mechanical, functional,
        hierarchical
- importance of the tableaux in science, technology, politics,
  economics of the 18th techniques of power and procedure of
  knowledge - but in naturalism links character to category,
  but in tactics of discipline singular to the multiple
  -control of activity
  (1) use of time - monastery spread rapidly to colleges, workshops,
      hospitals - influence of great Protestant armies in 17th - much
      more monasteries measured in minutes
  (2) more important in terms of power - temporal elaboration of the
      act, early 17th marching in file to drum - by late 18th steps
      measured and whole form of body - each movement measured
      (3) correlation of body and gesture - all parts of body must be used
  (4) articulation of body/object - rapport between body and object
  (5) exhaustive utilization - before negative principle of not working
      but discipline-positive - thus the old 18th idea of the mechanical
      given way to the natural organism as army corps of exercise rather
      than speculative physics; manipulated by authority rather than
      traversed by animal; useful discipline not rational/mechanical
      - ie., before circulation of blood stopped by discipline - now
      as a natural machine. Thus discipline has for a correlative an
      individuality not only analytical and cellular but natural and
      organic.

The Organization of genesis

1669 did create Sobelins - school: 3 classes - developed in
1677 method to take charge of the time of singular
instances, to integrate rapport of time with body and energy; assure
commission and discretion to capitalize the time of each, circulation
of each as a group susceptible to control

1. divide duration into segments, successive or parallel of
   which each must lead to a specific term - eg, practice for
   18th not only as real, present force but technique and knowledge which could project its schemes on the
   social body - strategy between states, tactics within the state for
   the expansion of the perfect society; historians of ideas have looked at philos-
   phers and jurists in 18th but also a military dream of society; Founder no

- same division in schooling - each division with subdivisions,
  minute.

- idea of genesis simple original focus of society and
  genesis of the individuals 2 great themes. Correlated with new
  techniques - macro and micro - integration in a
  temporal division, unified, continuous, cumulative, exercise of
  control and practice of domination - dynamic evolution replaces
  dynastic of solenom events
- idea of early graduated program for students appeared first in
  18th
  - L'Écart (Jean-Jacques Rousseau), La vie de la cité
  19th
  - Life = perfection toward exemplar becomes in the
    authoritarian perfection under professor - more and
    more rigorous special exercises to tasks of increasing complexity
    from the necessity to series before salvation became in most
    inverted economic time of life, accumulates time under a useful form, admis-
    stration

The Composition of Energies (Focus)

Invention of the rifle (faster than musket) thus disappearance of
the focus for a geometry of divisible segments, at the base of which
had been the mobile soldier - same problem on production effect must
be superior to the sum of the elementary forces which compose it.
A machine of which the effect will be to maximize through concerted
articulation of elementary pieces of which it is composed, several
ways (maniere)

1. singular body becomes an element to place, move, articulate on
   all the others - its power no longer the principle variable which
   defines it but the place it occupies, the interval it covers, the
   regularity, the good order to which it operates its displacemen-
   tions, i.e., the functional reduction of the body - overlapping
   networks, multisegmented machine

2. order of time sequence - maximization of individual body
   in time and combination with others. Servan Ordinaire, May 6
   1755 = dream of a military apparatus which would cover whole
   territory of nation and each would be occupied without interruption
   but in different manner with regard to evolving segments,
   general sequence which it finds; veterans to recruiting; mid
   18th factories too - and schools, like Lancaster: each level
   in turn teaches one below it - instead of one on one, master teach
   all at same time.

3. precise system of orders - not just instruction but receiving the
   signal - soldier smallest unit - La de Bouzanville LE ROI
   WILLIAM, 1770: indolently greatest crime of soldier - in school
   verbal orders

Thus discipline of the body - individuality endowed with formal character.

1. cellular (same of spatial divisions) techniques, table
2. organic (code of activities) techniques - maneuvers
3. genetic (codification of time) techniques - exercises
4. combinative (combination of forces) techniques - tactics

Tactics not advanced of the disciplines - discipline not by J.A. de
Guibert. Essai general de tactique, 1772.

War as a strategy must be the continuation of politics - politics find
manifest in 18th not only as real, present force but technique and knowledge which could project its schemes on the
social body - strategy between states, tactics within the state for
the expansion of the perfect society; historians of ideas have looked at philos-
phers and jurists in 18th but also a military dream of society; Founded no
in the state of nature, but in the idea of the machine
not primitive contract, but permanent coercion
not grounded in rights but in department
not respect for the general will but rather to automatic docility

Examples:
(1) Gilbert: we must create a national discipline
(2) Bonaparte: we must follow the example of imperial Rome: the
discipline of the legion and the imperial law — thus the
French Army and the Napoleonic Code

THE MEANS OF GOOD DEPORTMENT — fabricates the individual who is the
object and the instrument of the exercise of the body
(1) The Hierarchical Surveillance — apparatus or techniques which
depend on rising grades of surveillance — Age of Reason
invented many techniques (microscope, surveillance patrols
in schools) but subtle extension in the nineteenth century —
power then became less corporal than physical
(2) Normalization sanction — system of micropunishments (grades in
school, medals and ranks in military etc.)
(a) marks act in context of ensemble of comparisons, spaces
of differentiation
(b) differentiate individuals from each other
(c) measure in hierarchy and quantitative terms the capacities and
accomplishments of individuals
(d) mark play across this spectrum the constraints of conformity
(e) trace the limit which defines difference through the
rapport with other differences thus establishing the exterior
frontier of the abnormal
(3) Examinations — combines hierarchy and normalization, truth and
power together — the manner in which politics established in the
human sciences — exists in one form or another in schools,
army, hospital, prison etc. — performance principle — allows
teacher, captain, doctor etc. to place every individual into a
documentary field leaving behind a record — each individual
as a case history

THE EMERGENCE OF THE DISCIPLINARY REGIME (the inversion of the feudal
political axis of individualization)

Feudal regime

Individual is maximum at point where
superior power exercised, more power
and privilege one has the more
rituals, discourse and plastic
representation

Disciplinary regime

The opposite of the feudal:
more power: more
anonymous and functional, but
under power: more
individualized through
surveillance rather
than ceremonies

In literature: the noble deed
jousting
epic and romance

Political theory:
the individual a soul with
certain social privileges

Pregenitors of the disciplinary regime:
(1) response to the plague in the seventeenth century: closed space, town
divided according to the quadrillage (+), surveyed at all points,
least movement controlled, all events registered — just as the
leper provided the first general ritual of exclusion, so the
plague that of the disciplinary scheme
(2) political dream of purity and social discipline by controlling
relationships and preventing dangerous mixing
(3) two images of discipline
(a) the closed institution with negative function
(b) the discipline machine with positive function

Modern history: the functional inversion of discipline from negative to
positive
(1) military discipline to prevent pillage and desertion became a
technique for organizing army — begins in 17th century with armies
of William of Orange and Gustavus Adolphus
(2) disciplinary mechanisms
(a) Christian schools begin to apply it not just to quiet down
students but as a comprehensive method of control e.g.
informing parents by using grading system, if a child absent
ask the neighbors — Jesuits start subdividing schools into
classes with competitions between them
(b) military hospitals and state hospitals more and more a medical
surveillance of population — previous to this benevolent
associations had for a long time the purpose of controlling
the population by watching the poor, giving incentives to work,
religious conversion
(3) the State gradually takes over the mechanisms of discipline -- before state control the religious sects (e.g., the Methodists in England) have the function of public discipline -- in France the police rapidly assumed this function -- immense archives in church and police records.

Antiquity = society of spectacle
Modernity = the reverse of antiquity since the State interferes in every detail of social life
The junction of Antiquity and Modernity (1) Napoleon (2) Bentham's Panopticon

The formation of the disciplinary regime is part of a larger historical process:

(1) economic developments
(a) population growth led to floating populations so discipline tries to fix it, control it
(b) increase in complexity of production lead to the development of discipline -- production/profit system uses discipline
(c) utility of all elements in the system
(d) great economic discontinuity in the West -- accumulation of capital through political power the accumulation of people -- both processes of accumulation work together
(e) production is a violence we do to things

(2) juridical/administrative structures -- the philosophers who discovered liberty (Rousseau, Jefferson etc.) also invented discipline -- bourgeoisie take control of it but along with their domination goes the independent production of disciplinary schemes and mechanisms

(3) science -- hospital, asylum, barracks, public school, factory, office etc. have not only been put into order by discipline, they have become the apparatus where the mechanism of objectification occurs, the very mechanism which makes knowledge possible

POWER PRODUCES KNOWLEDGE

Questions:
(1) Is the prison made possible the emergence of criminology then what discipline of knowledge was brought into being by the public school? the mental asylum? the army base? the factory? the nuclear family?
(2) What is the relationship between the emergence of the disciplinary regime and the emergence of fascism in the twentieth century?
(3) How can a system of exclusion be superimposed upon a system of inclusion?
(4) Why is there so much sameness in modern societies?
(5) Has the individual gained or lost control over his/her body since the institution of the disciplinary regime?
(6) What are some points of comparison between molecular biology and political anatomy?
(7) In what ways is production a violence we do to things?

THE EARLY FOUCAULT

Foucault's early works were directed against all efforts to reduce man to homo natura, to derive the meaning of being human exclusively from biochemical, neurological, or instinctual structures. Not that human nature is unimportant, but a complete knowledge of man must also comprise an analysis of human existence, the presence of the world for each individual. Foucault placed his emphasis on the Lebenswelt, the lived world of each person, and on the unique set of significations an individual's experience of the world offers to the philosopher and the psychologist. For such an analysis of existence, Foucault collapsed the distinction between psychology and philosophy. He opened up a world of experience which reveals both the trajectories of liberation and the repetitiveness of fixations. He united psychoanalysis and existential philosophy: Freud and Lacan were yoked to Husserl and Heidegger. In his effort to fuse two major contemporary perspectives on the human condition Foucault followed the example of Ludwig Binswanger, the Swiss psychiatrist who remained faithful to Freud while incorporating the insights of phenomenology. It was therefore entirely fitting that Foucault's first published work was a lengthy introduction to the French translation of Binswanger's Drama and Existence, just as it was appropriate that Foucault's English counterpart, R. D. Laing, dedicated his first work, The Divided Self, to the same Ludwig Binswanger.

Foucault's first two works were published in 1954. An introduction to Binswanger's Drama and Existence, which we will designate as the Treatise on Drama, and Melancholic Menteal and Psychologic (Mental Illness and Psychology) were both dedicated to the task of enhancing Freudian psychotherapy with an
analytic of existence. As perspective as they were neither treatise prepared the world for the enormous range, erudition, and impact of Foucault's next work, *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (1961), which was translated into English from the considerably abridged French popular paperback edition as *Madness and Civilization*. To use a Hegelian category, *Histoire de la folie* stands apart as a world-historical book. Like the first two works it explored the limitations of our culture and our psychotherapy, both of which fail to consider the total lived world of the individual. Foucault demonstrated how this deficiency arose from the intellectual and institutional conditions which brought psychiatry and contemporary conceptions of man into being. *Histoire de la folie* forms with the *Treatise on Dreams* and *Mental Illness and Psychology* a family of works which share the central concern of expanding our awareness of the ways in which we can perceive individuals intersubjectively as persons rather than as objects for scientific dissection, or moral condensation, or political manipulation.

The *Treatise on Dreams* amplifies our understanding of persons by concentrating on the expressive capacities of the individual. Dreams constitute one of the major indices of the manner in which we insert ourselves in the world. They indicate the significant directions of our existence and our fixations on certain images. Freud gave us a method of dream interpretation which unravels the meaning of dream images, the words they body forth, the fantasies they play out, the wishes they conceal and reveal. Foucault does not deny the validity of Freud's interpretation of dreams, but he claims that it does not circumscribe the total world in which the dream disports itself. By seeing the dream image as a network of symbols which can be decoded according to a preconceived scheme Freud does not allow the images to speak for themselves or to collage themselves into a world of lived space and expressive acts. What is needed to complete the Freudian interpretation of dreams is a theory of the imagination and a grammar of dreams. This will enable the individual to read his dreams as revelations of the grounding of his existence in the world.

"When consciousness sleeps, existence awakens." Foucault credits Binswanger with this insight and he aims to expand the phenomenological method of dream interpretation. In this effort Foucault gives us first an analysis of Freud's achievement in the interpretation of dreams with its further developments in the work of Melanie Klein and Jacques Lacan, a history of philosophical perspectives on dreams from Heraclitus to Schelling; a method of reading dreams as oracles of our destiny and coordinates of our lived space; a discussion of Husserl's semantics and the value of an analytic of existence for dream interpretation; a new theory of the imagination and an original interpretation of literary genres; finally a way of enriching psychotherapy with a phenomenological interpretation of dreams. All these topics converge upon the overriding purpose of making us aware of the dream as an expression of our orientation in the world. The dream allows us to placate anxiety and to liberate ourselves from fixations. Three aspects of Foucault's treatment of dreams will occupy us here: the measurement of the spatial coordinates and the literary equivalents of dreams; the place of the dream in the efforts of the person to gain a sense of authenticity; a psychotherapy which uses the dream to liberate the imagination fixated on persistent images.

When Foucault surveys a dream he measures the spatial dimensions, the atmospheric pressures, and the infusions of light within the frame of imagined
experience. The dream constitutes a form of expression with analogues in literature and painting. First the horizontal dynamic power of the dream moves on the axis 'near to far'. The dreamer carries himself in some direction either traveling inward or projecting himself outward. The journey can be into the past or toward some wishful future. Like Odysseus the dreamer can travel to all kinds of kingdoms. The near-to-far axis in the dream world corresponds to the epic in literature and both can be read in terms of the need for separation and movement from sources of unhappiness or inertia toward an imagined space of freedom. The dream epic comprises the tug of nostalgia, cycles of repetition, return and new departure. The second device for assaying the world of the dreamer registers the chiaroscuro, the tonalities of light and shade in the landscape of the dream. The graphics of Goya alert us to the subtleties of this mode of analysis. Rather than being directional like the horizontal axis, the play of light possesses the character of seasonal change and corresponds to the literary mode of lyricism. Thirdly, and most important, the vertical axis coordinates the motions of ascent (up and fall). It is the tragic dimension. The weight pulling the dreamer earthward might indicate a fall from the fragile summit of wishful thinking. Or a feeling of heaviness in the dream could refer to the burden of death crushing the individual like the leaden cloaks on the backs of the hypocrites in Dante's Hell. Conversely, the feeling of weightlessness, of flying through the air could designate a false sense of transcendence, the morbid immobility of total floating. The vertical axis always signifies the firmness or the fragility of the dreamer's grounding in the world.

Freud mistook the fundamental significance of the dream when he considered it a regression to an archaic image, a repressed wish, or an inherited myth. For Foucault the dream in the final analysis is not "a modality of the imagination but the first condition of possibility. Through what it imagines consciousness aims at the original movement which unfurls itself in the dream. Dreaming is then not a singular way of imagining strongly and vividly. On the contrary to imagine is to aim itself to itself (en viser soi-même) in the moment of dreaming; it is dreaming itself dreaming." Foucault distinguishes between the image and the imagination. The former is only a primitive fixation derived from memory. He agrees with Sartre's observation the Psychology of the Imagination that the image constitutes a magical incantation with the aim of conjuring up something absent. The image represents the defeat of the imagination. One recalls Proust's distinction between the dead scales of memory invoked by picture postcards and the pulsations of life prompted by an awakened involuntary memory. Foucault formulates a theory similar to Coleridge's distinction between fancy and imagination, the former a mechanical yoking of images based on superficial analogies, the latter an integrative power which seeks identity. Ezra Pound's description of the imagination also resembles Foucault's: "the imagination breaks down familiar analogies, set moods, set ideas."

The dreamer must learn to free himself from the fixation of images and to release the imagination so that it can move with smooth alacrity as in reverie. Poetry and dreams work in a similar manner; both should shatter the fascination with a particular image and liberate the imagination so it can ground and integrate experience in an open, progressive, living manner. It is the difference between a series of photographic stills and a motion picture. "The dream is the fundamental moment when the movement of existence finds the decisive point of separating (du partage) the images where it attains itself in a subjective pathology and the expression where it accomplishes itself in an historical objective. The imagination is the milieu, the element of this choice. One can
then rejoin at the heart of the imagination the significance of the dream, reconstitute the fundamental form of existence, while it manifests the liberty, designates happiness and grief since unhappiness always inscribes itself in alienation and happiness in the empirical can only be the happiness of expression."

Thus the age-old trust in the dream as portent is reestablished. Dreams not only fulfill desires and uncover the naked heart but they announce the future, "restore in its authentic sense the movement of liberty, the development and totality of existence itself. Dreaming is not only another way of having the experience of another world, it is for the subject which dreams the radical manner of making the experience of his world, an existence which announced itself as being the world." If the same montage and axial movements keep occurring the dreamer exposes his inability to accept death and to adapt to mortality of life. Since the dream images forth the fundamental orientation of the dreamer, his grounding in the world, in this way it indicates the direction of the future. "Death is the absolute sense of the dream." Since death is the completion of life, the full plentitude of an individual's existence, the dream reveals the degree to which the subject accepts his life and its steady movement toward full accomplishment. The dream can also signify self-destructive alienation from life, repetition compulsion serving as a ritual placating the fear of life and death. Therapy should enable the subject to transform his dreams from nightmares of anguish into reveries of life ripening into death.

The Treatise on Dreams concentrates on the subtle ways an individual expresses his own particular posture toward the world. It behooves the analyst to detect in the dream the degree of uprootedness from lived experience and "the original movement and the significant directions of the subject's existence." Mental Illness and Psychology continued along this line of argument. It too brought existentialist psychology to bear on Freudian psychoanalysis. Foucault's second book aimed to sharpen our sensitivities toward individuals as persons rather than as agents who fit into some pre-established therapeutic scheme. "We must look at man himself and not to abstractions, analyze the specificity of mental illness, research the concrete forms that psychology has been able to assign to it, the determinate conditions which have made possible the strange regulation of madness." Foucault admitted that psychology will never be able to offer to psychiatry what physiology gives to medicine. First, the psychologist cannot delimit the problematic since all psychological dysfunctions affect the whole personality.

The coherence of a psychological life seems in effect assured in another way than the cohesion of an organism: integration of the elements toward a unity which makes each of them possible, but embodies and collects themselves in each. Psychological vocabulary borrows from phenomenology the "significant unity of the administration" which encloses in each element--dream, gratuitous gesture, free association--the general allure, the style, the historical anteriority and the eventual implications of an existence.

Moreover, there is no sharp distinction between normality and pathology as there is in organic medicine. Finally, the organic can be isolated for study, but the exploration of social milieus and contemporary practices act is necessary for the treatment of mental illness.

Because of these three differences one expects a different kind of abstraction from psychology than from physiology. As in the Treatise on Dreams, Foucault stresses the importance of considering the total lived space of the individual along with his capacity to integrate experience progressively into
Foucault calls such an approach to non-developmental psychology and discusses the contributions of Janet, Freud, Bleuler and others in the formulation of the discipline. For Freud, "neurosis is a spontaneous archology of the libido."

Foucault admits that the idea of a libido as a psychological substance which develops and is subject to regression has been discredited, but he still considers Freud's theory useful in understanding personality development. Janet viewed mental illness as the collapse of psychological energy which provokes a primitive or pre-social behavior. Life becomes too difficult, one long monologue where words and gestures lose their ordinary meaning and the social criteria of truth loses its validity. The theory of developmental psychology centers its attention on the places where ruptures of continuity occur, where consciousness becomes "disoriented, obscured, cramped, fragmented turbulence of elementary reactions and intense emotional reactions." Mental illness has then both a positive content which exalts simple, automatic functions and a negative impact which encompasses all the networks of instability, the suppression of complex functions. There occurs a regression to archaic structures in the individual and "the plurality of spatio-temporal coordinates permits conduct in blocks where the spaces are fragmented and the moments independent."

In its most general terms we recognize mental illness as impairment of affective contact with others, the inability to enter spontaneously into the emotional lives of others, and the loss of coherent patterns of association in speech and thought. The accumulation of research in developmental psychology authorizes greater specificity in the categorization of types of mental illness. Foucault provides a chart of the major types of mental illness:

| Neurosis: | The first degree of the dissolution of psychical functions which frees affective complexes, unconscious emotional schemes constituted during the course of individual evolution. |
| Paranoia: | frees an emotional structure which is only an exaggeration of ordinary behavior of the personality, but still has lucidity and coherence. |
| Oniroide: | structure of consciousness already dissociated and the control of reason is gone; the dream infiltrates consciousness. |
| Manic and Melancholia: | dissociation reaches the instinctive-affective sphere; the manical reverts to infantile emotional life whereas the melancholic experiences the loss of consciousness of the body and the drive toward self-preservation; the positive sign of both is the emotional explosion of euphoric agitation. |
| Schizophrenia: | a capital deficiency in deterioration, space/time becomes imprecise, fragmented; loss of affective contact with emotional lives of others and the impairment of normal associative coherent patterns of speech and thought; it takes the positive form of hallucinations, verbal schemes in incoherent syllables, brusque affective irritations leading to inertia. |
| Madness: | completes the cycle of pathological dissolution, abundance of negative signs, no personality only a living being. |

The scheme progresses through more and more serious impairments of the capacity to react creatively to experience, to enter into the lives of others, to think and speak in a coherent pattern, to accept evidence. But according to Foucault this scheme neglects the organization of the sick personality and the point of origin of the illness. Admittedly one of the signs of mental disturbance is the inability to make connections between the past and the future or to project the personality into the past or future. "But the chaos finds its point of coherence in the personal structure of the sick person which comprises the lived unity of his consciousness and horizon." Moreover, one must try to explain why the person falls into a particular illness, this or
that obsession or hallucination. Thus it is important to look at the history of the individual person, not just to the abstract evolution and regressions of the typical personality.

In drawing our attention to the individual quality of mental illness, Freud makes a capital distinction between history and evolution. "In evolution it is the past which promises the present and makes it possible; in history it is the present which detaches itself from the past and confers upon it a sense and makes it intelligible." Developmental psychology is both, but too often it stresses evolution over history or confuses them. It was Freud's genius to clarify the above distinction and to give both the evolution and the history of the personality its due. In the *Three Essays on Sexuality*, Freud created linguistic psychoanalysis which opened the domain where the psychology of individual history could be explored. Freud concerns himself with the way in which the individual reverts to archaic modes of behavior, or projects fantasies, or falls into obsessions and repetition compulsions as a defense against some present anguish. The living anguish of the individual is the key to understanding his history. The conflict which afflicts healthy individuals arises from the ambiguity of the situation whereas pathological conflict rests on ambivalence of experience. "All fear is the reaction against external danger; anguish is the affective dimension of this internal contradiction."

The reality of anguish constitutes the focal point where Freudian psychoanalysis, particularly Anna Freud's notion of psychological defense, and the insights of existentialism coincide. Through anguish psychological evolution becomes individual history. "The present on the point of raising up the ambivalence and anguish, provokes the game of neurotic protection." The sick person gets trapped in a monotonous circle. Therapy should enable him to discover ways to resolve the ambiguity of the situation, to overcome the ambivalence of his reactions and to integrate the evidence and practices yielded by experience. To the psychology of evolution one should add the psychology of genesis which "describes in a history the present sense of those regressions." Anguish continually stalks the sick person; it characterizes a personal style of experience, the very foundations of experience, the a priori of existence.

The *Treatise on Dreams* and *Mental Illness and Psychology* converge on a single point of view. The therapist should be attentive to the unique expressions of orientation toward life engendered by the individual person. Dreams reveal the sense of lived space and the trajectories of existence--near and far, up and down, radiant or obscured--while the present anguish of the individual manifests the principle and foundation of his existence. One should see the sick person he sees himself, which is to say that one must treat the sick intersubjectively. To accomplish this one neither invades the unconscious or surveys the lucidities of consciousness; rather one conducts an "allusive reconsideration, a diffuse perception of the morbid decor in the bed of which the pathological themes detach themselves." There one operates on two levels of apprehension. First one assembles the features of the illness into a peculiar style of living by penetrating to the core of the morbid universe as constituted and understood by the individual. It is very important to comprehend the manner in which the subject himself perceives and accepts the illness. We can experience his illness in the following ways: as an organic or pseudo-organic disturbance; as a contradiction in the present situation or a pervasive conflict in his setting; as a new and overwhelming
appearance of his illness as in the case of morbid jealousy; as detached elements which constitute a self-contained world pitted against reality thus placing the subject in two worlds; or as the experience of being devoured by the illness, which is lived as a dream-making reality inaccessible at the same time it is acknowledged to be there.

The second level of apprehension of the morbid decor of mental illness assesses the structures of the sick person’s world. This perspective encompasses the sense of lived time and space, the social and cultural points of reference and the experience of the body. The sense of time in the schizophrenic frequently oscillates between the sudden onset of anguish and the feeling of floating through eternity. In some cases of mental illness spatial awareness becomes opaque or objects become rigid and empty of meaning or the mind looks hopelessly into clear space with a horizon without perspective. In lived social relationships there can be the loss of effective contact with others who become strangers, symbols, entities, or masks. The body can come to weigh the person down like a cadaver or cease to be a center of reference. From the standpoint of a phenomenological description of the sick world there is no a priori distinction between the normal and the pathological, but illness takes the form of a strong and particular style of alienation and liberty, a privileged and fundamental experience of the world, a totally encompassing way of being in the world.

After describing the signs and structures of the morbid universe experienced by the mentally ill Foucault asks how it comes about that a culture excludes the sick, sets them apart, gives them a sense of their deviation and refuses to recognize in itself the same forms of mental illness it isolates and attempts to treat in its individuals. Foucault sketches an answer to these questions in the last part of Mental Illness and Psychology, an outline which constitutes a prolegomena to the full treatment of the matter in Madness and Civilization. The two major theses of the latter work are stated clearly and emphatically in the earlier. First, the three great themes of modern psychopathology—the relationship between liberty and automatism, the phenomena of regression and the infantile structure of conduct, and the problems of aggression and culpability—are all aspects of the “moral sadness in which the philanthropy of the nineteenth century encloses it under the hypocritical species of liberation. Psychiatry is only a thin pellicle on the ethereal surface of the ethical world where modern man finds his truth and loses it.” Second, it is necessary for us to open ourselves up to “the global structure of madness” and realize that psychiatry is useful for healing but it must not prevent us from encountering madness directly in its own terms and in its original language “as the perception of the world sufficiently near and far, reason recognizing itself as dividing in two and dispossessed of itself.” Regression is only an effect, not an origin. “The neurosis of regression does not manifest the neurotic nature of the child, but they [the symptoms] denounced the archaic character of the institutions which concern it.” Thus Foucault moves in the same direction as R. D. Laing, toward the study of the family, the asylum, and Western society as the loci of contradictions which drive people insane and as the repository of conventions, moralities, disciplines, authority-structures, and so-called therapies, which torment persons into mental illness and self-destructive strategies for survival. The politics of the family and the contradictions within and between power mechanisms reveal the limits and the repressed irrationalities of the surrounding culture. “There are social forms which do not permit the liquidation of the past and the assimilation of present experience. The life of the child is the death of the parents.”
To liberate difference we must attain thought without contradiction without dialectic, without negation: a thought which says yes to divergence; an affirmative thought in which the instrument is disjunction; a thought of the multiple -- of the dispersed and nomadic multiplicity which neither limits nor regroups the constraints of the Same; a thought which does not obey the scholar-model (which fakes the ready-made response) but which addresses itself to insoluble problems; that is to say to a multiplicity of extraordinary points which are displaced accordingly as conditions are distinguished in them, and which insists, subsists in a play of repetitions.

Michel Foucault, Theatrum Philosophicum

Observations

Man is but the shadow of a dream.
Hesiod

Wisdom consists in expecting the unexpected.
Heraclitus

Flee evil.
Lao Tsu.

Man -- uncanny creature.
Sophocles

The first will be last, the last first.
Jesus

States are but bands of robbers.
St. Augustine

There is no lack of a little.
Lucrèce

Time: I have the power in the self-same hour to make and overwhelm custom.
Shakespeare

All things excellent are rare and difficult.
Spinoza

Knowledge is power.
Bacon

Montaigne speaks too much about himself.
Pascal

Vanity is the greatest of flatterers.
La Rochefoucauld

Lost time.
Rousseau

God is love dispersing with itself.
Hegel

Energy is eternal delight.
Blake
Without music life would be a mistake.
Nietzsche

Praxis.
Marx

To explain it you must do it.
The Dodo (Lewis Carroll)

You too have weapons.
Kafka

Who asks the meaning of life is already a sick animal.
Reich

Humanism diminishes man.
Artaud

Imagination is power.
Graffiti/ Paris/ May '66

Write slogans. Write for those who do not read.
Deleuze/Guattari

Take an object/to something to it/to something else to it.
Jasper Johns

I like breathing best.
Duchamp

We must go home again.
Foucault

FILMS

All About Eve
The Awful Truth
Birth of a Nation
Blazing Saddles
Boy
Carnival of Souls
Contempt
Death Takes a Holiday (1933 version)
Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie
Forbidden Planet
Four Nights of a Dreamer
Fox and his Friends
The General
Hour of the Wolf
Itinerant Life (1934 version and 1954 remake)
Importance of Being Earnest
I've Always Loved You
Merchant of Four Seasons
Metropolis
Midnight Lace
Mystery of Kaspar Hauser
Night of the Living Dead
One Touch of Venus
Ortud
Outer Limits (First Series)
The Passenger
Pierre Riviére (Foucault version)
Princess Kwei Fei
Potemkin
Red Desert
Sansho the Bailiff
Satyricon
Silent Running
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Broadbent, Behavior
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Findlay, A., A Hundred Years of Chemistry


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Bataille, Death and Sexuality
Firestone, S., The Dialectics of Sex
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Jung, The Portable Jung (Viking Press)
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Reich, Wilhelm, Selected Writings (Farrar, Straus and Giroux)
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Sade, Juliet
__________, Philosophy in the Bedroom
Stone, Lawrence, Sex, Marriage and the Family
Tripp, Male Homosexuality

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STRUCTURALISM

Week 1: General Introduction
Reading: "David Robey, "Introduction," Structuralism (Oxford)
*Edmund Leach, "Structuralism in Social Anthropology", Structuralism, ed. Robey

Lecture: "The Significance of Structuralism"

Week 2: Philosophical Background
Reading: "Hegel, "Master/Slave," in Phenomenology of Mind
*Marx, The German Ideology
*Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Part I
Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy

Week 3: The Emergence of Social Science
Emile Durkheim, Selected Writings, ed. Giddens
Marcel Mauss, Sacrifice, Its Nature and Function
__________, The Gift. Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies
Ruth Benedict, Patoher at Culture

Panel Discussion: A panel composed of members of the departments of sociology, cultural anthropology and political science will discuss Gouldner’s The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology

Week 4: Structuralism in the Age of History (1800-1945)
Reading: Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, Part II

Week 5: Structuralism and Mathematics
Reading: "Jean Piaget, "Mathematics," in Structuralism
Ian Stewart, Concepts of Modern Mathematics (Penguin)
Lecture: "The Contribution of Mathematics to Structuralist Theory"

Week 6: Cultural Anthropology
Reading:
* Edmund Leach, Levi-Strauss
* Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology
* The Circle of Anthropology, ed., Conversations with Levi-Strauss
* Deleuze, "Savage, Barbarian, Civilized," in Anti-Oedipus

Conference: Levi-Strauss and his Critics. We will invite a group of cultural anthropologists from the southern California area to lead a symposium on the significance of Levi-Strauss for their discipline. We will also direct attention to a critique of Levi-Strauss.

Week 7: Linguistics
Reading:
* Saussure, from The Course in General Linguistics
* Tynanov and Jakobson, "Problems in the Study of Language and Literature"
* Jonathan Culler, The Linguistic Basis of Structuralism, in Structuralism, ed. Rabey
* Jonathan Culler, Structuralism and Post-Structuralism
* Robert Scholes, Structuralism in Literature
* Emile Benveniste, Problems of General Linguistics

Lecture: "Linguistics and Structuralism"

Week 8: Chomsky's Critique of Structuralism in Linguistics
Reading:
* Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind
* Reflections on Language
* David Peirce, Wittgenstein
* Noam Chomsky in the Modern Masters Series, ed. Kermode

Lecture: "The Significance of Chomsky for the Social Sciences"

Week 9: Political Science
Reading:
* Louis Althusser, For Marx
* Reading Capital
* Roland Barthes, Mythologies
* Nicolas Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Class

Lecture: "Structuralism and the New Social History"

Week 10: Psychology
Reading:
* Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child
* Structuralism
* Melanie Klein, Envy and Jealousy
* R.D. Laing, The Politics of the Family

Lecture: "Piaget and the Future of Child Psychology"

Week 11: Economics
Reading:
* Samuelson, Economics, Selections
* Wassily Leontief, Selected Writings

Lecture: "Structuralism and Contemporary Economic Theory"

Week 12: History
Reading:
* Peter Burke, ed., A New Kind of History
* Thomas Kuhn, The Origin of Scientific Revolutions, revised edition
* E.P. Lapierre, Interview in L'Express and issue of L'Arc devoted to his work

Lecture: "Structuralism and the New Social History"
Week 13: Methodology

Reading:  
  * Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato, The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man: The Structuralist Controversy
  * Roland Barthes, *S/Z*
  * Umberto Eco, "Social Life as a Sign System," in Structuralism, ed. Robey

Week 14: Post-Structuralism

Reading:  
  * Jacques Derrida, *Writing in English*
  * Lyotard, *Writing in English*
  * Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, Part 1

Exhibition: Structuralism and the Arts in America: From Op to P.S. 1

Week 15: Schizoanalysis

Reading:  
  * Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia
  * R.D. Laing, The Politics of Experience
  * Richard Evans, Interviews with R.D. Laing (Dutton)
  * Michel Foucault, Mental Illness and Psychology

Film: Werner Herzog's The Mystery of Kaspar Hauser

Conference: Schizoanalysis vs. Psychoanalysis: A series of lectures, exhibitions and discussions