Full Text (Criticism)

The Place of The Polis: Political Blindness in Judith Butler's Antigone's Claim
Stuart Elden. Theory & Event. Baltimore: 2005. Vol. 8, Iss. 1; 1 pgs

Full Text (10040 words)
Copyright Johns Hopkins University Press 2005

Introduction
1. Judith Butler's 1998 Wellek Library Lectures have been published as a short text entitled Antigone's Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death (2000a). This book makes a number of important and interesting suggestions, and throws out a challenge to some of the tradition's ways of reading Sophocles' Antigone. As such it is both a commentary on and criticism of scholarship on this text, and a contribution to that scholarship. At the same time Butler is able to move beyond the text in order to make a number of points that speak to her wider concerns. The argument here is that Butler neglects two crucial issues in her reading of the tragedy, place and community, both of which are explicitly related to the question of the polis. A reading which articulates the relation between these two issues is therefore well placed to provide a response to Butler's text, a response that has implications beyond the reading of Antigone itself.

2. My reading of Antigone's Claim in this paper moves through four stages. In the first I outline and discuss Butler's argument. Whilst I have some sympathies to her overall aim, my contention is that in trying to read relevance to contemporary debates back into Antigone she neglects the context of the text itself. Despite her interest in the play because it "poses questions about kinship and the state that recur in a number of cultural and historical contexts" (2000a, 2), she is inattentive to the shifting meaning of these terms, particularly that of the state.1 'State', which is accepted unproblematically as a translation of the word 'polis', is thought here in an entirely modern way. By suggesting that Antigone's defiance of the polis can be mirrored in contemporary debates about the state Butler commits an act of violence on the text. Or perhaps, in the terms in which she characterises other readings, this is her blindness (2000a, 5); a blindness to the political, a political blindness. The second part of the paper therefore critically discusses a range of literature that discusses the term of polis. Butler notes that "I am no classicist and do not strive to be one" (2000a, 2), and it would be a sad day if discussion of texts such as Antigone were confined to classicists. However, one does not need to be a classicist to recognise that certain key terms of Greek thought are irreducible to a simple English rendering. As Loraux notes, important work is being done in freeing antiquity from pre-established - that is, modern - conceptions (1981a, vii). Instead of the modern notion of the state I suggest that polis functions both as a place, a site, and the embodiment of the humans within it, close to our modern notion of community. In the third part, drawing on critical literature, variant translations and ultimately the Greek text itself, I attempt to think through how Antigone functions with a notion of polis at its core. In the final part I make some tentative suggestions about how this might be useful in resituating contemporary issues, and indeed, provide a basis for strengthening Butler's claims.

Reading Butler Reading Antigone
3. Butler suggests, at the very outset, that the reason she began to think about Antigone was when she wondered:

What happened to those feminist efforts to confront and defy the state. It seemed to me that Antigone might work as a counterfigure to the trend championed by recent feminists to seek the backing and authority of the state to implement feminist policy aims (2000a, 1).

4. Butler suggests that the point of Antigone's defiance may be missed in these contemporary feminist accounts (2000a, 1). But can Antigone be seen as someone who challenges the state in any simple way? This, it seems, was Butler's initial aim, and had been claimed by Elshtain (1982), but when researching the book she found "something different from what I had first anticipated" (2000a, 2). For Butler - and this in some sense is the heart of the book - the representative function of Antigone herself is in crisis, and therefore she is problematic as a representative for different political aims (2000a, 2). Despite claims that Antigone represents kinship, and the importance of the family (Knox 1964, 76-82; Segal 1986, 145; Elshtain, 1982; Hegel 1952/1977), for Butler Antigone is an example of what might be called "kinship trouble" (2000a, 62).

5. Butler notes that what struck her first was the way Antigone had been read by Hegel, Lacan, Irigaray and others not as a political figure, whose defiance has political implications, but rather as one who articulates a prepolitical opposition to politics, representing kinship as the sphere that conditions the possibility of politics without ever entering into it (2000a, 2).

6. For Hegel, according to Butler, Antigone comes to represent kinship and its dissolution, and Creon comes to represent an emergent ethical order and state authority based on principles of universality (2000a, 3).

7. Kinship and the state are the opposed poles. For Irigaray:

The insurrectionary power of Antigone is the power of that which remains outside the political; Antigone represents kinship, and indeed the power of 'blood' relations...... Antigone thus signifies for Irigaray the transition from the rule of law based on maternity, a rule of law based in kinship, to a rule of law based on paternity (Butler 2000a, 3-4).

8. The political is thus equated with the law; kinship is apolitical. Irigaray's context, argues Butler, is set by Hegel, who calls Antigone "the eternal irony of the community [die ewige Ironie des Gemeinwesens]" (Hegel 1952, 340; 1977, 288). (There is an ambiguity or difficulty with the translation of Gemeinwesen as 'community', to which I will return later.) Butler characterises this as suggesting that "she is outside the terms of the polis, but she is, as it were, an outside without which the polis could not be" (2000a, 4). Thus kinship is seen as apolitical, prepolitical, but constitutive of the political. Kinship is apolitical in that it is separate (and opposed to) the political. It is prepolitical because before politics there was kinship. And yet it is constitutive of the political because it sets up precisely the same sorts of relations that the political sphere makes more general and concrete.

9. Butler notes that:

The ironies are no doubt more profound than Hegel understood: after all, she speaks, and speaks in public, precisely when she ought to be sequestered in the private domain. What sort of political speech is this that transgresses the very boundaries of the political, which sets into scandalous motion the boundary by which her speech ought to be contained? (2000a, 4)
10. Such a characterisation rests upon an equation of the political with the public, even as Butler seeks to problematise and exceed it. Antigone's actions should be private, but are made public. Butler claims that for Hegel Antigone figures the threshold between kinship and the state, a transition in the Phenomenology that is not precisely an Aufhebung, for Antigone is surpassed without ever being preserved when ethical order emerges (2000a, 5).

11. Antigone blurs the polar opposites of kinship and the state, but though she plays a key role in Hegel's account of the transition from familial to broader ethical order she is marginalised and excluded from that order.

12. Butler clearly wants to problematise the relationship between kinship and the state: Not only does the state presuppose kinship and kinship presuppose the state but 'acts' that are performed in the name of one principle take place in the idiom of the other (2000a, 11).

13. Equally she wants to suggest that though the Hegelian legacy is to assume their separability, it can only do so on the basis of an essential relation between them (2000a, 5, 10). However, both of these moves rest on an assumption of what the state is. In terms of the play, Butler effectively challenges the assumption that Antigone can be thought of as a straight-forward representative of kinship (daughter of an incestuous bond, in a near incestuous relationship with her brother, ambiguous in terms of gender) and persuasively argues that Creon is not solely an embodiment of the state (his position is due to succession of a kinship line [see 174], and he departs from state norms through his actions). The relationship between Creon and Antigone is not separate, as it is in play throughout the text, and the context of each is set through the relation to the other (Butler 2000a, 5). And yet, Butler's notion of the state remains static, despite the fact that the word used in Antigone, and at times in her own work, is 'polis'.

14. For example, in Butler, there is a simple progression from defying the law - defying the king - to defying the state.

In defying the state, she repeats as well the defiant act of her brother, thus offering a repetition of defiance that, in affirming her loyalty to her brother, situates her as the one who may substitute for him and, hence, replaces and territorialises him (2000a, 11; see 2004, 168).

15. Elsewhere she criticises Lévi-Strauss and Lacan because "the state makes no appearance" (2000a, 12) in their readings, clearly implying that the notion of the state is central to understanding the text. Indeed, she suggests

For Hegel, kinship belongs to the sphere of cultural norms, but this sphere must be viewed in a subordinate relationship to the state, even as the state is dependent on this structure of kinship for its own emergence and maintenance (2000a, 12, see 29).

16. For Butler, Antigone

Attempts to speak in the political sphere in the language of sovereignty that is the instrument of political power. Creon makes his proclamation and asks that his guards make sure that everyone knows his words. 'These are the rules by which I make our city great' (190) (2000a, 27).

17. We have here the introduction - through a citation of a translation - of another word commonly used for polis, 'city'. And yet very quickly there is another slippage: this time between city and polis, and then without much pause, to the state. Butler continues:
What this suggests is that she cannot make her claim outside the language of the state, but neither can the claim she wants to make be fully assimilated by the state (2000a, 28).

18. Her claim on behalf of kinship is simultaneously made possible by, and challenges, the state. It is this contrast - and yet at the same time a parasitic relation - between kinship and state that is at the heart of Butler's concerns. She approvingly notes Lacan's claim that Hegel errs in the Phenomenology by claiming that Antigone reveals a "clear opposition...... between the discourse of the family and that of the state". For Lacan, "things are much less clear" (Lacan 1992, 236 cited in Butler 2000a, 46). Butler suggests we must ask

Does Antigone''s death signal the supersession of kinship by the state, the necessary subordination of the former to the latter? Or is her death precisely a limit that requires to be read as that operation of political power that forecloses what forms of kinship will be intelligible, what kinds of lives can be countenanced as living? (2000a, 29).

19. Butler wants to show that thinking Antigone as a representative of kinship and Creon as an embodiment of the state is problematic, and that the differentiation of kinship and the state is nowhere near as clear as Hegel would have us believe. Actually, reading Hegel, we get the sense that it is not as clear for him either. The reading in the Phenomenology of Spirit is one thing,5 but in the lectures on aesthetics he is more equivocal. Hegel suggests that the tension between Antigone and Creon is not simply between kinship and the state, but that political loyalties are important to Antigone; and family ones to Creon. That is, the tension is within each, and is played out internally before they confront each other (1986, Band 15 p. 549; 1920 Vol IV p. 324). It is only after an internal struggle that Antigone can be seen to reverence the "ties of blood, the gods of the underworld" and Creon "Zeus, the paramount power of public life and the commonwealth [Gemeinwohls]" (1986, Band 15 p. 544; 1920 Vol IV p. 318).6 Knox (1964, 76-90) and Bradley (1962) are far more polarised. This aside, despite her wish to blur distinctions, to effect a deconstructive move that shows the parasitic relation between seemingly dichotomous terms, Butler still accepts that Antigone is the constitutive element of the political. Constitutive, that is not part of, but necessary for, the establishment of the political. Kinship presupposes the state, and state presupposes kinship. Butler assumes this distinction and wants to blur it. But is there a distinction at all in the play, which can be thrown into question, and shown to be problematic or parasitic? Or is the very vocabulary of 'kinship' and, especially, 'state' reading a modern problematic into the text? If there is no term in the text which can be simply rendered as 'state', what precisely is the tension and parasitic relation between? My suspicion is that the opposition is one between a king and his niece, between loyalties to family and the community, another dichotomy perhaps, but one which operates in a different way to that which Butler argues against, and one within a wider realm of what might today be thought of as the political.

20. In a revealing passage, Butler points out that there is an ambiguity in Antigone's burial of Polyneices. She cites a passage from Oedipus at Colonus, where Oedipus asks "will they even shroud my body in Theban soil?" (406). Because of his crimes this is impossible, and he is buried out of sight, and out of site, by Theseus (see Edmunds 1996).

Then, Antigone, in the play of that name, mime the act of the strong and true Theseus and buries her brother out of sight, making sure that Polyneices's shade is composed of Theban dust. Antigone''s assertive burial, which she performs twice, might be understood to be for both, a burial that once reflects and institutes the equivocation of brother and father. They are, after all, already interchangeable for her, and yet her act re institutes and re elaborates that interchangeability (Butler 2000a, 60-1).
21. Elsewhere, Butler claims that the invocation of the notion of brother taking precedence over the decree of Creon is ambiguous, as there is nothing "that can successfully restrict its scope of referentiality to the single person, Polyneices" (2000a, 77, see 79). It could refer to Oedipus or Eteocles. To make this perfectly explicit, consider two points: Oedipus is both father and brother to Antigone, as they share a mother in Jocasta (2000a, 57); and though the burial of Polyneices is "out of sight", it is not out of site, for it is within the bounds of the polis of Thebes.

Polis - Place and Community

22. Now it is clear that the term Butler is referring to when she invokes the notion of the 'state' is polis. When, in the translation she uses, Creon talks of the 'city' this too is a rendering of polis. But both of these translations, these trans-lations, are carryings-across, the transfer of a Greek concept into a modern idiom, or, a modern notion used to comprehend the Greek. As Heidegger has persuasively argued, to read modern notions of the political back into Greek thought is problematic. Our understanding of the political is derived from the polis, but has been developed and affected over time, and so we cannot use a modern notion of the political to understand the polis (see Heidegger 1983/1959; 1982; Elden 2000).

23. The distinctions between Greek conceptions of the polis and modern ones of the state are helpfully outlined by Cartledge (2000, 17-18). For Cartledge, the contrasts are the direct, unmediated, participatory character of political action in Greece; the lack of any Hegelian style civil society; the lack of separation of powers; no real sense of sovereignty; and no parties, opposition, police force, or individual rights (see also Reeve 1996, 245). State therefore seems to be a problematic translation, because the tendency is to think it in terms of modern states (see Manville 1990, 36-8). As Castoriadis notes, the Greek polis is not a 'State' in the modern sense. The very term State does not exist in ancient Greek (characteristically, modern Greeks had to invent a word, and they used the ancient κρατζ?, which means 'sheer force') (1996, 46).

24. City is likewise problematic, because of our modern understanding of what a city is. A polis would necessarily have some rural areas because of a need to feed its inhabitants, and though the urban area would generally be the focus, the term polis does not simply mean the urban centre (Manville 1990, 42, 93).

25. What then was the polis? For Nicole Loraux, a polis is a "group of citizens established on its territory". There are therefore two key elements in defining a polis: land or territory (khôra), and men (andres) (Loraux 1996, 49-50; see 1981a, 450 n.35). Loraux's two part definition seems useful. On the one hand, the polis is a site or a place, a definite location on a map. In Plato's Laws, for example, in the discussion between the Athenian and Kleinias concerning the founding of a polis, the first key issue is the place where it is to be situated. The Athenian asks whether it is on the sea or inland, about its harbour, about the surrounding land, and if there is a neighbouring polis (1902/1970, 704; see Morrow 1960, 30, 95; Strauss 1975, 54). For Starr, "physically the polis was a definite geographical unit, in which public activities were concentrated at one point, the asty or polis proper" (1962, 338). Manville's discussion too shows that the polis had important urban and rural attributes, but he also explicitly links it to the notion of citizenship, which is one of the ways he suggests politeia can be rendered. And this duality is also found in Plato's Laws when after that of the place the discussion turns to the inhabitants (Plato 1902/1970, 707-8). For Manville the political apparatus of the 'state' and the notion of a 'citizen body' are both at stake in the definition of the polis: citizenship [politeia], which also means constitution, and the polis were interdependent (Manville 1990, 6; Reeve 1996, 245).
The polis therefore, whilst certainly encompassing a political apparatus we would today think of as akin to the state, did not see that political apparatus controlling or policing a separate citizen body. In many places we find the community aspect stressed over the geographical. An extreme form of the argument, which almost disregards the territory, is found in Finley (1982). There is some justification for this in classical writers. Thucydides claims that "men make the polis, not walls or a fleet of crewless ships", which follows the argument that soldiers make a polis wherever they encamp (Thucydides 1954, VII 77). A similar point is made by Aeschylus, in the Persians, when he suggests that while men remain to a polis its defences are secure (Aeschylus 1996, 347).10 That said, the notion of autochthony - of being born from the very soil of the place they inhabit - was extremely important in both Athens and Thebes (Loraux 1981b, 1996; Saxonhouse 1986). However their relative importance may be seen, it thus seems evident that notions of place and community need to be born in mind when thinking of the polis. Manville's summary definition is useful: "The Greek polis was a politically autonomous community of people living in a defined territory comprising a civic centre with surrounding arable countryside" (1990, 53; see Bradley 1991, 14-15). The polis was a community with governmental features, within a demarcated area or place.11

Heidegger's own reading of the polis fits well into this understanding. This is that the polis is "neither merely state [Staat], nor merely city [Stadt], rather in the first instance it is properly 'the stead' ['die Statt']: the site [die Stätte] of the abode of human history" (Heidegger 1984, 101-2). The polis is the place where humans come together, it is the site of the being-together of humans. It is the site of human community. For Heidegger, the gods, the temples, the priests, the festivals, the games, the poets, the thinkers, the ruler, the council of elders, the assembly of the people, the army and the fleet all belong to the polis. And yet Heidegger cautions against the answer to what the polis is being found too easily. For even in Plato and Aristotle it is unclear if they think the essence of the polis. Perhaps in these late reflections on the polis there is a lack of questioning, suggests Heidegger, for the polis is that which is question worthy (1984, 99-100; see Starr 1986, 46). It is not insignificant that Heidegger's reading here - found in An Introduction to Metaphysics and the lecture courses on Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister' and Parmenides (Gesamtausgabe volumes 40, 53 and 54) - is based upon an analysis of Antigone (Heidegger 1983/1959, 1984, 1982; see Elden 2000, 2001).12

Antigone and the Polis

Heidegger does not pursue the potential implications of his reading in any depth. Despite taking his analysis of the term polis from a reading of the choral ode in Antigone, he does not follow this through in a reading of the play as a whole. Indeed, in his own brief recapitulation of the story, he makes reference to the "home town or city [Heimatstadt]" of Thebes (Heidegger 1984, 122, see 63). His own use of the term Stadt, when only pages before he had cautioned against its use, demonstrates clearly that he had not worked through the potential implications of his reading. Equally, despite the cautions of scholarship on the polis, in the major English translations of Antigone it is rendered as 'city' and/or 'state'. Therefore here, in order to illuminate Butler's argument, I will reread Antigone with this term in mind.

The crucial elements of the story are the following. The principal characters - both alive and dead, are members of the royal household. Oedipus had four children by his mother, Jocasta. The two brothers - Eteocles and Polyneices - have been fighting over the polis of Thebes: Eteocles defending the polis, Polyneices attacking it.13 They meet at the seventh gate and die by each other's hand.14 Their maternal uncle Creon, the king of Thebes, has decreed that Polyneices should be left unburied, unmourned - "whoever disobeys in the least will die, his doom is sealed: murder by public stoning inside the polis walls" (36). The opening scene is a discussion between Antigone and Ismene - sisters to the brothers - about what should be done. Antigone decides to bury the corpse, alone, for Ismene declares
she has no strength to "defy the people of the polis [politon]" (79). Antigone is caught in the act, and confesses instantly when Creon questions her. Antigone refuses Ismene's attempt to share the blame, claiming "I do not care for a loved one who loves in words alone" (545). She is condemned to be entombed alive, ostensibly "that the polis may avoid defilement" (776), but the denial of a death with ritual mourning and burial is a symbolic punishment for one who valued these rites so highly. Equally though, the wish to avoid pollution seems a little inadequate given the pollution caused by Polyneices lack of burial (see 1016-8), and Creon's disregard for it (1040-5). Rather, Creon seems to have realised by this time that a public stoning, that is, a stoning by the public, as originally proposed (36) will not have the support of the community. Despite persuasion from his son, Haemon, who is to marry Antigone, Creon is unmoved, and it is only when the blind prophet Tiresias suggests the gods' disquiet that Creon relents. He realises his neglect of sacred duty to Polyneices, whose body by this time has been ravaged by birds and dogs, and first cleans, then burns, then buries the body. He then makes for Antigone's tomb. The prophecy of Tiresias had mentioned the interment of the living in a tomb, and the denial of burial for the dead (1065-70), and when the chorus had instructed Creon to follow this prophesy, they too had suggested the opposite order to what he actually does (1100-1). That is, Creon is supposed to attend to Antigone first, and with speed (see 1103-4) but his delay means that by the time he arrives at her tomb he is too late. Antigone has taken her life, Haemon kills himself in grief, followed by Creon's wife, Eurydice. Realising the horrific results of his actions, Creon is led from the stage.

30. The royal household of Thebes - Laius and Jocasta, Oedipus and Jocasta, Eteocles, Polyneices, Antigone and Ismene - seems fated. At the beginning of the play Antigone asks her sister if she knows of any evil that Zeus will not bring to pass "to those who stem from Oedipus" (2-3). It is Ismene's wish to avoid a similar fate to the rest of her family that leads her not to join Antigone in the burial (50-68). When the chorus confront Antigone they wonder if her ordeal is payment of a debt from her father (855-6). Antigone confesses this is her most painful thought, that it is a destiny which attends her 'house' (860-2), which had been earlier hinted at by the chorus (584-5). Creon himself, who as the brother of Jocasta claims authority "by closeness of kinship to the dead" (174), is hardly immune. Despite not being himself a blood relative of Laius it is Haemon and Eurydice of his family that are the last deaths of the play. But we should not forget that this personal, familial, tragedy is also a 'political' tragedy, or rather, a tragedy for the polis. The Greek polis was founded on kinship, and for the royal family to suffer such fates inevitably impacts on the polis (see Braun 1973, 5, 8; more generally Lacey 1968; Pomeroy 1997). As even Creon recognises, his creation of disorder within his blood-kin will impact on relations outside his family - to act rightly in his family will be to do his duty in the polis (660-2). Equally, when he confronts the sisters he likens the treachery to a viper in his house (531-2). Braun suggests that Creon is "a political tyrant, probably he has long been a domestic one". (Whilst the terms 'political' and 'domestic' are problematic, the point is still well made.) For modern audiences Braun suggests this dichotomy is "more apparent than real", for Athenians there would have been no doubt that they are inseparable (1973, 8).

31. It is important to note that the play initially seems to suggest a need for balance, because there is a real dilemma between the two sides. On the one hand the religious rites to be accorded to the dead, the law of the gods; on the other the danger that this dead man posed to the polis and its laws. As Vernant perceptively notes, the term nomos [law or convention] for Antigone "designates the contrary to what Creon, in his circumstances, also calls nomos...... and in fact the semantic field of nomos is extended enough to cover both of these senses, amongst others" (1988, 23-4). It seems that loyalty to the wider community must seemingly take priority over a blood relation,15 even though it is royal blood. This loyalty is most obviously embodied in the chorus, the old citizens of Thebes. They describe the borders of the polis as "our borders" (110), its walls as "our walls" (133). When Creon notes that "whoever proves his loyalty to the polis - I'll prize that man in death as well as life", the Leader gives cautious assent (209-
But it is not loyalty to the king, because when Creon's actions are revealed to be threatening to the community by Tiresias, the chorus turns against Creon (1098). This has been coming for some time. They express some doubts when they suggest that the initial burial was the work of the gods (278-9), but Creon browbeats them into submission. When Creon suggests to Antigone that she is alone in her view, she perceptively remarks that the chorus share her view "but they keep their mouths shut for you" (508-9). As she had noted earlier "fear seals their mouths" (506). Haemon later points out that the people of the polis support Antigone (693-4). The chorus, as representatives of the community, show that the polis can neither be reduced to the strictly familial (as late as line 875 they still say authority should not be breached), nor to the rule of the king.16 The polis must be understood in a dual sense - as the bounded place where the action takes place, and as the people who live there. In this sense the polis is indeed the site of human community, and has attributes that would later - through a series of transformations I am concerned with outlining elsewhere - become the modern notions of territory and population.

The polis is in need of protection as a site - the defence of its walls, the defence of its integrity - and as a populace. Antigone's loyalty is loyalty both to a particular instance (the polysemantic sense of 'brother') and a wider sense (the laws of the gods). As noted, on the initial discovery of the burial the chorus question whether this may be the act of the gods [theelaton] (278-9),17 but in the famous second choral ode, they judge that the polis casts out those who "wed themselves to inhumanity" (370-1), that is, to a purpose outside of the human community. Therefore because Antigone's loyalty seems in conflict with the polis they side with Creon. However, they turn to her when the actions of Creon seem to be more challenging to the polis. From the other side, Creon's initial actions seem to be directed first and foremost toward the maintenance of the polis, and therefore the chorus supports him. He recognises that as a new ruler he will stand or fall on the basis of his actions (175-85). It is as his actions become increasingly despotic that he is clearly the greater danger. We can see this encapsulated in the dialogue he has with his son. Initially, the chorus side with Creon - "you seem to say what you have to say with sense" (682) - then recognise that both Creon and Haemon should learn from each other - "you are both speaking wisely" (725). It is when Creon fails to heed this advice that the transition is complete:

Creon: So, men our age, we're to be lectured, are we? - schooled by a boy his age?
Haemon: Only in what is right. But if I seem young, look less to my years and more to what I do.
Creon: Do? Is admiring rebels an achievement?
Haemon: I'd never suggest that one admire treason.
Creon: Oh, isn't that just the sickness that's attacked her?
Haemon: The whole community [homoptolis leos] of Thebes denies it.
Creon: And is the polis about to tell me how to rule?
Haemon: Now you see? Who's talking like a child?18
Creon: Am I to rule this land [chthonos] for others - or myself? Haemon: It's no polis at all, owned by one man alone.
Creon: What? The polis is the king's - that's the law!
Haemon: What a splendid king you'd make of a desert island - you and you alone (726-39).
A number of remarks can be made about this passage. First is the issue of treason. For Creon, Polyneices’ treason is mirrored in Antigone’s defiance of the edict prohibiting burial; but the community denies this, which Creon immediately identifies with the polis telling him how to rule. The demos can be seen as an embodiment of the polis. As Haemon points out, to simply rule the polis in the interests of one is to neglect what is distinct about the polis. Nussbaum perceptively remarks that "only an impoverished conception of the city can have the simplicity which Creon requires" (2001, 60). Creon’s position of equating the polis with the law of the king is sufficiently extreme for the gods and subsequently the chorus to recognise that he is the greater threat. In other words, the human community is an important part of the polis. Antigone’s laments towards the end of the play include the lines "O my polis, all your fine rich sons! [literally 'men', andres]" (842-3), and "Land of Thebes, city of all my fathers [astu patroion]" (936). Antigone also invokes the chorus as patrias politai, "citizens of my fatherland" (807). The familial and the political entity are joined, as they are explicitly in the conjoined term 'mother-polis' [matropolin] (1122) used by the chorus, and again in the term patroian (199) used by Creon. The notion of lineage and a temporal, historical sense of the legacy of previous inhabitants is clearly stressed.

But equally, we should not forget the polis is situated, a site or place. Creon asks "am I to rule this land [chthonos] for others - or myself?", and elsewhere Creon describes himself as king of the realm [khoras] (155). In avoiding the word polis here, Sophocles is stressing that the place is anterior to the polis, even though it clearly forms its ground (see 187). This opposition between a place and a polis is also found in Oedipus at Colonus. Haemon’s final retort here demonstrates this again: a desert island with a single person is no polis. It has the place, but no community. Whilst the place is necessary to the polis, and a recognition of this necessary to an understanding, it is not itself sufficient.

Seeing Through Blindness

But to recognise the problematic notion of the polis, and to admonish Butler for her uncritical attitude toward it is not to negate the force of her argument, at least not entirely. For such a reading can be used to suggest that the parasitic relationship between kinship and the state (understood in its modern form) is not one that includes the polis (i.e. that reduces the polis to one pole of the opposition, or which sees the polis as at play between them), but one which is included by the polis. If the polis is understood as a the sphere of human community, the site of humans' being-together, these contrasts are played out, as they are in Antigone, within the land of the polis. We can see the issues at stake if we take another quotation from Butler.

In fact, to exercise that speech, in precisely the way that she [Antigone] does, is to commit a different kind of offence, the one in which a prepolitical subject lays claim to a rageful agency within the public sphere. The public sphere, as I am calling it here, is called variably the community, government, and the state by Hegel: it only acquires its existence through interfering with the happiness of the family; thus it creates for itself 'an internal enemy - womankind in general. Womenkind - the everlasting irony [in the life] of the community' (288, 352) (Butler 2000a, 35).20

Rather than her speech being prepolitical, in Antigone her speech is precisely political, that is, of the polis. The notion of kinship is foundational to the polis, and what we have in the play is a tension between a particular and a general bond. What Butler sketches over is that the problematic equation of "the community, government and state" in Hegel, and the suggestion that these are in some way reducible to the notion of the public sphere, is possible precisely through modern appropriations of the notion of the polis. In other words, if there is a deconstructive move to be effected, it is one within the polis. We should note that Hegel"s term Gemeinwesen is not quite as clear cut a term as Gemeinschaft to be rendered as 'community', having more a sense of the essence of the common or the general, or, as Steiner renders it, "communal totality" (Steiner 1984, 33). However, the opposition between public
and private, the separation of government from the state, and the sense that community might be separate from both the family and the state - as well as distinct in some sense from 'society' [Gesellschaft] - are all historically conditioned, and are all problematic in getting a sense of the notion of the polis. The polis, in the way it is used in Antigone, is both prior to these distinctions, and in many ways, includes and supersedes them.

37. Butler is closer to this when, in a note, she remarks upon the role of the chorus in the play. "There is, clearly a community judgement that is expressed by the chorus, but it would be a mistake to thereby conclude that the community operates as a separate or separable sphere from either kinship or the state. My view is that there is no uncontaminated voice with which Antigone speaks. This means that she can neither represent the feminine over and against the state nor can she represent a version of kinship in its distinction from state power" (2000a, 88 n. 1). The notion of the community, which here at least, plays a role closer to the notion of the polis than any of the other translations offered, includes the notions of kinship and the state. This is why Butler is onto something when she suggests that the community does not operate as "a separate or separable sphere from either kinship or the state" (2000a, 88 n. 1). But she does not think this through explicitly. To do so would require her to recognise that there is no simple notion of 'state power' in Antigone, but rather, a struggle between understandings of what is right in a polis. Antigone is political precisely because she is marginalised, and because she challenges that marginalisation (see Lane and Lane, 1986).

38. It is not my intent here to broaden this criticism to Butler's other works, rather it has been to show how this absence or blindness marks this text on Antigone. Indeed, though she sometimes shows a problematic grasp of the notion of the political,21 one notable text makes claims that would lend support to my reading and criticisms (1992; see 1995). Here Butler suggests that to claim politics requires a stable subject is to "claim that there can be no political opposition to that claim" (1992, 4). This suggestion has important implications for Butler's work, notably Gender Trouble (1990), because it hints that her project is inherently political, but that it is at risk of being labelled as apolitical by those who hold that there must be a stable subject. Butler continues:

To require the subject means to foreclose the domain of the political, and that foreclosure, installed analytically as an essential feature of the political, enforces the boundaries of the domain of the political in such a way that the enforcement is protected from political scrutiny. The act which unilaterally establishes the domain of the political functions, then, as an authoritarian ruse by which political contest over the status of the subject is summarily silenced (1992, 4).

39. For Butler, the subject is fully political, and indeed is "perhaps most political at the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself" (1992, 13). But her inability to pursue this in her reading of Antigone is precisely why her understanding of the polis as 'state' is a political blindness. Antigone is political precisely because - and indeed most political - because she is marginalised, because she is reduced to the constitutive outside. It is not because of Antigone's kinship trouble that she cannot represent the feminine or kinship as distinct from the state, but because the notion of the state is based on a narrow appropriation of the political which should not be read back into the play. Recognising that it is within the bounds of the polis and through its members that the conflict between kinship and the rule of law is played out in Antigone would help us to see that the term polis cannot simply be reduced to modern notions of city or state. To understand the polis as the site of humans being-together is an interpretation of the political that is useful for a range of political goals, even though it requires more lengthy and careful examination than is possible here.22 A broader notion of the political (i.e. that which concerns the polis) could include notions of kinship and family, and could be useful in challenging the patriarchal law and modern reductive notions of the state. In Antigone all of these things are within the polis. This is not to diminish the conflict, rather to recognise where it takes place.
This political blindness is all the more conspicuous given that her conclusion is a brief but insightful critique of Hannah Arendt. She points out Arendt’s problematic distinction between the public and the private, where Arendt argues “that in classical Greece the former alone was the sphere of the political, that the latter was mute, violent, and based on the despotic power of the patriarch”. For Butler, Arendt does not explain how there might be a prepolitical despotism, or how the 'political' must be expanded to describe the status of a population of the less than human, those who were not permitted into the interlocutory scene of the public sphere where the human is constituted through words and deeds and most forcefully constituted when its word becomes its deed. What she failed to read in The Human Condition was precisely the way in which the boundaries of the public and political sphere were secured through the production of a constitutive outside. And what she did not explain was the mediating link that kinship provided between the public and private spheres. The slaves, women, and children, all those who were not property-holding males were not permitted into the public sphere in which the human was constituted through its linguistic deeds. Kinship and slavery thus condition the public sphere of the human and remain outside its terms. But is that the end of the story? (2000, 81-2).

Of course it is not. A number of issues remain unexplored and central questions may need to be asked again. Particularly, in relation to this reading of Arendt, we need to ask what is the understanding of the political Butler would wish to espouse? If it is broader than the public sphere, and has to take into account the constitutive outside, does it simply include the private sphere? Is that distinction valid at all? Where does kinship fall? It therefore seems important to return to Butler's opening suggestion that she wanted to utilise Antigone "as a counterfigure to the trend championed by recent feminists to seek the backing and authority of the state to implement feminist policy aims". What did happen to feminist efforts to confront and deny the state? And her opposition is not just to feminists who might be using the state, but in a brief remark in this text (2000a, 70), and in more detail elsewhere, to the campaign for gay marriage, precisely because it seeks the recognition of the state (2000b, 171). The question needs to be asked as to why recourse to the state is a problem. Is it because the state is exclusionary, and sanctions particular types of behaviour rather than others? Is it because working within the state's structures makes us party to those structures? Or is it because the modern understanding of the state, and following from it, the notion of the political, marginalises certain issues as apolitical? That not only are certain groups, individuals, and issues treated in discriminatory ways, but their concerns are rendered apolitical. Modern notions of the state and the political are not simply exclusionary, they are also reductive. They fail to understand what might be meant by human community, and they fail to take account of the explicit situatedness of the political. The reading proposed here would allow us to see that polis may be closer to (though not reducible to) a notion of community. It is my sense that this would go some way toward achieving precisely the goals Butler advocates.

NOTES
1 This is especially noteworthy given her important parenthetical claim elsewhere that 'contexts' are themselves posited unities that undergo temporal change and expose their essential disunity (Butler 1999, xxi). I am grateful to Bela Chatterjee for alerting me to this new preface and this claim.
2 Elshtain (1982) claims that this powerful myth and human drama pits a woman against the arrogant insistencies of statecraft (p. 53); strangely, Antigone has not emerged as a feminist heroine (p. 54); maternal thinking, like Antigone's protest, is a rejection of amoral statecraft and an affirmation of the dignity of the human person (p. 59).
3 As Loraux notes, to proceed, as many do, to equate Oedipus's daughter with a rebel, I would have to forget so many Greek particulars! I would have to forget that Antigone wants to honour Polyneices' dead body, and not to 'overthrow' Creon or politically rehabilitate her brother's reputation. I would also...
have to forget that Antigone would not have gone against the regent's orders if the dead man were her husband instead of her brother... Finally, and especially, I would have to forget that Antigone is a tragic character, and, as such, she bears witness to the limits beyond which the unthinkable cannot be subverted (1998, 27-8).

Butler cites the play by line number of the Greek in parentheses within her text. I retain this in quotations from her work, along with the translation she cites. For my own citations, I give references in the same way. (Greek line numbers are usually found in the margins of translations). For the Greek text, I have used Sophocles 1999. I have used primarily the Fagles translation (Sophocles 1996), though I have also consulted the Watling, Claverhouse Jebb, Braun, and Brown versions (Sophocles 1947, 1967, 1973, 1987).

The reading of Antigone in the Phenomenology is found in 1952, 336-42; 1977, 284-9. For an insightful commentary, see Derrida (1974), especially 164. Here, Derrida notes that it is the inability to replace a brother (see 912) that makes the site of burial so important. The brother is irreplaceable [irremplaçable] so she cries out for a burial place [une sépulture].

The 1823 lecture transcript is more terse: Antigone reveres family bonds, the gods of the underworld; Creon Zeus, state power [Staatsmacht] (1998 Vol 2, 304, see 306). On the internal struggle for Creon, see Nussbaum (2001, 54-63).

This may help to explain the much disputed lines 904-20, where Antigone suggests she only defies the citizens for a brother, and would not have done the same for a husband or a son. For a discussion, see Brown 1987, 199-200, Braun 1973, 87-8, Hester 1971, 55-58. To my mind the conclusive proof of their genuineness (and therefore the need to explain them) is Aristotle's citation of the lines (1831, 1417a28-32).

That said, it is not entirely clear in the play. Initial remarks suggest that it was at the seventh gate that the brothers died (141-7), we are not told of the body being moved, and yet at the end of the play Creon has to go to the furthest part of the field (1196-7). Griffith (1999, 31) notes that some critics suggest that it is Creon's refusal to allow the body to be removed for burial outside the borders that makes it a step beyond the norm; Landers (1954, 16) suggests that Polyneices' body is left outside the walls. Brown (1987, 6) is clear, suggesting that it is usual not to bury traitors within the borders of the polis, rather to cast them outside, but here the affront is the public display of the unburied body within the polis (see Braun 1973, 76; Buxton 1984, 28; Zimmermann 1991, 66; Hester 1971, 19-20; Knox 1964, 84). As Brown notes, in Antigone the possibility of casting the body out is never mentioned (because if it were, there would be no play) (1987, 6). Brown notes the ambiguity in the play for the position of the body at 219-20. See Derrida 2000, 85-7.

For a more detailed discussion of Plato and Aristotle in this regard, see Elden 2003.

For a reading of various interpretations in classical thought, see Stambaugh (1974).

See also de Polignac (1984) and Starr (1986).

Hecht and Bacon suggest that the attack of Polyneices on his parent land can be read as incest, and that it parallels the crimes of Oedipus. They suggest this would have been more immediately obvious to an Athenian audience than it is for us today (1973, 6-7). See the description of Polyneices by the Scout: he declares he will mount and bestride the walls, and be proclaimed lord and subjugator of the land (Aeschylus 1985/1973, 634-6).

This much of the story accords with Aeschylus' Seven Against Thebes (1985/1973); the final pages of that play, which go on to mention the edict (this time given by the magistrates, not the king) and Antigone's defiance, are probably later additions (for opposed views see Brown 1987, 4; Hecht and Bacon 1973, 7-8).
15 The question of burial is also central to Sophocles 1998. On death and the family, see Pomeroy 1997, 100-40; Lacey 1968, 28-9. On the challenge of mourning in Greek tragedy more generally, see Loraux 1981a, 1998.

16 The most explicit equation is from Eurydice, when she addresses the Chorus as O whole city [o pantes astoi], but this refers to the astu [astoi is aristocracy too] and not the polis. The suggestion is sometimes made that the chorus are supportive of the king, and misrepresent the community as a whole (see Braun 1973, 77), but this neglects the development of their position through the play. See Zimmermann 1991, 69-70.

17 The ambiguity of the word theelaton is noted by Knox (1964, 69) who states it can mean divinely caused or driven on by a god. In other words it could be by the gods, or - as seems more likely - by Antigone with a divine motivation.

18 This should be read in two ways: Creon characterises Haemon as a child; but Antigone is continually referred to as the child [e pais] throughout the text. I owe this point to Lacan (1992, 250). For a rendering of the story that emphasises this motif of childishness, see Anouilh (1954).

19 For an extended treatment, see Edmunds (1996) 101ff.

20 The reference is to Hegel (1952, 340; 1977, 288).

21 See several passages within Butler 1990 (for example 161, 181, 189). This absence does not seem to be addressed in Butler 1993.

22 For a beginning, see Elden 2005.

23 For a persuasive argument for gay marriage, see Kaplan, 1997.

24 There is renewed interest in the notion of community within the continental tradition. See, for example, Derrida, 1994; Nancy 1996; Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997.

[Reference]

WORKS CITED


