What is meant by the word constitution? If we take the standard phrase “the constitution of the United States of America,” at a most obvious and literal level, it refers to the document which begins “We the people of the United States . . .” and is signed by George Washington and others. It, of course, also means the framework of laws which that document initiated. But at the same time, the phrase could be taken as the “making” of the United States of America—constitution as a process rather than as a result—the Constitution’s signing and its subsequent interpretation and amendment being but part of that process. Equally, one might suggest that the United States of America is constituted—that is, is made up—of fifty states, 3.6 million square miles of territory, 264 million inhabitants, et cetera. Another would be to take the more medical sense—the “physical nature or character of the body in regard to healthiness, strength, vitality, etc.” (Oxford English Dictionary). In other words, a diagnostic, a physician’s report: an address on the state of the union. This alerts us to the plural sense of the word—legal, political, biological, and medical.¹

The word *constitution*, in this plural sense, plays an important role within Michel Foucault’s work. This is particularly true in his 1975–1976 lecture course «*Il faut défendre la société*» [“Society must be defended,” or perhaps “protected”], where he discusses the *constitution* of the state. In Foucault’s work, the notions of the political and medical come together particularly in the concept *bio-power*, a term that relates both to the politics of constitution and the constitution of politics.2 Given that *bio-power* is introduced in the final chapter of the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*—*La Volonté de savoir* [The will to knowledge]—and that «*Il faut défendre la société*» is contemporaneous to this book, some interesting parallels can be drawn. Elsewhere I have argued that the most profitable way to read the lecture courses of the mid 1970s (of which only «*Il faut défendre la société*» and *Les Anormaux* [The abnormals] are so far published) is “as the most thorough treatment we are likely to get from what would have been in the originally planned set of volumes” of *The History of Sexuality*.3 The most relevant of these to «*Il faut défendre la société*» is the projected sixth and final volume, *Population et races* (Population and races). Four themes, then—constitution, the state, population, and race—will shape the reading of this course.

**One Chapter, Two Lectures**

Foucault claimed in a 1977 interview that the final chapter of *La Volonté de savoir* was frequently neglected in the literature. It would not be wrong to claim the same is true today. Foucault suggested that though

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the book was short, he suspected people did not reach the last chapter. “All the same,” he remarked, “it is the foundation of the book.” In that final chapter, which Daniel Defert claims was the first part to be written, Foucault discusses race, the state, and the right of death and power over life. The final lecture of «Il faut défendre la société» (delivered on 17 March 1976) covers many of the same themes as this chapter (the book was published at the end of 1976). If in La Volonté de savoir the chapter seems somewhat odd, misplaced—which perhaps accounts for its relative neglect in the secondary literature—in «Il faut défendre la société» it is a much more logical conclusion.

While the last lecture of this course is familiar material, the first two


6. I note that Ann Laura Stoler, in Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s “History of Sexuality” and the Colonial Order of Things (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995), seems to think that there was a year between them: “Volume I of The History of Sexuality introduces the question of racism in a muted way that resurfaces at the core of his 1976 Collège de France lectures the following year” (x); “nor is it insignificant that the final chapter of volume I should reappear the following year in revised form as the last Collège de France lecture” (xi). This is misleading. Foucault’s course ran from January to March, the book appeared in December, all in 1976. It would seem fair to conclude that the published volume, being an overview of a projected six-part series, will touch on themes to be developed elsewhere. It is, therefore, not so much that Foucault returned to these themes in the lecture course but that Volume 1 was in part a summary of lectures that must surely have been largely written by the time the book was delivered to Gallimard.

7. Stoler makes a similar point in Race and the Education of Desire, 91–92. This is also the place to note the useful, and yet again misleading, formulation on page 95: In the lectures, “a discourse of races (if not modern racism itself) antedates nineteenth-century social taxonomies, appearing not as a result of bourgeois orderings, but as constitutive of them.” What is useful is the recognition of the constitutive power of the war of races; what is misleading is the suggestion that The History of Sexuality is any different. See also page 56.
lectures are perhaps even better known. Appearing first in Italian, they were translated by Kate Soper as “Two Lectures” for the collection *Power/Knowledge*. Because they are well known, I will not dwell on them at length. Suffice it to say that they discuss power relations in some detail and oppose models of understanding power on the basis of possessive right and the productive relation (liberal and Marxist) to those that seek to understand it on the basis of repression (Hegel, Freud, and Wilhelm Reich are cited) and models based on war. Karl von Clausewitz’s famous dictum is quoted and then reversed—“Politics is war pursued by other means.” However, there are a few passages that do not appear in the earlier published version, of which the close of the first lecture is particularly worth noting:

The essential part of the course will be given over to . . . the problem of war. I would like to try to see in what measure the binary schema of war, struggle, of the confrontation of forces, might effectively be mapped as the foundation of civil society, at the same time the principle and the motor of the exercise of political power . . . power has the role of defending society. . . .

I will begin by putting to one side, justly, those who appear to be theorists of war in civil society but who are absolutely not in my sense—that is to say Machiavelli and Hobbes. Then I will try to recapture this theory of war as a historical [my emphasis] principle of the function of power, around the problem of race, since it is in the binarism of race that can be perceived—for the first time in the West—the possibility of analyzing political power as war. And I will try to lead this up to the moment where the struggle of races and the struggle of classes become, at the end of the nineteenth century, the two grand schemes by which we can map the phenomena of war and the relations of force in the interior of political society.9

Some of this is obviously very familiar, but the emphasis on race is not, nor perhaps is the recognition of the role of class—though we sense that

8. This phrase finds a remarkable parallel in Hannah Arendt’s *On Violence* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), esp. 9. Unlike Arendt, Foucault sees this reversal not as a recent development but as a historical one. Indeed, he thinks that Clausewitz himself is effectively reversing an earlier thought. The relationship between Arendt and Foucault remains undeveloped in the literature.

it is the struggle of class struggle that is stressed. Indeed, elsewhere, Foucault questions the lack of attention paid by Marxists—though he exempts Marx and Trotsky somewhat—to what constitutes struggle when they talk of class struggle (DE, 3:310–11; P/K, 208; see also DE, 3:206). We should not be surprised by the emphasis on war, as, for example, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault analyzes the army and the figures of warfare as constitutive elements in the genealogy of modern punitive society (DE, 3:32–34; see also P/K, 68–70). The rejection of Hobbes and Machiavelli is also important: More than just a clearing of precursors to this idea, Foucault is challenging a prevalent interpretation of their work.11

Because of the links to other work, and because the course summary has been available for a number of years,12 we might feel we know the contours of the course well. Such an impression would be misleading. The course summary stresses the importance of war but makes only a passing reference to the role of race within this study. We should also note that there have been three critical pieces on this course, two of which appeared before the course itself was published in French. The first piece was by Pasquale Pasquino, a student and colleague of Foucault's, who attended the lectures; the second, by Ann Laura Stoler, who made use of the tape recordings archived at the Bibliothèque du Saulchoir and an illegal Italian version. Pasquino picks up most explicitly on the reinterpretation of Hobbes and its implications for political theory but neglects the issue of race; Stoler is interested in the issues of race and colonialism.13 The third piece is, as yet, unpublished and was presented by Warren Montag as a paper at the conference Michel Foucault et la médecine, held in Caen in 1999.14 Montag draws some interesting parallels and contrasts between Foucault’s suggestions and contemporary thought on racism and biology.

10. See also Stuart Elden, Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History (London and New York: Continuum, 2001), 139–41.
While my reading is informed by and is indebted in some ways to these accounts, my emphasis seeks to be rather different. Rather than pursue the critique of political theory, I am more interested in Stoler’s suggestion that “if any single theme informs the seminar, it is not a quest for political theory, but an appreciation of historiography as a political force, of history writing as a political act, of historical narrative as a tool of the state and as a subversive weapon against it.” Stoler does not explore this in detail, but my emphasis is on the war of races that precedes modern racism, and, in particular, how the war can be seen as part of the constitution of the state.

Clausewitz’s Return

Foucault begins the third lecture by suggesting that the juridical model of sovereignty is not suited to a concrete analysis of the multiplicity of power relations. He therefore bids adieu to such a theory (FDS, 37). He had shown this earlier in the course, when he contrasted his concern with that of Hobbes: “Rather than pose the problem of the central soul [of the Leviathan], I believe that we must attempt . . . to study the peripheral and multiple bodies, those bodies constituted, by the effects of power, as subjects” (FDS, 26; see P/K, 98). Then, in the first real development of what is well known from the “Two Lectures,” Foucault suggests that the question is not so much one of returning to Clausewitz’s principle but of knowing which principle Clausewitz was returning to. “I think, in effect—and I will try to show this—that the principle according to which politics is a war continued by other means is a much earlier principle than Clausewitz, who simply returned to a sort of thesis at the same time diffuse and precise which circulated since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” (FDS, 41, see also 146–47). He traces it—as he says, “schematically or rather crudely”—to the development of states throughout the Middle Ages until the threshold of the modern age. The practices and institutions of war become more and more concentrated in the hands of a central power; over time, only state powers could engage in wars and use the instruments of war: the establishment of state control over war (étatisation . . . de la guerre). At the same time, because of this, the private wars of the social body are effaced (FDS, 41). War begins to exist only at the frontiers, at the external limits of these grand unified states. The social body is cleansed of the belligerent relations of the medieval period (FDS, 42).

But Foucault notes a paradox, one that arises at the same time as, or maybe a little later than, this transformation. A new discourse appears, one which he describes as “the first historico-political discourse on society,” which is different from the “philosophico-juridical discourse” that had held until then. This historico-political discourse is a “discourse on war extended as a permanent social relation, as an ineffaceable foundation of all relations and all institutions of power.” This discourse dates from the end of the civil and religious wars of the sixteenth century and is clearly formulated in the political struggles of seventeenth-century England, at the time of the bourgeois revolution. It appeared in France a little later, at the end of the reign of Louis XIV (FDS, 42). Later, Foucault calls this the first non-Roman history that the West had known, because it challenged the Roman notion of sovereignty (FDS, 60). In both contexts, the discourse was itself one of the means by which the aristocracy in France, or the bourgeoisie, petit-bourgeoisie, and eventually the whole population in England, challenge the absolute monarchy, but, more fundamentally, they challenge the idea that society is at peace. Beneath the facade of order is a raging battle. Foucault suggests a long list of writers who have contributed to this discourse—among them, Edward Coke, John Lilburne, Henry de Boulainvillier,16 the Abbé Sieyès, and Augustin Thierry—and analyzes many of them at length in later lectures. He notes that the biological racists and eugenists of the late nineteenth century return to these themes. Summing up this discourse, Foucault first makes the following general point: “Contrary to what is said by the philosophico-juridical theory, political power does not begin or end with war. The organization, the juridical structure of power, of states, of monarchies, of societies does not have as its principle the cessation of the noise of weapons. War is not averted. First, of course, war presides over the birth of states: law, peace, and laws are born in the blood and mud of battle” (FDS, 43).

Second, the establishment of law is not a pacification, because beneath the law war continues (FDS, 43). “It is a question of finding the blood which has dried in the legal codes [codes]” (FDS, 48). These legal codes, these constitutions, are written not in the ink of consent and contract but with the blood of those defeated in war. This is not a war of all against all but of one group against another; one is either in one group or the other, there is no neutral. This is a binary structure: two groups, two categories of individuals.

16. The spelling given is Boulainvilliers, though, as Renée Simon notes, the correct spelling is actually Boulainviller. See “Avertissement,” in Henry de Boulainviller, Oeuvres Philosophiques (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), vi.
two armies present (FDS, 44). What becomes important is the division, the reasons for the division. Foucault suggests, therefore, that the principle of history becomes a series of brutal facts, facts we can call physico-biological: “physical vigor, force, energy, proliferation of a race, weakness of the other, etc.” (FDS, 47). It is precisely differences in these physico-biological aspects, along with ethnic or linguistic differences, that allow the separation of two races, that are at the root of social conflict. “The social body is at base articulated on two races” (FDS, 51).

Responding seemingly to comments he had received, Foucault begins the following week’s lecture by noting that he is not undertaking a history of “racist discourse” but one of “the war or the struggle of races.” Modern racism is only “a phase of, a returning to, the reprise of” this older discourse (FDS, 57). To put this into more explicitly Foucauldian language, he is undertaking a genealogical study of the struggle of races, and this history may enable him to make more general points about modern racism as a history of the present. As the editors of the course note, the contemporary context is set by the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia and France, the Vietnam War, Black September in Jordan (1970), student revolts in Portugal (1971), the IRA in Ireland, the Yom Kippur War, the “Colonels” regime in Greece, the overthrow of Salvadore Allende in Chile, fascism in Italy, the miners’ strike in England, Francoism in Spain, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and civil war in Lebanon, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and several African states. 17 However, this older discourse, in sociobiological terms, served the ends of social conservatism and, in some cases, at least, colonial domination (FDS, 57). Modern racism replaces the theme of the historical war with the biological theme, postevolutionist, of the struggle for life. “It is no longer a battle in the sense of a war, but a struggle in a biological sense: differentiation of species, selection of the strongest, survival of the best adapted races. Indeed, the theme of the binary society . . . becomes replaced by that of a society which is, on the contrary, biologically monist” (FDS, 70). Similarly, there is a transition in the role of the state. The state no longer serves the interests of one race against another, but as “the protector of integrity, of the superiority and purity of the race” (FDS, 70–71). The dominant race does not say “we must defend ourselves against society” but “we must defend society against all the biological perils of this other race, this sub-race, this contra-race which we are in the process of, in spite of ourselves, constituting” (FDS, 53). It is not therefore simply a struggle of one

social group against another but of a state racism, a racism that society exercises throughout itself, an internal racism, a permanent purification, one of the fundamental dimensions of social normalization (FDS, 71).

The broad themes of the course having been sketched, Foucault spends the rest of the course going over them in more detail. In the case of a society formed through contract, Foucault notes that for Hobbes, “sovereignty thus constituted assumes the personality of all.”18 But, Foucault then asks, what about the other form of the constitution of republics, the mechanism of acquisition (FDS, 81–82)? Foucault notes that Hobbes’s work, as is often observed, should be understood in the context of the civil struggles that divided England at the time he was writing (FDS, 85). However, Foucault goes on to trace this notion of a division of society back to the Norman Conquest, to the figure of William the Conqueror, and he suggests that the rituals of power established by this event continued until Henry VII (FDS, 86). This is particularly true in the figures of the Normans and Saxons, which become transposed into the more general figure of high and low conditions or classes. “Conflicts—political, economic, juridical—were . . . very simply articulated, coded, and transformed into a discourse . . . which was that of the opposition of races” (FDS, 87). He suggests that the new forms of political struggle that emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—between the bourgeoisie, aristocracy, and monarchy—were still expressed in the vocabulary of the racial struggle (FDS, 87–88).

Of Foucault’s reading of the various interpretations of the Norman-Saxon conflict in England it is worth noting one particular point: the suggestion that much of the literature represents William as the legitimate heir, a legitimate heir whose sovereignty was limited by the laws of England. As Hobbes recognizes, a state formed by conquest can function as one formed by contract if the people recognize the ruler. In the words of the seventeenth-century Winston Churchill, “William did not conquer England; the English conquered William.”19 The perfectly legitimate transfer of Saxon power to a Norman king was one thing, the later disposessions, exactions, and abuses of power, another. This Normanization, the Norman yoke—this political regime favoring the aristocracy and the monarchy—was the target of the revolts of the Middle Ages, the Magna Carta, and so forth, not William

himself. And this struggle was recoded in the seventeenth century through the struggle between King and Parliament. Parliament was seen as the “true inheritor of Saxon tradition” (FDS, 91). The Levelers, for example, viewed the Norman Conquest as the root of the contemporary social and political system; there was a direct relation between William and the lords of the manor and Charles and his colonels. Foucault’s point was that this is the first time that the binary schema of rich and poor was not simply a complaint or a demand but was articulated as a fact of nationality: “language, country of origin, ancestral customs, depth [épaisseur] of a common past, existence of an archaic right, rediscovery of ancient laws” (FDS, 95). This war was exactly what Hobbes was opposing: his philosophico-juridical discourse was a way of blocking what Foucault calls the “political historicism” that was the dominant discourse or knowledge [savoir] in the political struggles of the seventeenth century (FDS, 96).

According to the Trojan myth of the French, the French were descended from the Francs, who were themselves the Trojans who had left Troy under King Francus, son of Priam, as the city was burned (FDS, 101). For Foucault, what is important is, again, the war of races: Did the Francs conquer the Romans or the Gauls? This stresses the same motif of invasion as was important in England (FDS, 104), and like the Normans and Saxons, the Francs and Gauls are essentially irreconcilable (see FDS, 141). The difference is that, in this case, it is the victors, the aristocracy, who, portraying themselves as Germanic, write the history. Not only do they assert their separation from the bourgeoisie and proletariat (of Gallo-Roman pedigree), but they also limit the power of the king. Foucault will return to these issues later in the course, in a new context.

Boulainviller and the Generalization of War

“Until the seventeenth century war was essentially the war of one mass against another” (FDS, 144). Foucault suggests that “this generalization of war” is what characterizes Boulainviller’s thought. Boulainviller saw how the relations of war worked in all social relations, how social relations were divided in a thousand ways, how war was a sort of permanent state between groups in society: not, therefore, a war of all against all in an individualistic Hobbesian sense but a war of groups against groups (FDS, 144).

It is interesting that Foucault takes a seemingly marginal figure to illustrate so many of his key themes, but as Renée Simon notes, “We should ask ourselves how such a ‘famous’ man in the eighteenth century (the word is Diderot’s) could slip into such a complete lapse of memory.”

This generalization of war provides us with insights into our understanding of society: “the organization of a historico-political field begins here. The functioning of history within politics, the utilization of politics as a calculation of force relations within history, all this starts here” (FDS, 146). The generalization of war is coupled with the development of a technological knowledge in the eighteenth century that allowed the state to intervene, either directly or indirectly, in a number of areas. These interventions were sometimes related to the control of knowledge or sciences, and some to practices, such as the medical sciences and their implementation in society. As Foucault argues extensively elsewhere, the medicalization of society extended beyond the creation of hospitals and codifications of the medical profession to an enormous campaign of public hygiene. Four things were central: selection, normalization, hierarchization, and centralization (FDS, 161). Foucault suggests that this is true of science as a whole.

Science understood in this new way replaces the role of philosophy in the processes of knowing. At the same time, Foucault suggests that the notion of mathesis—which had served as the formal instrument and rigorous foundation of all sciences—also disappears. In order to make some sense of this, it is necessary to look back to The Order of Things. In this book, Foucault aims to show how general grammar, natural history, and the

analysis of wealth became linguistics, biology, and political economy. The first three ways of analyzing language, life, and wealth are part of the Classical epistemê, which he believes is too narrowly understood by historians of ideas as “the tendency to make nature mechanical and calculable.” Instead, he suggests, three things need to be distinguished: a mechanism that offered a theoretical model to such areas of knowledge as medicine and physiology—which held sway briefly at the end of the seventeenth century; an attempt to broaden this to other fields as a way of mathematicizing empirical knowledge, which had more limited, sporadic, but longer-lasting success; and the more general relation all Classical knowledge maintained “with the mathesis, understood as a universal science of measurement and order.”24 It is this last, more general, relation that is most important. As Foucault notes, “the fundamental element of the Classical epistemê is neither the success or failure of mechanism, nor the right to or the impossibility of mathematicizing nature, but rather a link with the mathesis which, until the end of the eighteenth century, remains constant and unaltered.” For Foucault, this link has two key characteristics. “The first is that relations between beings are indeed to be conceived in the form of order and measurement, but with this fundamental imbalance, that it is always possible to reduce problems of measurement to problems of order.” The notion of measurement is, for Foucault, founded on the regime of order, which is the true sense of the relationship to mathesis: “The relation of all knowledge to the mathesis is posited as the possibility of establishing between things, even non-measurable ones, an ordered succession” (MC, 71; OT, 57).

Rather than a narrow sense of mathematics then, it is analysis that has the value of a universal method, and Foucault thinks Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s “project of establishing a mathematics of qualitative orders is found at the very heart of Classical thought.” An important qualification is added:

This relation to the mathesis as a general science of order does not signify that knowledge [savoir] is absorbed into mathematics, nor that the latter becomes the foundation for all possible knowledge [connaissance]; on the contrary, in correlation with the quest for a mathesis, we perceive the appearance of a certain number of empirical fields now being formed and defined for the very first time. In

none of these fields, or almost none, is it possible to find any trace of mechanism or mathematicization; and yet all rely for their foundation upon a possible science of order. Although they were all dependent on Analysis in general, their particular instrument was not the algebraic method but the system of signs. (MC, 71; OT, 57)

This system of signs is a taxinomia, a way of dealing with complex natures; mathesis, with the general method of algebra, is a way of dealing with simple natures. But taxinomia relates wholly to the mathesis because empirical representations must be analyzable as simple natures; on the other hand, analysis is only one particular case of representation in general, and therefore mathesis is only one particular case of taxinomia (MC, 86–87; OT, 72).

This is an incredibly rich analysis that bears fruitful comparison with Martin Heidegger’s work in this area. While Heidegger’s analysis of the calculability of being in Descartes and beyond is instructive in his understanding of machination and technology, Foucault tries to show how that underpins the more complex phenomena investigated by the empirical sciences. In The Order of Things, his analysis is of general grammar, natural history, and the analysis of wealth. While he suggests that no attempt was made during the Classical age to mathematicize these sciences, he stresses that this is not paradoxical, because “the analysis of representations in accordance with their identities and differences, their ordering into permanent tables, automatically situated the sciences of the qualitative in the field of a universal mathesis” (MC, 258; OT, 245–46). As Foucault summarizes, “At the two extremities of the Classical episteme, therefore, we have a mathesis as the science of calculable order and a genesis as the analysis of the constitution of orders on the basis of empirical series” (MC, 87; OT, 73). Both are founded on the same ontological ground.

Foucault thinks that by the end of the eighteenth century the analytic sciences seem to be distinct from the synthetic sciences. Logic and mathematics (the a priori sciences) appear to be in a different domain from the empirical, a posteriori sciences. Crucially, because the mathesis and the universal science of order appear to be dissociated, modern thought on science attempts to unify knowledge on the basis of mathematics (MC, 258–

It is then, and not immediately following Descartes, that the mathematical, in a more straightforward sense, becomes evident in areas such as thinking about race. As Benedict Anderson notes, while census categories became more explicitly racial through the colonial period, the real innovation of the census takers in the 1870s was "not in the construction of ethnic-racial classifications, but rather in their systematic quantification." 26

What is important, therefore, is not the simple disappearance of mathesis but its reformulation as a general calculative, ordered mode of thinking. In Foucault's argument, the notion of science—as a general domain or field—organizes the particular sciences. And the problems it poses are those specific to the disciplinary front of the savoirs: problems of classification, problems of hierarchization, problems of vicinity, and so forth (FDS, 162). What we have here in "Il faut défendre la société" is a politicizing of the argument of The Order of Things (see especially FDS, 170).

In one of the most important passages of the course—which is why I will cite it at length—Foucault suggests that there are three tasks in this sort of project of analyzing the intelligibility of history: renew the strategic thread, trace the thread of moral divisions, and re-establish the rectitude of something which we can call the constituent point of politics and history, the moment of the constitution of the kingdom. I say "constituent point," "moment of the constitution," to partly avoid, without however erasing it completely, the word "constitution." In fact, you will see, it is certainly constitution which is at stake: One makes history to restore the constitution, but the constitution understood not as an explicit ensemble of laws which had been formulated at a given time. What is at stake is not finding a kind of founding legal convention, which would have been passed in time, or before time, between the king, the sovereign and his subjects. What is at stake is finding something which has consistence and a historical situation; which is not so much about law, as about force; which is not so much about the order of writing as about the order of equilibrium. Something which is a constitution, but almost as doctors would understand it, that is, a relation of force, equilibrium and sets of proportions, stable dissymmetry, congruent inequality. It is of all this that the doctors of the eighteenth century spoke when

they evoked the “constitution.” This idea of constitution is found, to some extent, in the historical literature which one sees being formed around the reaction of the nobility, at the same time medical and military: a relation of force between good and evil, also a relation of force between adversaries. This constituting moment which it is a question of finding, must be brought together by the knowledge [connaissance] and the re-establishment of a fundamental relation of force. It is about putting in place a constitution which is accessible not by the re-establishment of old laws, but by something which would be a revolution of the forces. . . . What was possible, starting from Boulainviller—and I believe that this is fundamental—is the coupling of these two concepts, that of constitution and that of revolution. Throughout the historico-juridical literature, which had been primarily that of the parliamentarians, by constitution one understood essentially the fundamental laws of the kingdom, that is to say a legal apparatus, something about convention . . . but from the moment where the constitution is not anymore a legal armature, an ensemble of laws, but a relation of force . . . one can restore it only if there is something like a cyclic movement of history . . . you see reintroduced here, by this idea of a constitution which is medico-military, that is to say a relation of force, something like a philosophy of cyclic history, the idea in all cases that history develops according to cycles. . . .

This link of three themes—constitution, revolution, cyclic history: here you have, if you want, one of the aspects of this tactical instrument that Boulainviller had developed. (FDS, 171–73)

Boulainviller is opposed to finding the constituent point not only in law but also in nature. His thought is both antijuridical and antinaturalist. The key adversary of this kind of analysis is “the human of nature, the savage.” This is understood in two senses, first, as “the savage, good or bad, the human of nature that the jurists or the theorists of right gave, before society, to form society, as an element from which the social body could constitute itself,” and, second, as the other aspect of the savage, the ideal element invented by the economists, the human without history or past, who is moved only by his or her own interest and who exchanges the product of his or her work for another product. So the notion of the savage that is opposed is simultaneously the one who leaves the forest in order to contract and found society and also the homo oeconomicus of exchange (FDS, 173). This double savage is the human of exchange: the exchanger of rights or the exchanger of goods. “As the exchanger of rights, they found society and sovereignty. As
exchanger of goods, they constitute the social body which is, at the same
time, an economic body” (FDS, 173–74).

Foucault suggests that the figure Boulainviller opposes to the savage
is the barbarian. Unlike the savage, the barbarian can be understood, com-
prehended, and described only in terms of his or her relation to civilization.
There is no notion of barbarism or cruelty (barbarie) without a civilization
for it to be outside of. The barbarian is always trampling at the frontiers of
states, colliding with the walls of the city. Unlike the savage, who rests on the
foundation of nature, the barbarian arises from the ground of civilization, but
he or she will always be in conflict with it. Therefore, the barbarian has a his-
tory—unlike the savage—because of the link to civilization. The barbarian
is not an exchanger but a dominator. The barbarian takes, or appropriates:
Rather than cultivate the land, the barbarian plunders and pillages. The bar-
barian’s freedom is based only on the freedom others have lost; whereas the
savage gives up some liberty to guarantee his or her life, security, and prop-
erty, the barbarian never gives up liberty. He or she creates a king or elects
a chief not to diminish his or her own power or rights but to strengthen them,
to be stronger in their relation with others. It is to multiply his or her own indi-
vidual force that the barbarian puts power into place. The barbarian’s form
of government is necessarily military and does not rest at all on contracts
of civil transfer (FDS, 174–75).

Boulainviller puts this notion of the barbarian to work in his histories,
suggests Foucault, and it forms one of the four elements of his study: con-
stitution, revolution, barbarism, and domination. The question is one of find-
ing out what is useful in barbarism: “How must one filter barbarian domina-
tion to achieve the constituent revolution?” It is the problem of finding within
the field of historical discourse the historico-political field, the tactical posi-
tions of the various groups, the various interests, the various centers of the
battle of the nobility or monarchical power, of the bourgeoisie (FDS, 176).
The question, then, is not a simple opposition of revolution or barbarism but
of revolution and barbarism, “the economy of barbarism in the revolution.”
The contemporary opposition of the journal Socialisme ou barbarie is there-
fore a false problem; the true problem is revolution and barbarism (FDS,
176–77).27 Through this move, Foucault suggests, Boulainviller has intro-
duced the figure of the blond beast—familiar, of course, from Nietzsche’s
On the Genealogy of Morality—the juridical and historical fact of invasion

27. Foucault cites a piece by Robert Desnos, “Description d’une révolte prochaine,” La
Révolution surréaliste, no. 3, 15 Avril 1925, 25, to support this. See FDS, 190 n. 9.
and violent conquest, the conquest of land and the servitude of men, and finally an extremely limited royal power. 28 Though Foucault thinks that there are many results of this move, he focuses on the three that are politically and epistemologically most important and that correspond to three clearly differentiated political positions (FDS, 177). 29

The first position is the most rigorous, the absolute filter, where all the traces of barbarism are covered over. Foucault uses the example of France after the German invasion. The roots of the nobility, the idea that they came from the other side of the Rhine, were denied. The invasion of the Francs is dismissed as a myth, an illusion, a creation of the works of Boulainviller. The Francs, rather, were a small group of allies who were called upon to resist the Roman invasion. It was not, therefore, invasion or conquest, but immigration and alliance. Their later dominant position—in particular, that of the king—is due to invasion, conquest, and dominance from within rather than from without. The power of the nobility is analyzed not as a result of a military invasion and the irruption of barbarism but as a result of internal usurpation. The nobility are political swindlers rather than barbarians (FDS, 177–80). Examples of this interpretation are the Abbé Dubos and his “absurd continuator,” Jacob-Nicolas Moreau. 30

The second position is closest to Boulainviller and aims to disassociate a Germanic liberty from the exclusive privileges of the aristocracy. In other words, it opposes the Roman absolutism of the monarchy to the primal liberties the Francs and the barbarians brought with them. The barbarians created not a small aristocracy but the body of the people. This idea supports a democracy rather than an aristocracy, an egalitarian understanding of soldier citizens: “no authority to follow, no reasoned or constituted authority” (FDS, 180). In this understanding, members of the aristocracy are complicit in absolutism; they support the king, who supports feudalism. “Of course, the aristocracy and the absolute monarchy will fall out one day, but one must not forget that they are, at root, twin sisters” (FDS, 181). The Abbé

29. As one of the anonymous reviewers of boundary 2 perceptively points out, this reading of Boulainviller is also useful in understanding Foucault’s concern with the Iranian revolution. Foucault wrote a number of reports for the Italian newspaper Corriere della sera and discussed the issues in interviews and elsewhere. The texts are collected in DE, 3:662–69, 679–94, 701–6, 708–16, 743–55, 759–62, 790–94.
Gabriel Bonnet de Mably and Jean-Paul Marat are among Foucault's examples.

The third position, Foucault suggests, is the most subtle, which, while it has had the greatest historical success, had less impact at the time when it was formulated. The central point is the distinction drawn between two types of barbarisms: the bad barbarism of the Germans and the good barbarism of the Gauls, who alone truly possessed liberty. This position allows two key moves: on the one hand, to disassociate liberty and the German; on the other, to disassociate the Roman and absolutism. It discovers in Roman Gaul elements of liberty that Boulainvillier and the other interpretations had suggested were imported by the Francs. Roman government had certainly included an absolute centralized power, but there was also a residue of the original liberties of the Gauls and Celts. Liberty, therefore, is compatible with Roman absolutism—a Gallic phenomenon, but above all an urban phenomenon. While the towns were destroyed by the invasion of the Francs, they were rebuilt and became a site of resistance to feudal power. Foucault suggests that clearly here is the root of the theory of the Third Estate, because for the first time the history of the town, the history of urban institutions, is at the heart of historical analysis. The Third Estate is not simply formed by concessions from the king but has a history, a strongly articulated urban right, in part imprinted with Roman right but founded on an ancient liberty, that is to say on ancient Gallic barbarism (FDS, 181–83). A number of writers contribute to this interpretation, notably Thierry.

Foucault's general point is that Boulainvillier has constituted a historical and political discourse within which the objects, pertinent elements, concepts, and methods of analysis are very close to each other. In the eighteenth century, this historical discourse is held in common by a whole series of historians who oppose each other strongly in their theses, hypotheses, and their political dreams, but who operate within a shared epistemic framework (une trame épistémique très serrée). This does not mean, of course, that this epistemic frame requires them to think in the same way; rather, it is the condition that allows them to think differently, and it is this difference that is politically pertinent. The tactical reversibility of the discourse is a direct function of the homogeneity of the rules of formation of this discourse. The regularity of the epistemic field and the homogeneity of the mode of formation of the discourse are usable in the struggles that are extradiscursive (FDS, 185). These variations within these discourses, and the Rousseau-esque juridicism of the noble savage to which they are opposed, are then utilized in a reading of the French Revolution (FDS, 186–89). What is impor-
tant, suggests Foucault, is that there are several interpretations of the revo-
lation, and the political and social struggles within it, in terms of the history of races (FDS, 188).

It is the discourse of history, then, rather than the discourse of right, or that of political theory, that has made war the principal analytic tool of political relations.Political theory, with its contracts, savages, inhabitants of prairies or forests, states of nature, war of all against all, and so on, is not sufficient. In the revolution, this element of war is not entirely eliminated, but is, rather, reduced, limited, civilized, and pacified. The nineteenth-century historical discourse has a model of a final calm, or a perpetual peace (apaisement final), not in the sense of an equilibrium (such as was found in the eighteenth century) but in the sense of a reconciliation (FDS, 193). The problem to be investigated is how the notion of war shifts from being a condition of the existence of society to a condition of the survival of society. It is a question of how war becomes reinscribed with a negative role, an exterior role, where it is no longer constitutive of society but the protector and conserver of society. What appears at this point is the idea of a society that uses war internally as a defense of society against the dangers that are born in and of its own body. It is, suggests Foucault, “the great reversal from history to biology, from the constituent to the medical in the history of the social war” (FDS, 194).

One of the crucial developments is the shift in the notion of the nation. In the eighteenth century, the idea of the nation, where it was deemed to exist at all, was associated with the body of the king. There was not a nation because there were a group of people who lived in a territory, who had the same language, customs, and laws. Instead, individuals, who did not form a union, all had, individually, “a certain relation, juridical and physical, with the real, living, corporal body [la personne] of the king.” “It was the body [le corps] of the king, in its physico-juridical relation with each of his subjects, which made the body of the nation” (FDS, 195). This notion of the nation was used by the nobility when wars between nations were fought. In order to investigate this shift, Foucault cites the Abbé Sieyès’s famous three questions: “What is the Third Estate? Everything. What has it been in the political order until now? Nothing. What does it want to be? To become something” (FDS, 194).31 Sieyès has another definition of the nation.32 This is a two-

31. Emmanuel Sieyès, Qu’est-ce que le tiers état? (Paris: Société de l’histoire de la Révolution Française, 1888), 27.
32. See Sieyès, Qu’est-ce que le tiers état?: “The nation exists prior to everything; it is the origin of everything. Its will is always legal, it is the law itself” (67).
part definition: On the one hand, it is a juridical condition (un état juridique), with a common law and with a legislature (simply an ability to makes laws; it does not necessarily need a king, nor even a government); on the other, it is a group of people held together by a certain interest who would have certain things in common, such as customs, habits, and eventually a language (FDS, 195–96). For Sieyès, there is no distinction between the people and the nation. This means that the nation is constituted of ordinary people as much as the king or nobility. Indeed, at one point, Sieyès falls back on the notion of race in relation to class: “Those who are not of my species are not my fellow men; a noble is not of my species; he is a wolf and I shoot.”

This political reelaboration of a notion associated with the aristocracy in the eighteenth century, this reinscription of the nation, the idea of the nation, makes possible a new kind of historical discourse. This understanding of the nation becomes central to state power. It is the active nucleus, the constitutive nucleus, of the state. “The nation is the State at least in outline [au moins en pointillé], it is the State insofar as it is in the process of being born, being formed and finding its historical conditions of existence in a group of individuals” (FDS, 200). There is a straight line in the passage from national totality to state universality, and this opens up a way where relations of force are not relations of war but are entirely civil. Foucault reiterates that, in Boulainviller’s work, the confrontation of nations within one social body was made possible through intermediate institutions (economy, education, language, knowledges, and so forth), but he suggests that in that case there was no pretense that this was not war. In the nineteenth-century case, the problem is entirely other; the problem is an internal tension against the universality of the state (FDS, 201). The question arises, however, as to how these internal struggles can be understood without recourse to military terminology. Can economic and political struggle be understood through properly economic-political terms? Or, on the contrary, must we return to the foundation of war that the historians of the eighteenth century tried to map (FDS, 202)?

A Matter of Life and Death

It is then, and only then, I suggest, that we can see the final chapter of La volonté de savoir in context. War has been used as a grid of intelligibility of historical processes. War has been conceived—initially, and for

practically all of the eighteenth century—as a war of races. The same notion of war is finally eliminated by historical analysis with the principle of national universality, at the time of the French Revolution. The theme of race does not disappear, however; rather, as has been intimated, it becomes reborn as a state racism. It is reborn, because power takes control of life, of the human as a living being, a sort of extension of state power (étatisation) over biology (FDS, 213). The power of the sovereign over individual lives was, of course, an ancient right, deriving from the Roman patria potestas (VS, 177; WK, 135), and by the time it was put on a contractual basis by the likes of Hobbes, it was already in a circumscribed and diminished form. The sovereign could directly take a life only to defend an attack on his body, or, only when the threat of external enemies was great could he expose people to the risk of death to defend him. The symbol of this was the sword (le glaive) (FDS, 214; VS, 178; WK, 135–36). The nineteenth- and twentieth-century development is that life can be protected, by death if necessary, through the defense of the social body as a whole (FDS, 214; VS, 179; WK, 136). The right of sovereignty was to make die or let live; the modern state can make live or let die (FDS, 214).

It is worth thinking this through in a little more detail. As Foucault notes, “Never have wars been so bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations” (VS, 179; WK, 135–36). He suggests that the modern formidable power of death is the counterpart of a power that administers life through precise controls and comprehensive regulations (FDS, 215; VS, 179–80; WK, 136). What happens is that politics becomes increasingly scientific: medical and mathematical. There is a discipline of the individual body—an anatomo-politics—and a regulation of the social body—a bio-politics of the population or human species (FDS, 216; VS, 183; WK, 139). Bio-power involves the building up of profiles, statistical measures, and so on, increasing knowledge through monitoring and surveillance, extremely meticulous orderings of space, and control through discipline. Birth and death rates and measures of longevity become important; fertility, illness, diet, and habitation become measured; statistics and demographics come together with economics and politics (FDS, 215–16; see also VS, 36; WK, 25). This use of figures is pronounced in medical campaigns at the time (FDS, 217). This notion of calculation is both a particular case and the foundation of the more general science of ordering. As Foucault notes, “The body is a bio-political reality; medicine is a bio-political strategy” (DE, 3:210).

Issues such as geographical area, climate, and hydrography become
important: there is a particular stress on the link between epidemics and proximity to swamps or marshes. The organization of the town becomes a central problem (FDS, 218). Governments, therefore, are not just concerned with their territory and the individuals within it but with an economic, political, scientific, biological problem, a problem of power, that of population (FDS, 218–19; see also VS, 35–36; WK, 25). Two series, then: “the series body—organism—discipline—institutions; and the series population—biological processes—regulatory mechanisms—state. An organic institutional ensemble: an organic-discipline of the institution, if you will, and on the other side, a biological and statist ensemble: bio-regulation by the state.” Foucault is keen to stress that there is not a clear separation of institution and state here; the disciplines tend to overflow their institutional context, the state is involved in the disciplines (FDS, 223). Equally, as the editors of the course underline, there is not a separation of these two understandings of power—as discipline and normalizing bio-power—in Foucault’s work. They are not independent of each other, or successive to each other, but rather are two conjoined modes of the functioning of knowledge/power.34

The reason that the problem of sexuality is so politically important for Foucault is that it is situated at the crossroads of the body and the population, of discipline and regulation (FDS, 224; see also DE, 3:153; FR, 67; VS, 191–92; WK, 145). “Sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species” (VS, 192; WK, 146). The campaigns against masturbation and incest, which allow power to infiltrate the heart of the family, are examples here.35 The creation of norms, by which the individual body can be measured and disciplined, and the social body can be measured and regulated, is central (FDS, 225).36 “The Constitutions written throughout the world since the French Revolution, the Codes drafted and revised, all this continual and noisy legislative activity should not deceive us: these are the forms which make acceptable this essentially normalizing power” (VS, 190; WK, 144). Understanding the demographics of a population could lead to campaigns to control birthrates and prolong life: This was the power to “make live” (FDS, 219–20). The extreme form of this is the power to make life, to make the monster, to make uncontrollable and universally destructive viruses (FDS, 226).

36. Foucault recognizes that any interpretation predicates a norm by which it measures, even if the normal is defined in terms of what it is not, as a consequence. See Les Anormaux, 46; and Elden, “The Constitution of the Normal,” 102–3.
The reverse side is the power to allow death. State racism is a recoding of the old mechanisms of blood through the new procedures of regulation. Racism, as biologizing, as tied to a state, takes shape where the procedures of intervention “at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race” (VS, 197; WK, 149).37 For example, the old anti-Semitism based on religion is reused under the new rubric of state racism. The integrity and purity of the race is threatened, and the state apparatuses are introduced against the race that has infiltrated and introduced noxious elements into the body. The Jews are characterized as the race present in the middle of all races (FDS, 76).38 The use of medical language is important. Because certain groups in society are conceived of in medical terms, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race. What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power (FDS, 230). The recoding of old problems is made possible through new techniques.

A break or cut (coupure) is fundamental to racism: a division or incision between those who must live and those who must die. The “biological continuum of the human species” is fragmented by the apparition of races, which are seen as distinguished, hierarchized, qualified as good or inferior, and so forth. The species is subdivided into subgroups that are thought of as races. In a sense, then, just as the continuum of geometry becomes divisible in Descartes,39 the human continuum is divided, that is, made calculable and orderable, two centuries later. As Anderson has persuasively argued, to suggest that racism has its roots in nationalism is a mistake. He suggests that “the dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to ‘blue’ or ‘white’ blood and breeding among aristocracies.”40 As Stoler has noted, for Foucault, it is the other way around: “A discourse of class derives from an earlier discourse of races.”41 But it is a more subtle distinction than

39. See Elden, “The Place of Geometry.”
that. What Foucault suggests is that discourses of class have their roots in
the war of races, but so, too, does modern racism; what is different is the
biological spin put on the concepts. But as well as emphasizing the bio-
logical, modern racism puts this another way: to survive, to live, one must be
prepared to massacre one’s enemies, a relation of war. As a relation of war,
this is no different from the earlier war of races that Foucault has spent so
much of the course explaining. But when coupled with the mechanisms of
mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely
different ways. Bio-power is able to establish, between my life and the death
of the other, a relation that is not warlike or confrontational but biological:
“The more inferior species tend to disappear, the more abnormal individuals
can be eliminated, the less the species will be degenerated, the more I—
not as an individual but as a species—will live, will be strong, will be vigor-
ous, will be able to proliferate.” The death of the other does not just make
me safer personally, but the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or
the degenerate or abnormal, makes life in general healthier and purer (FDS,
227–28). “The existence in question is no longer of sovereignty, juridical; but
that of the population, biological. If genocide is truly the dream of modern
powers, this is not because of a return today of the ancient right to kill; it is
because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the
race, and the large-scale phenomena of population” (VS, 180; WK, 136). “If
the power of normalization wishes to exercise the ancient sovereign right
of killing, it must pass through racism. And if, inversely, a sovereign power,
that is to say a power with the right of life and death, wishes to function with
the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it must also
pass through racism” (FDS, 228). This holds for indirect death—the expo-
sure to death—as much as for direct killing. While not Darwinism, this bio-
logical sense of power is based on evolutionism and enables a thinking of
colonial relations, the necessity of wars, criminality, phenomena of madness
and mental illness, class divisions, and so forth. The link to colonialism is
central: This form of modern state racism develops first with colonial geno-
cide. The theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically. But what
is important in the shift at the end of the nineteenth century is that war is
no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of
regenerating that race (FDS, 228–30). As Foucault puts it in La volonté de
savoir:

42. Some similar ideas are found in Michael Banton, The Idea of Race (London: Tavi-
Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of all; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity. Massacres have become vital [*vitaux*—understood in a dual sense, both as essential and biological]. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. (VS, 180; WK, 136)

The shift Foucault thinks is interesting is what might be called a shift from sanguinity to sexuality: sanguinity, in that it had an instrumental role (the shedding of blood) and a symbolic role (purity of blood, differences of blood); sexuality, when mechanisms of power are directed to the body, to life. The theme of race is present in both, but in a different form (VS, 194; WK, 147). We have moved from “a *symbolics of blood* to an *analytics of sexuality.* Clearly, nothing was more on the side of the law, death, transgression, the symbolic, and sovereignty than blood; just as sexuality was on the side of the norm, knowledge, life, meaning, the disciplines and regulations” (VS, 195; WK, 148). In Nazism, the two are combined. Eugenics and medical/mathematical techniques are coupled with the fantasy of blood and the ideal of the purity of the race. Foucault notes that there was immediate control of procreation and genetics in the Nazi regime, and that regulation, security, and assurance were imposed over the disciplined, ordered society; but at the same time, the old sovereign power of killing traversed the entire society. This was not simply confined to the state, nor simply to the SA or the SS, but ultimately to everyone, as, through denunciation, everyone could have this power over their neighbor (FDS, 231).

While destruction of other races was central to Nazism, the other side of it was the exposure of the German race itself to death, an absolute and universal risk of death. The entire German population was exposed to death, and Foucault suggests that this was one of the fundamental duties of Nazi obedience. Only this exposure of the entire population to the universal risk of death could constitute the Germans as the superior race, regenerated in the face of those races either totally exterminated or completely subjugated. We have, therefore, in Nazism, both the absolute generalization of bio-power and the generalization of the sovereign right of death. Two mechanisms—one classical, archaic; one new—coincide exactly. A racist state, a murdering state, a suicidal state. Accompanying the final solution was the order of April 1945 that called for the destruction of the conditions of life of the Ger-
man people themselves. A final solution for other races, an absolute suicide for the German race (FDS, 231–32).

Foucault wants to suggest that this is inscribed into modern states more generally. But the course is nearing an end at this point, and he does not really make good on this claim. He looks briefly at how the theme of bio-power was not criticized by socialism but repressed by it—developed and modified, certainly, but not fundamentally criticized. Foucault notes the anti-Semitism of French socialist parties during the Dreyfus Affair, and earlier in the Paris Commune. Equally, the state took control over life, risk, and reproduction in socialist states too. Its racism was not properly ethnic but evolutionary, biological, and was found in its treatment of the mentally ill, criminals, and political adversaries. More general than this Soviet model is the use of similar language in the class struggle. The idea of struggle against the enemy, eliminating the adversary within the capitalist society, thinking of physical confrontation with class enemies—all trade on the notion of racism. If struggle is simply economic elimination, a removal of the privileges of the class enemy, it has no need of racism; but if it resorts to confrontation, to physical violence, to risking life and seeking to kill, then it rests on racism. Every time socialism resorts to the language of struggle, Foucault suggests, there is the model of racism (FDS, 232–34). He ends the course inconclusively, questioning, “How can one make bio-power function and at the same time exert the rights of war, the rights of murder, and the function of death, if not passing through racism? It was the problem then, and I believe that it is always the problem” (FDS, 234).

The Constitution of the State

Foucault is instructive here in a much wider project. He has shown that politics is saturated with relations of war and racial conflict. Initially, this is found in the blood and mud of battle, but in its mathematical-medical, calculative mode, it is even more fatal. This calculative mode of thinking is related to the development of political arithmetic across Europe, which entailed the cataloguing of the physical and human resources of the state. The notion of population, which Foucault continues to trace in the next two courses given at the Collège de France, “Security, Territory, Population” and

43. See Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire, 87.
“The Birth of Bio-politics,” is thought in a new way. Equally, the rise of statistics, the description of states, the popularity of utilitarianism, and, indeed, the understanding of the study of politics as political science are all related to the calculative revolution.

Earlier, though, we find that a transformed understanding of state territoriality is perhaps the first example of the mathematicizing of the political. The notion of extension in Descartes’s understanding of space relates closely to the notion of political space resulting in part from the Treaty of Westphalia. It is no surprise that the rise of modern mapmaking techniques is also linked to the scientific revolution. The Cassini family’s use of satellite eclipses to measure France and Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban’s work on its clearly demarcated boundaries, the drawing of political boundaries along lines of latitude or longitude, the frontier zones in the conquest of the New World, and many other examples are all related to a particular way of grasping the modern world as a calculative mode of thinking. This can be helpful in situating current debates about the nature of globalization and the political death of the state. Rather than initiating a radical break, capitalism extends the mathematical, calculative understanding of territory to the entire globe, instead of merely a single state. The flows of information, the digital “revolution,” the Internet, global capital, and international deregulation are little more than the old ideas writ large. Crucially, though, there has been an acceleration in this that is dependent on a calculative understanding of time.

Calculation is, therefore, key to the constitution of the modern state. Constitution needs to be understood in this plural sense—legal, political, biological, and medical. In the notion of bio-power, where the medical and political come together, as a term that relates both to the politics of constitution and to the constitution of politics, we can see a particular example of this new understanding in the terms population and race. For Foucault, the war of races is inscribed in the constitution of the state.