Mais un jour, peut-être, le siècle sera Deleuzien

(Foucault 1994: 76)

Michel Foucault’s suggestion is often misconstrued. The usual translation, found in the Language, Counter-Memory, Practice collection, is: “perhaps one day, this century will be known as Deleuzian” (165). Unsurprisingly, it is regularly referenced in books on Gilles Deleuze (see, for example, Marks 79 and Dumoncel 67), and indeed there was a special issue of the journal SAQ entitled “A Deleuzian Century?” (Buchanan). But, as James Faubion, following Paul Rabinow, notes: the double entendre is neglected – le siècle can also mean “the circle of courtiers,” and the phrase can therefore also be translated as “some day, the in-crowd will be Deleuzian” (xix, xxxix n. 30). We might be content with this, laughing gently at Foucault’s prophetic irony. Deleuze himself certainly saw the suggestion as a joke, or at least as provocative (Negotiations 48-89). But there is yet more to this polysemantic phrase. Le siècle, especially in religious contexts, can mean the worldly life or the world as a whole, an exchange of a temporal marker for a spatial signifier.

Attempts to understand the world as Deleuzian have been widespread in recent years, with a range of studies taking up his concepts with alacrity. Of course, the “his” obscures the way in which many of his most used concepts are the ones he developed in conjunction with Félix Guattari, published in four important works. Indeed, in What is Philosophy? he and Guattari describe the task of the philosopher as that of formulating concepts (5) and, in his well-known interview with Foucault, Deleuze suggests that “a theory is exactly like a box of tools … it must be useful. It must function” (Language, Counter-Memory, Practice 208). Does this mean that we should simply sit back and watch while terms such as schizoanalysis, hybridity, smooth and striated space, the molar and the molecular, the rhizome, the refrain and others are paraded for the entertainment and edification of the multitude? Conceptual policing may seem to go against the very nature of the Deleuzian enterprise.
In spite of this, it seems instructive to me to slow down, to hesitate, to read and to think, before embarking on such an appropriation. That was certainly the way in which Deleuze approached his thinkers in studies of, among others, Nietzsche, Spinoza and Leibniz. Here, I am particularly concerned with thinking about the notion of deterritorialization that Deleuze developed in some of the works written in collaboration with Guattari. This term has been widely used in recent literature on globalization (for a critique see Elden, “Missing the Point”), but is usually divorced from its conceptual partner of reterritorialization. What is interesting about these terms in Deleuze and Guattari is the way in which they function both as a linguistic medium and in terms of organisms and their movement. Metaphoricity and mobility are, therefore, intertwined in important and complicated ways. Perhaps the most important recent study utilizing these terms has been Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s *Empire*, where sometimes they are used together and at times separately. The separation raises a number of problems, but in utilizing and developing these terms in a much more explicitly political way, they make space for further potential utilizations. Taking this forward, the conclusion of the essay stresses not the politics of deterritorialization but the politics of reterritorialization. It suggests that we can see this at play in recent events, but that, before we speak too freely of either deterritorialization or reterritorialization, we need to think far more carefully about territory itself, conceptually, historically and politically.

**Deterritorialization/Reterritorialization**

There are a number of ways in which these terms are used in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. As Ronald Bogue has usefully cautioned, the concept of *territory* is discussed “in its narrow ethological sense in *A Thousand Plateaus,*” but “is inseparable from the general notions of territorialization, reterritorialization and deterritorialization, which play through their thought in a wide range of contexts” (“Minority, Territory, Music” 114). These contexts have been helpfully discussed in some of Bogue’s own works, but in the wider field of literature they are often conflated. Bogue notes that the first recorded use of these terms is in 1966, in Guattari’s work on group psychology (“Art and Territory” 466). As Holland has also noted, the uses of deterritorialization/reterritorialization “derive from Lacanian usage” (“Schizoanalysis and Baudelaire” 241). Territorialization, in Lacan, refers to the way in which parental care structures and organizes the child’s body, how feeding and cleaning focuses behavior on specific zones or sites of the body (the mouth, the genitals, the anus, etc.). As Holland notes, in Deleuze and Guattari, deterritorialization shows how this centering on particular sites can be applied elsewhere. Holland gives the examples of movement from the mother’s breast and the Oedipal complex (“Schizoanalysis and Baudelaire” 241-42; see also “Deterritorializing Deterritorialization”).

The point, though, for both Bogue and Holland, is that this is not just a move toward the psychological register, but also toward the social, where the terms can
allude to capitalism, “the disconnection and reconnection of working bodies and environments – for example, the disconnection of peasants from grazing land by the Enclosures Acts in England, and their reterritorialization onto textile looms as wage-labor in the nascent garment industry” (Holland, “Schizoanalysis and Baudelaire” 242).

For Bogue, the aim of Guattari’s early work “is to extend to the domain of the social Lacan’s essentially psychological use of ‘territorialization,’” a process which is continued in Anti-Oedipus, where “deterior territorialization” and “reterritorialization” “figure prominently in tandem with the concepts of ‘decoding’ and ‘recoding’ ” (“Art and Territory” 466). In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari discuss different ways in which the world has been configured, as primitive-territorial, barbarian-despotic, or civilized-capitalist (also see Marks 95). What is significant about the capitalist machine is that it “seeks to multiply deterritorialised schizophrenic flows, never reaching a limit” (Marks 96). For Marks, following Lyotard (1972), “Marx was the first to locate the fluidity and deterritorialisation which is axiomatic of capitalism,” but it is Deleuze and Guattari who are capable of revealing this (Marks 97). As Marx and Engels famously proclaimed, “all that is solid melts into air” (70).

But although the term deterritorialization is found within Anti-Oedipus, it is in Deleuze’s work on Kafka that it takes a central role. Here, Kafka’s writings in German are seen as disruptive because of his position as a Czech Jew outside of Germany. Kafka himself, in a diary entry from Christmas Day 1911, discusses these issues: the springboard for the reflections of Deleuze and Guattari (see Kafka 148-53 and Bogue, “Minority, Territory, Music” 114-15). Other studies that Deleuze, in particular, undertook, emphasized these disruptive tendencies in writers such as Marcel Proust, Jack Kerouac, Samuel Beckett, Herman Melville and Henry Miller (Critique et clinique and Deleuze and Parnet. Also see Goodchild 55 and Bryden, Buchanan and Marks).

Some of Deleuze’s work on Nietzsche functions in a similar way. Indeed, in a piece written a couple of years before the book on Kafka, he explicitly relates the two: “The only parallel I can find here is with Kafka, in what he does to German, working with the language of Prague Jewry: he constructs a battering ram out of German and turns it against itself” (“Nomad Thought” 143 and see Marks 58-59).

This forms a distinct understanding of the concept of deterritorialization, based on the notion of a minor literature (Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature 16-17 and see also A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 97-98, 104-05). The notion of minor literature, which, rather than coming from a minor language, is that which “a minority constructs within a major language” (Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature 17), has been developed in recent work from the field of sociology, literary and cultural studies (see, among others, Appadurai and Papastergiadis). For Papastergiadis, for example, “the concept of deterritorialization has been a useful mode of understanding the fissures within language and cultural identity” (118). As he notes, “the cultural dynamic of deterritorialization has decoupled previous links between space, stability
and reproduction; it has situated the notion of community in multiple locations; it has split loyalties and fractured the practices that secure understanding and knowledge within the family and social unit” (117).

It is essential to note that these are quite narrow understandings, interesting in their own right, but limited to specific issues. Bogue notes that it is only in “1837: Of the Refrain” in A Thousand Plateaus that Deleuze and Guattari discuss “territory per se, engaging the subject via an analysis of music’s relation to animal ethology” (“Minority, Territory, Music” 125, also see “Art and Territory” 466). Bogue then leads us through a range of discussions of animal territoriality, touching on the work of Henry Eliot Howard, Bernard Altum, J. S. Huxley, Konrad Lorenz, Jacob von Uexküll and Raymond Ruyer, among others, spending most time on the last two, because of their importance to Deleuze and Guattari (“Art and Territory” 466-75). It is worth citing Bogue at length here:

In essence, what Ruyer is describing at such length are biological instances of de/reterritorialization, of the detachment or unfixing of elements and their reorganisation within new assemblages. Ruyer’s work, then, supports Deleuze and Guattari’s contention that a territory, in the biologic sense of the term, is created through the general process of deterritorialization, whereby milieu components are detached and given greater autonomy, and reterritorialization, through which those components acquire new functions within the newly created territory. (475)

From this we can stress one key thing: the continual process of de- and reterritorialization. In other words, the reconfiguration of spatial relations rather than their end. This is often missed: deterritorialization is part of a process. We find this insisted upon in several places in A Thousand Plateaus. They are “always connected, caught up in one another;” deterritorialization “always occurs in relation to a complementary reterritorialization” (10, 54; also see 181, 508 and What is Philosophy? 67-68). Indeed, they make this point more strongly when they stress the territoriality that is the condition for change: “we must therefore take a number of factors into consideration: relative territorialities, their respective deterritorializations, and their correlative reterritorializations” (A Thousand Plateaus 303, also see 203). In this, we see that deterritorialization, in spite of its name, does not mean the end of the importance of territory. Indeed, far from it, because territory is both its condition of possibility and, in some newly configured form, its necessary outcome.

In this light, it is worth turning our attention to Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of the nomad in A Thousand Plateaus. Contrary to visions of the nomad as without territory, they emphasize how nomads, too, follow “customary paths … from one point to another,” noting water, dwelling and assembly points. But these points are reached only in order to be left behind, they are stages on a life’s way, “strictly subordinated to the paths they determine, the reverse of what happens with the sedentary.” This is in contrast to the migrant, “for the migrant goes principally from one point to another, even if the second point is uncertain, unforeseen or not well localized” (A Thousand Plateaus
Deleuze and Guattari make a distinction here between a closed space and an open one. In the first, land is parcelled out and divided between people, in the second, people are distributed in space. This leads them to suggest the difference between these understandings of space, a distinction between striated and smooth space (380-81, 474ff).

The migrant moves in striated space, space that is divided and limited – “walls, enclosures, and roads between enclosures.” Every deterritorialization is partnered by a reterritorialization (381). Agriculture, therefore, is a form of both, with land distributed between people (rather than the other way round), and, for Deleuze and Guattari, “earth, unlike other elements, forms the basis of a striation, proceeding by geometry, symmetry, and comparison” (441). For the nomad, “there is no reterritorialization afterward as with the migrant, or upon something else as with the sedentary;” instead, “It is deterritorialization that constitutes the relation to the earth, to such a degree that the nomad reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself. It is the earth that deterritorializes itself, in a way that provides the nomad with a territory” (381). Even here, with the stress on deterritorialization, there is an insistence on the importance of reterritorialization. The nomad has a territory, but it is a territory in the process of making and remaking, one in which they are always changing, without a final resting point. The distinction between smooth and striated space is an important one, and relatively well-known. What is sometimes neglected is the emphasis they place on the fact that “the two spaces in fact exist only in mixture. Despite the important qualification that “the de facto mixes do not preclude a de jure, or abstract, distinction between the two spaces” (475), they note that “smooth space is continually being translated, transversed into a striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space” (474). This point seems to be crucial to an actual comprehension of the ways in which contemporary events are played out in space, and the way in which the spaces of Empire operate. It is a point to which I will return.

In terms of this project, the other issue of interest is the wide historical scope of the book. It is no surprise that the various plateaus all carry dates, given the range of examples. From Kleisthenes’ reforms in ancient Athens, through to the Roman Empire and the Crusades, and onwards to the discovery of the New World, we see that deterritorialization and reterritorialization (in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms) are not a new phenomenon. Rather, the continual remaking and reshaping of spatial relations may take on, indeed must take on, different forms in different times and places, but this is not a vision of a static world of fixed territories suddenly thrown into flux, as it is in much of the literature on deterritorialization. Here, I would sound a note of caution, suggesting that, although without a doubt spatial relations and territorial configurations have been continually under process of review, this does not mean that earlier periods had anything like a sense of “space” or “territory.” There is a weak version of this argument – which suggests that earlier periods had different perceptions of
these and other terms, and a strong version – which argues that they did not have a sense of them at all (on Kleisthenes in this context, see Eiden “Another Sense of Demos”).

There are other uses of these terms in Deleuze and Guattari. Indeed, in What is Philosophy? thinking itself is a form of deterritorialization (Patton, Deleuze: A Critical Reader 9), but this is hopefully a useful enough survey to reflect on (see also Colebrook). The terms emerge from an engagement with Lacan, and function as a way of moving from the psychological to the social sphere. They are used to analyze minor literatures and the potential for disruption and they re-emerge through engagement with ethology and ideas of nomads and migrants. For Paul Patton, the political implications are great: “Minority provides an element capable of deterritorialising the dominant social codes. Conversely, it is the process of deterritorialisation which constitutes the essence of revolutionary politics for Deleuze and Guattari” (Deleuze and the Political 7). For Philip Goodchild, who defines deterritorialization as “leaving home and travelling in other parts,” and reterritorialization as “making a new dwelling place” (218-19), they are, despite the title of his book, largely apolitical. In his view, issues surrounding desire are more important. Indeed, following the suggestions in What is Philosophy? he suggests that “Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts are entirely deterritorialized: they have no meaning, and only express a kind of nonsense – ‘deterritorialized’ means ‘outlandish’ ” (56, citing Deleuze, Critique et clinique 93).

Empire, Sovereignty and Territory
One of the most interesting adaptations of these ideas is found in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire. As they state in a note, “two interdisciplinary texts served as models for us throughout the writing of this book: Marx’s Capital and Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus” (415 n. 4). But this is not an idle claim, Hardt having written one of the best introductions to Deleuze’s thoughts (see also Negri, “On Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari”) and Negri having corresponded and written with both Deleuze and Guattari (Deleuze Negotiations, Negri, The Politics of Subversion and Guattari and Negri). Equally, a few years before, Negri argued that he had found in A Thousand Plateaus “the fundamental elements of the renewal of historical materialism, in function of the new dimensions of capitalist development” (“On Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari” 104, cited in Patton, Deleuze and the Political 6, also see Negri, The Politics of Subversion 95 note). He also admitted that his own work on Spinoza would have been impossible without Deleuze’s work (The Savage Anomaly 267, cited in Patton, Deleuze and the Political 143 n. 1).

In philosophical terms, Empire is perhaps the most sophisticated attempt to come to terms with the new world order that has partnered “an irresistible and irreversible globalization of economic and cultural exchanges” (xi). At its root, it is a reformulation of perceptions of sovereignty, with a recognition that models of sovereignty developed
in the early modern period – by Hobbes, for example – are no longer valid. There is a “new form of sovereignty,” and it is Empire that is the political subject that “effectively regulates these global exchanges.” Instead of the sovereignty of nation-states, we now have sovereignty of the world. This is important, because it underlines the way in which Hardt and Negri dismiss claims that sovereignty itself has declined (xi). It is a new logic of rule that is under investigation here. That rule might be exercised in different ways, in different places, and by a range of bodies, but the underlying “single logic of rule” is consistent (xii).

Hardt and Negri claim that the concept of sovereignty, in its modern sense, evolved in tandem with that of modernity. It was tied both to conflict within Europe and the colonial project, where it was formulated through Europe’s relation to its outside. It was also tied to developments in modern science (70). Elsewhere, I have discussed how sovereignty, political theory and scientific practices come together principally in the seventeenth century, with the Thirty Years War and the English Civil War showing the problems of divided rule and overlapping territoriality, with theoretical solutions offered by Hobbes and Leibniz, respectively. While Hobbes’ solution to the question of sovereignty is to concentrate it in one place, unlimited and undivided, Leibniz proposes a distinction between sovereignty and majesty, with the Emperor having the latter, meaning the power to command obedience and loyalty, and the princes of the Empire the former, tied explicitly to territory (Leibniz 347, for a discussion, see Elden, Missing the Point).

Hardt and Negri draw upon Weber and Foucault to theorize the emergence of modern sovereignty, but, in contrast to Foucault, suggest that, instead of a development from sovereignty to governmentality, there is “a passage within the notion of sovereignty” (88). Citing the famous principle from the 1555 Diet of Augsburg, they argue that “cuius regio, eius religio” means that “religion had to be subordinated to the territorial control of the sovereign” (94). The real issue here, though, is in danger of being missed due to the speed of their progress. Augsburg laid down a principle that the territorial princes in the Holy Roman Empire had religious freedom and that they could determine the religion of their subjects. This was only partly upheld at Westphalia a hundred years later, which proclaimed the “free exercise of territorial right” of the princes. In other words, rather than sovereignty being exercised over territory and then over religion, it is territory that makes the sovereign. Sovereignty, in this weak sense that is the first modern version of the term, is “territorial superiority,” in distinction to the majesty proposed by Bodin and claimed by the Emperor. Hobbes’ absolute version, proposed just a few years after Westphalia, should not blind us to the way in which it was Leibniz’s formulation that was a more accurate reflection of the situation at the time.

Nevertheless, Hardt and Negri recognize that the model of sovereignty in the imperial period was tied to boundaries, strictly defined and demarcated territories, with the partitioning of the world into discrete portions. “Wherever modern sovereignty
took root, it constructed a Leviathan that overarched its social domain and imposed hierarchical territorial boundaries, both to police the purity of its own identity and to exclude all that was other” (xii). Modern sovereignty is framed in terms of its territory and its relation to an outside (187), where “the spiritual identity of the nation rather than the divine body of the king now posed the territory and population as an ideal abstraction” (95). In contrast, Hardt and Negri argue that:

_Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command … Capital seems to be faced with a smooth world – or really, a world defined by new and complex regimes of differentiation and homogenization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization. (xii-xiii)_

There is obviously much here that derives from and parallels the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari. Perhaps particularly when they suggest that Empire is a concept, not a metaphor (xiii), and that the book’s aim is to be “a general theoretical framework and a toolbox of concepts” (xvi).

However, in places, they can seem to be proposing an understanding of the world as merely deterritorialized, without considering the concomitant process of remaking – of reterritorialization. In part, this is because, like many other theorists of globalization, Hardt and Negri do not seem to have a fully developed notion of what territory itself might be. The best I can find, by Negri alone, in an earlier work, is that “in advanced capitalism territory becomes the framework of productive potential; that is, it becomes the spatial ontology of the productive society” (90). But in _Empire_, for example, we find a discussion of the “deterritorializing capacities of communication,” bringing about both the “dissolution of territorial and/or national sovereignty” as well as “the very possibility of linking an order to a space” (346-47). They recognize that analysis meets an obstacle here: “At this point we cannot conceive of this relationship except in another space, an elsewhere that cannot in principle be contained in the articulation of sovereign acts,” but they do claim that “the space of communication is completely deterritorialized” (347). They attempt to justify this by suggesting that it does not fit the pattern of space analyzed in “terms of the monopoly of physical force and the definition of monetary measure” (347), which perhaps reveals the problem of that very definition.

Elsewhere, we find the suggestion that the “deployments of the imperial machine are defined by a whole series of new characteristics, such as the unbounded terrain of its activities” (35). Hardt and Negri also argue that “perhaps the fundamental characteristic of imperial sovereignty is that its space is always open” (167). While they are right in noting that political sovereignty in the modern period “conceived space as bounded, and its boundaries were always policed by the sovereign administration” (167), this seems
to me to confuse things somewhat. Space was understood in such a way in the modern period so as to allow it to be restricted, which would then enable it to be policed. Space was conceived of as something extending into three dimensions, qualitatively measurable and thereby amenable to partitioning, regulation and order. The sense of “space,” of *spatium*, that emerges in the late medieval period, which finds its most clearly worked through argument in Descartes, is not necessarily something that is circumscribed and divided politically into separate sovereign entities. But this sense of space is a necessary condition for such a political system: it makes it possible.

In contrast, rather than the strict differentiation of an earlier time, “the world market both homogenizes and differentiates territories, rewriting the geography of the globe” (310). It is clear that this phrase rests on the inclusive logic of the “both … and….” Change both homogenizes and differentiates. If the homogenization is a process of deterritorialization, the differentiation and, indeed, the homogenization itself evokes a passage of reterritorialization. This may not be based on what we commonly understand by territory, but the spatial context is clear. We find this most strikingly illustrated in a central passage:

*The striated space of modernity constructed places that were continually engaged in and founded on a dialectical play with their outsides. The space of imperial sovereignty, in contrast, is smooth. It might appear to be free of the binary divisions or striation of modern boundaries, but really it is crisscrossed by so many fault lines that it only appears as a continuous, uniform space. In this sense, the clearly defined crisis of modernity gives way to an omni-crisis in the imperial world. In this smooth space of Empire, there is no place of power – it is both everywhere and nowhere. Empire is an ou-topia, or really a non-place. (190, also see Hardt and Negri, Multitude 101-02)*

There is much going on here, and its conceptual prevarication can easily lead us to misconstrue its purpose. There is a danger that striated and smooth space are perceived as polar opposites, and we are, supposedly, seeing the passage from one to the other. For here, even if smooth space only appears to be free of striation, it is still being conceived of in such a way that it is different from, and seen in opposition to, striated space in the strict sense. While striated space is scored, chamfered, grooved, channeled and divided into shapes of various sizes, the smooth space of Empire is crisscrossed with lines, overlapping and creating jumbled points in a web of connections. Politically, we have the nation-state map of ordered Europe that progressively eradicates the overlapping sovereignties of medievalism, redistributing land in order to remove almost all the enclaves and exclaves, in contrast to the globalized world of the third millennium, a world of far-flung points connected in a network society like nodes in a system. But as Sparke puts it, “Hardt and Negri fail to distinguish between the globalist enframing of smooth space and the much more messy, uneven and asymmetrical political-economic geography of globalization that the vision of a
decentred and deterritorialized globe serves simultaneously to obscure and enable” (385). In other words, there may be a conceptual division within globalization, rather than a passage from a prior mode of spatial ordering. Indeed, it seems to me to make more sense to think of the two spaces as overlapping, the smooth space of Empire imposed over the striated spaces of modernity, the nation-states still attempting to cling to their sovereignty and territorial integrity in an age of globalizing markets and culture and emergent global modes of governance. The unevenness and asymmetry show the messiness, the incompleteness, the striation of the smooth. In other words, it reveals deterritorialization partnered with reterritorialization.

A Politics of Reterritorialization

I am not convinced that Deleuze and Guattari’s understandings of de- and reterritorialization, important and interesting though they are, are the most useful ways of understanding what is happening at the moment. In particular, I think that there is a danger in using ethological understandings of territoriality as a basis for understanding territory. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari analyze how bird-song is used to mark a territory, broadening this into a discussion of how the refrain functions as a “territorial assemblage [agencement].” What this means is that, whatever other functions it has, “it always carries earth with it; it has a land (sometimes a spiritual land) as its concomitant” (312. Also see 326-27). Earth [terre] and territory [territoire] are not the same, but as they describe it, earth “is the intense point at the deepest level of the territory or is projected outside it like a focal point, where all the forces draw together in close embrace” (338-39). Territory “is the product of a territorialization of milieus and rhythms” (314), and they give examples of birds and fishes, rabbits and monkeys, drawing upon a wide range of ethological literature in the process (also see What is Philosophy? 67). My concern is that there is not only a latent vitalism evoked here, in spite of the critique of some of this literature, notably in Konrad Lorenz’s work on aggression (On Aggression), but that, by this logic, all periods of human behavior have exhibited some sense of territoriality. It seems to me that territory is something rather more historical and limited. In other works, I have tried to develop an understanding of space (as opposed to place) as both a historical development and one centrally tied to understandings of calculation, in particular to a new mode of geometry that emerges from late scholasticism and finds its central exponent in Descartes (also see Casey and Malpas). Territory is, I believe, the political corollary of the notion of space – much more about calculation than boundedness, boundaries being a consequence of, and made possible by, “space” and the emergence of new techniques in cartography and surveying.

But even if we are to use Deleuze and Guattari as a tool, it seems important to see the push-pull, almost dialectical, balance of de- and reterritorialization. As Deleuze and Guattari insistently argue, every deterritorialization is partnered by a reterritorialization;
striated and smooth space can be theoretically disassociated, but are perpetually entwined in practice. In terms of contemporary insights, such a dialectical understanding of Deleuze and Guattari’s territorial politics remains underdeveloped. In one of the most interesting discussions of the politics of Deleuze’s work, Patton suggests that “Deleuze and Guattari’s mature political philosophy might be regarded as a politics of deterritorialisation” (Deleuze and the Political 136).

The concept of deterritorialisation implies a contrast between “earth” and “territory” (terre and territoire) understood as the two fundamental dimensions of nature. Territory is in the first instance territorialised earth, but it produces its own movements of deterritorialisation, while conversely the earth gives rise to processes of reterritorialisation and the constitution of new territories. Stable identities or territories are therefore secondary formulations upon the mobile earth. Deleuze and Guattari describe a world in which the overriding tendency is deterritorialisation. (9)

By contrast, I want to argue that perhaps in the current climate, as we try to come to terms with both Empire and Empire, it is rather a politics of reterritorialization that we need to think about and articulate. How is the globe being reconfigured, remade, re-divided?

David Harvey’s recent book The New Imperialism, a book that explicitly perceives itself as operating in the wake of Empire, makes a persuasive distinction between two contrasting elements within capitalist imperialism: its fundamental basis in state politics and the flow of capital between and beyond such strict territorial boundaries. Harvey calls this the logic of territory and the logic of capital (26, 33). Trading upon his earlier writings (for example The Limits to Capital and Spaces of Capital), Harvey discusses the strains between these two forms of logic. For example, the endless accumulation of capital creates tension with the territorial logic because of a need to “create a parallel accumulation of political/military power” (183). The boundaries of the state are necessarily exceeded by the capitalist demand for bigger and better markets, a tendency Marx perceptively noted in the Grundrisse: “capitalism by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier … to conquer the whole world for its market” (524, 539). Political demands may require military solutions, especially when the state takes on the role of protecting and promoting the internal economy on the world stage, what Lefebvre has called the state mode of production (De l’État, also see Elden, Understanding Henri Lefebvre 222-26, 231-35).

Harvey is certainly on the right track when he suggests that “imperialism cannot be understood, therefore, without first grappling with the theory of the capitalist state in all its diversity” (183), but this must be understood to include the state’s territorial foundation. By this I mean more than a simple cataloguing of its material base, but a deeper understanding of territory itself. Indeed, the recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown how it became easier for the US to fight a territorially identifiable foe rather than the Al-Qaeda “network of networks.” A deterritorialized challenge
was reterritorialized, situated by the US government and forced onto a geographically located base. Baghdad could be found and targeted and Saddam located more easily than could a dispersed and splintered organization. Harvey identifies this clearly when he suggests that “with most of the American public uncaring and uninformed about almost anything geographical, it proved fairly easy to parlay the hunt for terrorists into a campaign to hunt down and remove Saddam” (15, see Leaman). In a quote variously attributed to Ambrose Bierce or Paul Rodriguez, war is supposedly “God’s way of teaching Americans geography.” Reversing Marx, this is comedy replayed as tragedy (Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” 146).

But the territorial aspects of the war on terror go beyond these straightforward, if important, geographies. One of the key issues is the way in which the term "territorial integrity" is being used. Territorial integrity is a term with two interlinked and usually compatible meanings. The first is that states should not seek to promote border changes or secessionist movements within other states. This also applies to attempts to seize territory by force. The second meaning is the standard idea that within its own borders, within its own territory, a state is sovereign. Territorial integrity, in this sense, can be found enshrined within the UN Founding Charter:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. (Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1: Purposes and Principles, Article 2 Paragraph 4)

It is also found in numerous Security Council Resolutions, and in the constitutions of several countries. States are supposed to recognize the equal legal standing of other states, and, therefore, respect their sovereignty within the limits of their boundaries.

In recent years, though, this notion of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states has come under scrutiny. Tony Blair was one of the first to make this assumption problematic, notably in a speech in Chicago in April 1999, where he called for a “new doctrine of international community.” Under this doctrine, intervention could be justified, not on the basis of “any territorial ambitions but on values” (1999). At the time, this was a justification of the actions in Kosovo, but it was used soon after to legitimize British involvement in Sierra Leone. Since the war on terror commenced, however, several other examples have been given. One of the most striking is that given by Richard Haass, Director of Policy at the US State Department, in April 2002:

Sovereignty entails obligations. One is not to massacre your own people. Another is not to support terrorism in any way. If a government fails to meet these obligations, then it forfeits some of the normal advantages of sovereignty, including the right to be left alone inside your own territory. Other governments, including the United States, gain the right to intervene. In the case of terrorism, this can even lead to a right of preventive, or peremptory, self-defense. You essentially can act in anticipation if you have grounds to think it’s a question of when, and not if, you’re going to be attacked. (quoted in Lemann)
Blair too, has warmed to this theme:

So, for me, before September 11th, I was already reaching for a different philosophy in international relations from a traditional one that has held sway since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648; namely that a country’s internal affairs are for it and you don’t interfere unless it threatens you, or breaches a treaty, or triggers an obligation of alliance ... The best defence of our security lies in the spread of our values ... But we cannot advance these values except within a framework that recognises their universality. If it is a global threat, it needs a global response, based on global rules. (Speech, Sedgefield, 5 March 2004)

Blair has similarly called for revisions to the UN charter that allow this changed position (Mansion House Speech on Foreign Policy, 16 November 2004).

While there are clearly numerous problems with such positions, not least the Eurocentric projection of universal values, it is notable that the notion of “territorial integrity” in the other sense is continually stressed by Blair and others. In fact, Blair generally goes out of his way to underline the importance of the territorial integrity of most regions he subsequently orders to be bombed. Security Council resolutions stressed the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, even as its government complained to the UN that it was being violated. It has similarly been articulated for Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, and even, recently, for Sudan. Challenges to territorial integrity have been identified as terrorism: China has used the notion to protest against Muslim separatists in Xinjiang province calling for a separate East Turkestan; Russia has stressed its importance in relation to Chechnya; and India has long insisted on it in relation to Kashmir. The US has generally subscribed to these recodings. As I write these lines, the outcome of the Ukraine election is still in doubt and concerns regarding the viability of that country’s unity are being voiced. Most notably, the term has been insisted upon in relation to Iraq. Despite the artificial construction of a country from three provinces of the Ottoman Empire – Mosul, Baghdad, Basra – under British mandate following World War One, this most important territorial issue in Iraq can not even be mentioned now. Bush, Blair and Aznar stressed that they envisaged “a unified Iraq with its territorial integrity respected” as an outcome of the war (Azores Summit Statement, 16 March 2003), and subsequent UN resolutions and the express wishes of several of Iraq’s neighbors have supported this. Only dissident voices, such as Naqishbendi in The Kurdistan Observer, have suggested that the maintenance of the arbitrary unity is the root of the problem, proposing three states – from north to south: Kurdish, Sunni, Shiite – with the Kurds and Shiite’s providing some kind of financial recompense to make up for the uneven distribution of oil reserves.

While dominant powers are, therefore, able to suggest that the precepts of international law should be revised in accordance to their values, it seems that the other side of the coin is that secessionist movements, that is, those who want to challenge any notions of territorial integrity, are increasingly being recoded as terrorists. This
can be profitably related to Weber’s famous definition of the state: “The state is that human community, which within a certain area or territory [Gebietes] – this ‘area’ belongs to the feature – has a (successful) monopoly of legitimate physical violence” (510-11). The point here is not just that standard discussions of the state neglect the territorial aspect of its character; nor that this definition renders any use of violence by non-state actors necessarily illegitimate; but that any potential redrawing of the borders of a state limits the extent of the state’s ability to use violence and is, therefore, in itself, necessarily violent and illegitimate. As Blair noted in 2002, “today boundaries are virtually fixed. Governments and people know that any territorial ambition threatens stability, and instability threatens prosperity.”

This explicit linking of territorial issues, stability and prosperity is revealing. It is a concern that is important in the various strategies that the US, notably, has adopted in recent years in order to safeguard its interests. Of the many strategies, one is particularly worth noting, because it makes explicit the territorial issues that are implicit within globalization. This is the “Pentagon’s New Map,” a map of a world where, as Thomas Barnett puts it, “disconnection defines danger” (“The Pentagon’s New Map” and The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century).

Barnett’s map shows a world with a “functioning core” and a “non-integrating gap,” formed by those countries that share American values and can be seen as part of a globalized world, and those which do not. The map is represented in two ways. One is a picture of the globe in two halves, showing its physical geography, but with a dark “stain” spreading over the center, across the equator and running north and south to various degrees. On the other map, “major U.S. military operations 1990-2003,” these “excluding humanitarian operations,” are plotted. These operations are subdivided into combat, show of force, contingent positioning, reconnaissance, evacuation, security, and peacekeeping (“The Pentagon’s New Map” 144-45). A line snakes around these plotted areas, demarcating the “non-integrating gap,” like a lasso thrown around the problem places, a hole in the global ozone layer. This gap is a contiguous area, including Central and South America, with the exception of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile; Africa (except for South Africa); the Middle East and the Balkans; the Central Asian Republics of the former USSR; South-East Asia, Indonesia and the Philippines. There are but a few exceptions to the inclusion of all the places that the US military has been involved since the end of the Cold War, notably North Korea (149). For Susan Roberts, Anna Secor and Matthew Sparke, “the map is both that which is to be explained and the explanation itself, descriptive of the recent past and predictive of future action” (890, also see Barnett, “The Pentagon’s New Map” 153). These authors usefully discuss how the “common neoliberal imagined geography of the globe as a smooth, de-centred, borderless, level playing field” is seemingly in tension with this model of the world as divided and orientated around a new US hegemony, which we might perceive as striated and scarred. For them, following Thomas
Friedmann (373), this tension is implicit in the neoliberal project, with the US as the hidden fist that abets the economy (894). Barnett talks of decreasing the gap, effectively tightening the noose around the non-globalized world. What is significant is that the map operates with no outside: the gap is within its core.

**Conclusion**

What these and other examples show is the concomitant reterritorialization that coincides with deterritorialization. New geographies, maps and territorial configurations are emerging. If John Locke founded his seventeenth-century argument for property accumulation on the basis that “in the beginning all the World was America” (II §49), perhaps today we are seeing an attempt to turn back the clock. Indeed, Barnett’s solution to the global malaise is “more Locke” (“The Pentagon’s New Map” 166).

Although Hardt and Negri are careful to argue against seeing Empire as an American venture, the organization *Project for the New American Century* (set up during the Clinton years by a number of prominent conservatives, including Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, Francis Fukuyama, Donald Rumsfeld, Dan Quayle, and Paul Wolfowitz) seems determined to mould it in its own image. In its founding Statement of Principles, it calls for “a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity,” which, although it “may not be fashionable today… is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next” (“Statement of Principles”). It subsequently lays out the military program required for this new century in a major report (*Rebuilding America’s Defenses*), which has clearly influenced “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (United States, The White House, *The National Security Strategy*).

If the century is, indeed, defined in this way, the world will be reshaped. This shift is worth stressing: a persuasive point made by Neil Smith is that Henry Luce’s 1941 editorial for *Life* magazine, “The American Century,” masks its territorial, imperial ambitions by means of a temporal aspiration (18-20). As Harvey notes, PNAC “deliberately repeats, therefore, all the evasions that Smith exposes in Luce’s presentation” (*The New Imperialism* 191).

Perhaps, then, in the current global climate (and however loosely we define ourselves as a crowd of followers of such thoughts as Deleuze and Guattari’s), we need both to articulate a response to such geographical obfuscation and understand what is actually taking place. Although some important steps have been taken in this direction by geographers and other spatially minded social theorists, it seems to me that discussions of deterritorialization and reterritorialization require more than a straightforward deployment. In attempting to demonstrate how these terms are utilized in the work of Deleuze and Guattari and to show how they are deployed in a more explicitly political sense in *Empire*, and to highlight some contemporary territorial issues, I have essentially opened up a much deeper and more difficult problematic in...
this article. That is, that before we attempt to understand deterritorialization, and to articulate a politics of reterritorialization, we need to undertake a more detailed – that is conceptual, historical, and political – analysis of territory itself. In other words, what precisely is it that we have supposedly gone beyond?

This is a long-term project investigating the interrelation of mathematical, philosophical and political conceptions of space. The guiding theme is that there is a relation, but that this is not a strict, causal relation, but rather a complicated set of shifts and developments that needs to be investigated carefully. What is at stake in this project is an understanding of the ways in which advances in geometry and calculus allow more exact mapping of the territories of states in Europe and increasingly abstract geometries of division in the New World. For if territory can be re-thought not as bounded space, but as the political form of the type of conceptualization of space that makes boundaries possible, we may well find that contemporary events are a variant within an existing spatial-political configuration, rather than the ontological shift they are often presumed to be.⁹
Notes

1. The fact that Dumoncel writes in French shows that this is not merely an issue of translation.

2. See also the comment made at the very beginning of A Thousand Plateaus: "The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us was already several, there was already quite a crowd" (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 3).

3. We should remember that Guattari was trained by Lacan.

4. Tellingly, when they discuss this in Multitude they entirely neglect the spatial content (16).

5. On this criticism of Empire, see Painter, more generally Minca and Balakrishnan.

6. This would not have concerned Deleuze. See his suggestion that "everything I've written is vitalistic, at least I hope it is" ("Lettre-préface" Negotiations 143, cited in Daniel Smith, "A Life of Pure Immanence" xiii).

7. I owe this phrase to Burke 14.

8. There is a key question, raised by Meikins Wood, as to whether the thesis of Empire can “accommodate the military actions of an imperial nation-state, and least of all the ‘democratic’ U.S.A.” (71). Hardt and Negri's answer can be found in Multitude, the first part of which is entitled “War,” although it seems to require quite a lot of conceptual back-pedaling to do so.

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