Reading Logos as Speech: Heidegger, Aristotle and Rhetorical Politics

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Thus aletheuein shows itself most immediately in legein. Legein, “to speak,” is what basically constitutes human Dasein. In speaking, it expresses itself, in the way, by speaking about something, about the world. This legein was for the Greeks so preponderant and such an everyday affair that they acquired their definition of man in relation to, and on the basis of, this phenomenon and thereby determined it as zoon eichon logon.

—Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist.¹

Between late 1921 and the composition of Being and Time, Heidegger devoted an enormous amount of time to Aristotle, in a number of lecture courses, supplementary seminars, and a manuscript that was to serve as an introduction to a book on him. As Heidegger notes in a 1924 lecture course, Aristotle deserves an honored place in the Greek and even the entire Western philosophical tradition (GA18, 5). That the book on Aristotle mutated into Being and Time demonstrates the importance of the project; that Aristotle was the subject of the projected Division III of the second part of that book shows Heidegger’s continued interest in him. That said, it is not so much in the explicit material on Aristotle that the debt is felt in Being and Time, but that Being and Time, in the actually existing version, owes much of its terminology to Aristotle, and indeed its very structure is grounded in an Aristotelian distinction.

In a 1924–25 course devoted to Platonic dialogues, in which, however, only the Sophist was actually considered, Heidegger provides an extensive discussion of Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, as a prelude (until p. 188 of the German text). In it he makes a great deal of Aristotle’s distinction between poeisis and praxis, making and doing, and the intellectual virtues that apply to them—techne and phronesis.² The first part of Division I of Being and Time is concerned with the techne of poeisis; the second part and the entirety of Division II with the phronesis of praxis.³ It is
in relation to the second that Heidegger suggests that the basic constitution of human Dasein, human existence, in its comportment to other beings that share its way of being, is speaking. It is in speaking about something, about something in the world, that it expresses itself. Aletheuein, so easily translated as the empty “being-true,” is the idea of an uncovering, an unconcealing, which plays a central role both in the *Sophist* course and also throughout Heidegger’s career. The verb “to speak,” *Sprechen*, is Heidegger’s translation of the Greek *legein*, that is the verbal form of the term *logos*, which we would commonly associate with logic, reason, rationality. Instead, for Heidegger, *logos* is speech. It is a peculiarly practical sense of speech though, that finds its ultimate outcome in what speech does, of which rhetoric is a privileged form. In outlining the basis of this argument I want to expose how, for Heidegger in the early 1920s, his determination of the political is fundamentally grounded upon this distinction. Heidegger notes how the *zoon echon logon* is the Greek determination of the human being: as that living thing which has *logos*. *Zoon echon logon* is equated, as we shall see, with the *zoon politikon*.

Heidegger’s Aristotle

In order to trace this, it is necessary to reconstruct the path of Heidegger’s work on Aristotle. This was a monumental project, quite probably the most sustained engagement with a thinker in his career, surpassing even the later work on Nietzsche. Heidegger notably attempts to do this without the support of any literature on Aristotle, seeking to strip off the layers of interpretation in a return to the texts themselves. This reading of Aristotle is therefore part of Heidegger’s de-struction [*Destruktion*] of the tradition. Of this de-struction Heidegger writes:

*Ruthlessness toward the tradition is reverence toward the past, and it is genuine only in an appropriation of the latter (the past) out of a de-struction of the former (the tradition). On this basis, all actual historiographical work, something quite different from historiography in the usual sense, must dovetail with philosophy’s research into the matters themselves.* (GA19, 414)

The way the “tradition” is received in the present covers over the past. Heidegger’s notion of de-struction is therefore far from negative: it is an uncovering, a de-structuring, an archaeology of the levels of interpreta-
tion, the layers of sedimentation of the tradition that have obscured the issues at stake, the matters themselves. With Aristotle this is largely the obscuring reading of scholasticism (GA18, 9). Like Heidegger’s work more generally, this history is a critique of the present, an opening to a better future.

This engagement began with a seminar exercise on De anima in 1921, which Kisiel describes as “an hors d’oeuvre before the main meal” (1993, 230). This was followed by a course in winter semester 1921–22 entitled Phenomenological Interpretations to Aristotle. Heidegger always referred to this course merely as “Introduction” (see GA63, 47), paving the way for work on Aristotle, which came in huge detail in the following semester’s course, which has only recently appeared (GA62). This too offered “phenomenological interpretations,” concerning his works on “ontology and logic,” particularly Metaphysics A and Physics A. The next semester was one of the very few Heidegger did not lecture, but he began a monumental seminar (again under the same title), continuing into the next semester, while revising some of his notes toward the Aristotle book he was planning on writing. The introduction to this book, never completed, but circulated for employment purposes, is the now famous Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation piece (PIA). Aristotle plays an important role in the next two courses (GA63 and GA17), before assuming centre stage in the Plato’s Sophist course and Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy. (We should also note a further seminar on the Nicomachean Ethics in summer semester 1922, and one on Physics Book B in winter semester 1923–24).

Heidegger’s principal claim is that the problem of logic is understood too narrowly, and that the notion of logos is reduced to this narrow understanding. Indeed, he claims that “philosophy, after Aristotle, no longer understands the problem of genuine logic,” it has been reduced to formal, academic logic (GA61, 20; see GA1, 17–43). In some later courses Heidegger makes this more explicit, talking of an original logic (GA20, 2), a logic that would not be an ontic logic, a school logic, but a hermeneutically ontological logic, looking at the interaction of being, truth and language (GA21, 12–19; GA18, 9). Logic for Heidegger was always a logic of logic: ontology was the science of being, logos was the way of access to the being of beings (GA19, 438; see 205, 529, 626 Supplement 25; GA1, 288); logic was a science of the ways being was addressed and articulated. In a marginal note added to a transcript of the course, Heidegger suggests that the term “logic” comes “precisely from onto-logy; the ‘logy’ more original than logic” (GA19, 438 n. 3). Heidegger argues that the theoreti-
cal sense of *logos* for the Greeks was the proposition, but this has been taken by Western philosophy to be the only sense, leading to varieties of propositional logic (GA19, 252–53). In the winter semester 1922–23 seminar, according to Kisiel, *logos* is central to the ontological categories. *Logos* plays a role in *episteme (sophia)*, and to understand Aristotle on ontology and logic we need to begin with *episteme* in the *Physics.*

We can see the contours of this overall project very clearly in the draft of the Aristotle book introduction. Heidegger suggests that the “the following investigations serve a history [Geschichte] of ontology and logic” (PIA 1), the two categories of GA62. Aristotle provides the basis, the ground, for an investigation into these crucial categories:

> The problematic of philosophy has to do with the being of factical life. In this regard, philosophy is principal *ontology.* ... The problematic of philosophy has to do with the being of factical life in the how of its being-claimed and being-interpreted at any particular time [im jeweiligen Wie des Angesprochen- und Ausgelegtseins]. This means that philosophy, as the ontology of facticity, is at the same time the categorical interpretation of the claiming and interpreting; that is, *logic.*

Ontology and logic are to be brought back into the primordial unity of the problematic of facticity and are to be understood as the expressions of principal research; which can be described as the *phenomenological hermeneutics* of facticity. (PIA 16)

We can see here how the interpretation of *logos* as speech is crucial to understanding the overall project of a hermeneutics of facticity, of existence. Heidegger again:

> With this there is indicated the *visual stance* [Blickstand] which the following interpretations, as phenomenological and as investigations into the history of ontology and logic, will take. The idea of the phenomenological hermeneutic of facticity includes within it the tasks of: formal and material object-theory [Gegenstandskunde] and logic; the theory of science [Wissenschaftskunde]; the “logic of philosophy”; the “logic of the heart”; the logic of "pre-theoretical and practical" thought; and it includes these within itself, not as some unifying collective concept, but rather according to its own effective force as the principal approach of the philosophical problematic. (PIA 17–18)

As in many of these early lecture courses, the root of the discussion of *logos* comes in the context of a discussion of the root of phenomenology. We find this especially in summer semester 1923, when Heidegger schematizes again, in another of these succinct but pregnant strings: ““Phe-
nomenology’—logos—pseudos—alethes,” that is, language, falsity, truth (GA63, 106). The original title of this lecture course was Logic, but this clashed with that of another professor, and so it was changed to Ontology. In some respects these two titles were interchangeable for Heidegger at this time. The Greek notion of logos was understood as “discourse” about being. In this respect logic was hermeneutics, not understood in its common usage, but in the particular sense Heidegger gives it in the subtitle of the course, Hermeneutics of Facticity. Hermeneutics means, “in connection with its original meaning . . . a definite unity in the actualising of hermeneuein (of communicating), i.e., of the interpreting of facticity in which facticity is encountered, seen, grasped, and conceptualised” (GA63, 14; see GA2, 37).

Heidegger makes some remarks in this course that are useful in coming to terms with his interpretation of logos. He suggests that Aristotle’s De Interpretatione “deals with logos in terms of its basic accomplishment of uncovering and making us familiar with beings” (GA63, 10). Logos has a fundamental property of aletheuein, that is, “making what was previously concealed, covered up, available as unconcealed, as there out in the open” (GA63, 11). Because of this, Heidegger suggests that:

We should be wary of the concept of a “being endowed with reason” insofar as it does not capture the decisive meaning of zoon logon echon. In the paradigm academic philosophy of the Greeks (Aristotle), logos never means “reason,” but rather discourse, conversation [Rede, Gespräch]—thus man is a being which has its world in the mode of something addressed. This levelling off of concepts already came into play in the Stoics, and we find logos, sophia, and pisteis surfacing as hypostatic concepts in Hellenistic speculation and theosophy. (GA63, 21–22)

This traditional definition has become that of animal rationale (GA63, 26; GA18, 13). This means that though the Greeks understood animal rationale in a fundamental way, the term has become something entirely other:

The position which looked at the human with the definition “animal rationale” as its guide saw them in the sphere of other Daseins [Daseinenden] with them in the mode of life (plants, animals) and indeed as a being which has language (logon echon), which addresses and discusses its world—a world initially there for it in the dealings it goes about in its praxis, its concern taken in a broad sense. The later definition “animal rationale,” “rational animal,” which was indifferently understood simply in terms of the literal sense of the words, covered up the intuition which was the soil out of which this definition of human being originally arose. (GA63, 27–28)
In addition, in reading the term *zoon logon echon* we should bear in
the mind that to say that the human is the animal or being that has language
is not to say that humans merely possess it, but that they are, at the same
time possessed by it. As Aristotle notes in the *Metaphysics*, having means
both an activity of the haver and the thing had, and a disposition (1022b4–
14, see 1023a8–25). 13 Having is akin to holding, in the way that a fever has
hold of a man, or a tyrant has hold of a city (1023a10). The verb is, as
Hatab puts it, in between the haver and the thing had. 14

Introduction to Phenomenological Research

For the purpose of an engagement with the notion of *logos* and rhetorical
politics, the most important instances of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle
are found in the two lecture courses delivered immediately before the one
on the *Sophist*. 15 These three courses were his first at Marburg, in his first
full professorial role. The first is a course entitled *Introduction to Phenom-
eno logical Research* (GA17). Although it is largely devoted to analysis
and comparison of Descartes and Husserl, Heidegger spends the first forty
pages or so in an analysis of Aristotle, particularly the notion of *logos*. The
reason for this is that Heidegger is once again interested in analyzing the
roots of the word “phenomenology.” Heidegger wants to trace a history of
these “two originary words of Greek philosophy,” namely *phainomenon*
and *logos* (GA17, 1–2). 16 One of the ways that he does this is through
readings of some works of Aristotle, notably *De Anima* and *De Inter-
pretatione*.

The first of these texts of Aristotle is entitled *Peri psuches*, usually
translated as “On the Soul.” But Heidegger cautions that this title is al-
ready misleading, if we simply stop here, because it fails to take into ac-
count the central role of language, *Sprache*. Heidegger argues that
“perception [Wahrnehmung], thinking, and desiring [Wollen] are for
Aristotle not experiences [Erlebnisse].” Accordingly, *Peri psuches* “is not
psychology in the modern sense, but deals with the being of humans (that
is, of the living person [Lebendem] in general) in the world” (GA17, 6).

It is the same with speaking, so equally we need to be careful in our
interpretation of the notion of *logos*. “Logos is phonetic [lautliches] being,
that means it is voice [Stimme]” (GA17, 14). The classic place to look for
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this is Peri Hermeneias [De Interpretatione or On Interpretation] Book 4, where Aristotle provides a definition of logos: “Logos de esti phone semantike” (16b26). A standard English translation has this as “a sentence is significant speech,” although phone is more usually understood as voice or sound. Heidegger does not really translate this phrase, but poses a number of questions: “The first question is now: What is phone, then phone semantike, finally: what is logos?” (GA17, 14). Aristotle makes it clear in this classic definition that though all sentences have this meaning, this semantike, this does not mean that they are all propositions, that we could ascribe truth or falsity to them. A request or a prayer, for example, is a logos, but does not have a characteristic of either alethes or pseudes (Interpretation, 17a1–6). Heidegger adds questions, instructions, requests or calling attention [Aufmerksamachen] to this category—they are not “true or false,” it makes no sense to call them judgments. Whilst they may be aletheuein, a mode of being-true, of uncovering, not all instances of logos are such (GA17, 20). Instead of seeing truth in terms of propositions, we should see propositions in terms of truth. Speaking is being with the world, it is something originary and situated before judgement” (GA17, 20–21).

Heidegger suggests that the Genesis of words is not the physiological being of humans, but their proper existence [eigentlichen Existenz]. As long as the human is in the world, it has need of speech: “it speaks, insofar as the world is discovered as a matter of concern [Besorgbares] for it and in the ‘for it’ sees itself” (GA17, 16). This does not mean that the word [Wort] is simply there like a work-tool [Werkzeug], an organ (organon, 17a2) as, for example, the hand is. Rather, “speech is the being and becoming [Werden] of humans themselves” (GA17, 16). Heidegger goes on to relate this to the question of time, and our experience of it (GA17, 16–17).

Whilst we therefore have some sense of what logos is, this is a mere Vormeinung, a pre-opinion. We still have no idea what the concept of logos meant for the Greeks, in its natural state of Dasein. Hellenism, that is later Greek thought, has turned this into linguistics and grammar, “a doctrinaire treatment and theory” (GA17, 17). In the following course he even describes logic as a Gewächs of Hellenistic school philosophy, a tumor on this philosophical current (GA18, 9). All modern language formulations come from this, as indeed does the theory of knowledge and other related issues, so that the question of how the Greeks lived in their language is no longer asked. But, Heidegger suggests, “the Greeks lived in their language in an excellent way, were lived by it; and they were conscious of this.”
“The responding and discussing ability of the meeting of world and self, which requires no philosophy, characterises the being of humans as *logon echein* [Politics, 1253a9], having speech *[Sprache]*)” (GA17, 17–18; GA22, 310).

Talking [*Das Reden*] is therefore not a characteristic [*Eigenschaft*] like “having hair,” but it “constitutes the specific existence [*Existenz*] of humans,” because “the human is in the world in such a manner that this being with the world is what it speaks about” (GA17, 21). This is a fundamental definition of being-human, a life in the possibility of dealings [*Umgänge*] with *pragmata*, the world as a matter of concern [*besorgen*], such that in its being it speaks. “The being is in its *praxis* essentially characterised by speech” (GA17, 21–22). *Logos* is a possibility of human being, which brings it to the highest possibility of its being, the *eu zên*. But this is no longer mere *logos*, but *dialektos*, speaking with others, *hermeneia* (420b19), moving toward an understanding with others (GA17, 21–22). Speaking is therefore at one with the mode of hearing, listening. It should accordingly be understood not in isolation, but as part of an exchange, what we might call a speech community (GA17, 28).

Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy

At one point in the final early course at Freiburg, Heidegger added a note to the course manuscript: “Summer Semester 24 better” (GA63, 21n. 2). This course, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, or, as it is listed in some places, Aristotle’s Rhetoric, has recently been published as volume 18 of Heidegger’s *Gesamtausgabe*.20 Hiding behind a bland title is one of Heidegger’s most remarkable courses, one that is explicitly political, perhaps beyond anything else Heidegger wrote before 1933. As Heidegger confessed to Karl Löwith, this course, which was originally slated to have been on Augustine, was changed in order to have one final attempt at getting the Aristotle book into print.21 Why, though, does the *Rhetoric* receive such treatment here, alongside more obvious texts such as the *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, *Politics*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*?

There are a few crucial references to the importance of the *Rhetoric* in Heidegger’s previously published works. One of them comes in *Being and Time*, where Heidegger suggests that “contrary to the traditional orientation, where rhetoric is considered as something we learn in school,
Aristotle’s work must be taken as the first systematic hermeneutic of the everyday character of being with one another [Miteinanderseins]” (GA2, 138). And as Heidegger states in the Sophist course, Aristotle’s advantage over Plato is that by “penetrating through to the proper structure of logos [he] made it possible to institute a genuine investigation of logos itself. It likewise makes it possible for the logos that is not theoretical, i.e., for speech that is not in service to dialegesthai, to receive a certain justification within the context of everyday Dasein.” Speaking does not have to aim for aletheia, but pertains to everyday Dasein: this is Aristotle’s “genuine discovery” (GA19, 339). As Heidegger had suggested somewhat earlier in that course, “only on the basis of a positive understanding of the phenomenon of legein within life (as can be found in the Rhetoric)” did Aristotle really come to terms with this phenomena (GA19, 199–200). In 1925, Heidegger suggests that rhetoric is the first part of logic properly understood (GA20, 364).

The Hellenistic period and the early Middle Ages have demeaned rhetoric to be a school-discipline. But actually, for Aristotle, Heidegger suggests, “rhetoric is nothing other than the interpretation [Auslegung] of concrete Dasein, the hermeneutic of Dasein itself,” indeed, the discipline where this self-interpretation explicitly takes place (GA18, 110; see GA20, 365). As Scult notes, it is “the very concreteness of its focus that makes the Rhetoric the perfect site for the realization of certain key aspects of Aristotle’s ontology” (1999, 146). We can see this exhibited most explicitly in the discussion of the emotions or passions at the beginning of Part Two of the Rhetoric (1377b–1388b; see GA20, 393).

The passage cited above from Being and Time is explicitly in relation to what Heidegger finds in Aristotle’s discussion of pathe in this part of the Rhetoric, as is the reference in the History of the Concept of Time course. It is indeed to Book II of the Rhetoric that Heidegger devotes much attention in Basic Concepts, albeit with productive detours through the Ethics, De Anima, Parts of Animals, and other texts (see, especially, GA18, 161–72, 179, 183, 246–61). What Heidegger finds remarkable is that this interpretation of affects is not psychology, but is concerned with the moods created through rhetoric and the moods that create rhetoric: “it is into such a mood and out of such a mood that the orator speaks. He must understand the possibilities of moods in order to rouse them and guide them aright” (GA2, 138–39; see GA18, 122, 197). Scult makes much of this insight:

Thus, for Heidegger’s Aristotle, the situations in which we find ourselves, which comprise the world in which we live, call us to live our particular lives
by imposing themselves upon us as highly charged emotional moods; and we move about in the world, becoming ourselves, by articulating responses to those moods that seem “appropriate” in our life with others. (1999, 156)

Interesting and important though this undoubtedly is, the point of this course is not explicitly to think about rhetoric, but to conceptually illuminate the basic concepts of Aristotle’s philosophy, listed as the thirty we find discussed in the *Metaphysics* Book V (GA18, 3–4). Many of these concepts were philosophically nuanced readings of everyday Greek terms. Heidegger is concerned with precisely the same kind of move. But the goal is not the concepts in themselves, but their conceptuality, their Boden, that is their ground or basis (GA18, 4). In other words, the underlying structure, hermeneutically, of Aristotle’s thought. The two most central for Heidegger are the seventh and eighth, on and ousia. The first is being, the second he glosses as Dasein (GA18, 3; see 25). “Ousia is the expression as such for the basic concept of Aristotelian philosophy” (GA18, 22). In this course the means of access into the question is through the human as the being possessing speech. As Kisiel summarizes:

Hence, many themes that were given short shrift in BT, according to critical readers, are dealt with in great detail in SS 1924: animality, corporeality, the life of pleasure, Dasein both as consumer and as producer; speech in its full amplitude of possibilities, authentic as well as inauthentic, practical as well as theoretical; being-with as speaking to one another toward communal ends, with special attention to the problem of political rhetoric. (1993, 293)

Most important for our current purpose is the notion of being with one another in the *polis*, Miteinandersein, through speech, and the concomitant listener (GA18, 45–47, 123, 134). In an important early passage of this course, Heidegger notes that all speaking is a speaking about something, and a speaking to someone. Language is something concrete: humans do not solely exist, but constitute themselves through their speaking with others. “All speaking is, especially for the Greeks, a speaking to one or with another, with itself or to itself” (GA18, 17). All “life is being-in-a-world, animal and human are present [vorhanden] not beside others, but with others [nicht neben anderen, sondern mit anderen].” The difference is that for the human, the constitute each other mutually through speech (GA18, 21). The Greeks therefore perceive the human as zoon echon logon, not only philosophically, but in their concrete lives. Language is a fundamental determination of human being-in-the-world; it is what separates us
from the animals way of being-in-the-world (GA18, 17–18, 49). As an approximate contemporary (1924), and perhaps explicitly German, translation, of the *zoon echon logon*, “the human is a living being that reads the newspapers” (GA18, 108). A living being [*ein Lebendes*] is not to be understood physiologically, but one that has its proper existence [*eigentliches Dasein*], in “conversation and in talking” (GA18, 108).

Heidegger gives some time to an analysis of animality and its being-in-the-world, and what distinguishes it from the humans way of being-in-the-world (for example, GA18, 53–62). In doing so a whole range of the issues familiar to us from *Being and Time* begin to emerge—care, everydayness, the they, to name the most obvious. As has long been known, many of these terms emerge through an engagement with Aristotle. What is less well known is how much they are dependent not just on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but on the *Politics* and the *Rhetoric*.

We have seen how the crucial point is the interpretation of concrete Dasein: “That is for Aristotle the intended sense of rhetoric. Speaking in the manner of speaking-in-talk [*Sprechens-in-der-Rede*]: in the people’s assembly [*Volkversammlung*]; before the court; celebratory rhetoric [*bei feierlichen Gelegenheiten*].” What is interesting for Heidegger is that “these possibilities of speaking are definite [*exponierte*] examples of ordinary speaking, how it speaks into Dasein itself [*wie es im Dasein selbst spricht*]” (GA18, 110). For Scult, it is through rhetorical activity, “everyday speech,” that human beings “show themselves with the kind of access which genuinely belongs to them” (GA2, 61). The Greeks therefore take their view of existence from everyday life and not outside, and it is clear how Aristotle comes up with his primary definition of the human as that being which has the *logos*, understood as speech (GA18, 110). It is not something arbitrary, not an invention, but the essential character of Dasein, to be speaking about something, *logos ousias*, speaking about beings, *Sprechen mit den Sachen selbst*, speaking about the matters themselves—that Husserlian motto for phenomenology (GA18, 109–10).

The examples Heidegger gives of rhetorical speech—in the assembly, before the court, and in praise of something—are Aristotle’s examples: forms of public discourse that necessarily have political issues.

1. The political speech aiming to lead a popular body, for Heidegger the *Volkversammlung*, to resolve a decision—*deliberative* rhetoric, *sumbouleutikon*. 
2. The judicial speech before a court of law—**forensic** rhetoric, *dikanikon*, speech for the accused and the defendant.

3. The festive speech, **display** rhetoric, *epideiktikon*, a speech to praise (see 1358b8–9, GA18, 125).

Deliberative rhetoric can be either **exhortation or deterrence**, to persuade either for or against; forensic rhetoric can be **prosecution or defense**; **display** is either **praise or denigration**. Each of these kinds of rhetoric also has a temporal relation—to the future for deliberative; to the past for forensic; to the present (and to an extent the past) for display (see GA18, 125–26). They equally have different objectives, **advantage and harm; justice and injustice; nobility and baseness** (1358b). These are all politically charged issues in Aristotle’s time, as deliberative speakers speak of such concerns as revenue, war and peace, the defense of the realm, imports and exports, and legislation (1359b–1360a); speeches on justice and injustice equally speak to the good of the community; and praise speeches were originally given to celebrate the victories in the Olympic games, but also relate to, for instance, Pericles' Funeral Oration in Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War*.27 As Kisiel has noted, all of these kinds of speech had contemporary resonance in 1920s Germany: debates about the November criminals of the Weimar Republic; Hitler’s famous speech to the jury following the Munich Beer Hall putsch; and the elegies to war heroes (of which Heidegger would give some of his own later).28

For Aristotle, and Heidegger following him, “rhetoric is a kind of offshoot of dialectic and the study of ethics, and is properly characterised as political. It is therefore subsumed under the schema of politics” (1365a29–33). Rhetoric and indeed ethics are part of the wider realm of **politike** (*Nic. Eth.* 1094a11–12), which is why the *Nicomachean Ethics* should be supplemented with the *Politics*, with which it forms a continuous and related enquiry,29 and why the *Rhetoric* is a thoroughly political text. Aristotle suggests that *strateniken, oikonomiken*, and *retoriken*—strategy, householding, and rhetoric—are all subordinate to **politike** (*Nic. Eth.* 1094b3–4), and all have their ultimate end in the good of man [*agathon tanthropinon*], which is the **telos**, the **houn heneka** [the final cause, the “for the sake of”] of **politike** (*Nic. Eth.* 1094b7–8). It follows from all of this, that Heidegger’s view of the political is founded upon speech, **logos**, based on this detailed reading of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. To live with one another in the **polis** is to be part of a speech community, to possess and be possessed by language.
In the being of the human itself lies the fundamental-possibility of being-in-the-polis. In being-in-the-polis Aristotle sees the proper [eigentliche] life of humans. Concerning this indication, he shows that the being of the human is logon echein. In this determination lies summarised a whole peculiar [eigentümliche], fundamental manner of the being of humans, characterised as being-with-another [»Miteinandersein«], koinonia. This being, that with the world speaks, is such, that is in the being-with-others [Sein-mit-andern]. (GA18, 46)

In this course devoted to the analysis of the Rhetoric, Heidegger accordingly spends some time analyzing the important passage from the Politics where Aristotle describes the humans as the zoon politikon (Politics 1253a7–18; GA18, 45–49). What distinguishes the human from other animals that associate, such as bees, is that humans have logos, speech, while animals only have phone, voice or sound. Whilst animals can use voice to express pain or pleasure, speech is able to signify what is useful and harmful or just and unjust as well. This indication [Anzeige] is important. While animals have perception, aesthesis, in relation to pain and pleasure, humans have aesthesis in relation to good and bad, just and unjust. Animals and humans share something, but it the question of speech and this notion of a particular type of judgment that sets them apart. “It is the sharing of a common view [koinonia—association, i.e., being-with-another] in these matters that makes an oikos and a polis” (Politics, 1253a9–17). Heidegger’s paraphrasing translation of this sentence is important: “This being-together in that way (i.e., the way they are in the world, that they speak with you) forms the household and the polis” (GA18, 47).

This rendering is important for a number of reasons. First that Heidegger blurs the actual distinction that Aristotle is making. For Aristotle it is not just the speech that is important, but the kinds of things that it can indicate—good and bad, just and unjust. For Heidegger the stress is on the indication itself. Equally, although Heidegger translates agathon and kakon as good and evil [Böse], dikaios and adikon become das Gehörige und Ungehörige, which we might render as the “seemly” and the “unseemly.” Politically this is important, as it is part of Heidegger’s general suggestion that notions of justice are a Latinate invention.30 Perhaps most important, that association or community is given a definite ontological status, rather than merely being a social phenomenon. Finally, Heidegger does not seek to translate polis, a point he will return to later in his career.
Going beyond this one sentence, Heidegger stresses this *Miteinandersein* as a fundamental character of human Dasein, not “in the sense of being-put-additionally-to-each-other [Nebeneinandergestelltseins], but in the sense of the being-speaking-with-another [Miteinderandersprechendseins] in the manner of announcement, refutation and argument [Mitteilung, Widerlegung, Auseinandersetzung—the latter being literally a setting apart from another]” (GA18, 47). Humans therefore do not solely exist, but constitute themselves through their speaking with others, and it is through this community of speaking and hearing that their being-together is constituted. As Heidegger exhorts his students to keep in mind, “the Greeks see existence as existence in the *polis*” (GA19, 231; see GA18, 46, 56, 67, etc.). The *zoon politikon* is indeed the *zoon echon logon* (GA18, 50, 56, 63–64, 134–35, *passim*). 

**Rhetoric and Phronesis**

Above I noted how the distinction between *phronesis* and *techne* was an important issue in Aristotle and Heidegger’s reading of him. Rhetoric, however, occupies an ambiguous place here: a form of *phronesis* or a *techne*? We can understand *techne* by looking at what it works upon. One of Aristotle’s four causes, the material cause, the *hulê*, can be either a material thing or the material of study. For this reason both craftsmen and mathematicians have *hulê* on which to work (*Metaphysics*, 1036a; *Physics* 198a). Equally, population (the body of men) and territory are the *hulê* of the *politikos* (*Politics*, 1326a5). Technai can therefore be classified in terms of *hulê* in three ways: those having a product composed of sensible matter, those having a product composed of states of sensible matter, or those having a product composed of intelligible matter. Carpentry and cooking; dancing and statecraft; arithmetic, geometry, and rhetoric are examples of each of these three ways.

While this is the case for *techne*, *phronesis* is a *logos enhulos*, “a form that is by definition form of this matter; the other intellectual virtues are not” (Garver 1994, 153). Rhetoric, which is an example of the third kind of *techne* according to the above schema, is also related to *phronesis*. Rhetoric therefore occupies an interesting place in Aristotle’s thought, and accordingly in Heidegger’s, precisely because it lies between *phronesis* and *techne*. It is situated, as Garver puts it, “between the activities of practical reason, for which moral character is enough, and instrumental activi-
ties that can be bought, sold and taught” (6). Rhetorical practice is, in an important sense, both a techne and directed toward praxis. It therefore is related to phronesis, but only in a particular way. That way is how it is appropriate to the inhabitants of a polis. Garver hits the nail on the head when he suggests:

By frequently developing both phronesis and the moral virtues in the Ethics through contrast to art, Aristotle at the very least implies that praxis and techne are incompatible, and an art of praxis consequently impossible. There can be a civic art of rhetoric only if there is an art of praxis. (19)

In the second book of the Rhetoric, Aristotle notes that three things are required of the orator in order to produce conviction: phronesis, arête, and eunôia—in Heidegger’s terms, Umsicht, Ernst, and gute Gesinnung or Wohlwollen. Prudence or insight, seriousness or more generally virtue, and having a good fundamental attitude or goodwill (1378a9; GA18, 165). Rhetoric, a techne, is therefore in part dependent on phronesis, at least as far as it produces results (see also GA18, 166–67). Garver is useful because he shows how this apparent contradiction actually elevates the position of rhetoric as compared to other arts. “Ultimately, the project of the Rhetoric is to construct a civic relation between argument and ethos, and so between techne and phronesis” (1994, 77). It is the fusion here of phronesis and techne, a rational art that makes it so important. But all of this is subordinate to politics, and therefore “rhetoric is always likely to appear to be politics” (45). But Heidegger goes further. For Heidegger rhetoric is not an art, but a power, a dynamis, and through this a kind of phronesis (GA18, 114).

It is not the case, however, that rhetoric can be straightforwardly equated with speech, so it is not the case that all politics is rhetoric. Nor, of course, is all speech rhetorical. Rhetoric is more limited, but its importance is clear. Similarly, rhetoric is distinct from science and philosophy because it does not have the same rigor of argument; it is distinct from mere sophistry, however, because it aims at truth. For Heidegger it takes on a privileged role philosophically because it is a means of aletheuein, a mode of access to the question. Politically it takes on an important position because of the relation between the human as a speaking and “political” being. As Heidegger suggests, “even the sophist, in his proper occupation, is a retor, an orator and teacher of rhetoric, a teacher of the speech that plays a substantial role in the public life of the polis: in the courts, in the senate, and in festivals.” All of these three are directed to the politika (GA19, 244–45).
Concluding Problems

I have barely scratched the surface of the 1924 course, with its deep excavation of Aristotle’s works. There are long discussions of passages in the *Ethics* not treated elsewhere, of the *Metaphysics* and the *Physics*. Unusually for Heidegger’s courses, the manuscripts and transcripts have not been collated into a single text, but are published as two separate divisions. Most of the references above are to the student transcripts, although parallel references could have been given to the manuscript (where it exists—large sections are missing). Reading both gives a sense of what a dynamic lecturer Heidegger was, elaborating and improvising around prescribed themes. There is an obvious rhetorical component to Heidegger’s pedagogy. Had this been further developed into the projected book on Aristotle it would doubtless have been, as Kisiel suggests, a “remarkable” study: “From all indications, it would have been even more difficult than BT, in view of the staggering depth, detail, and density of this Greek-German dialogue with the original texts of the Aristotelian opus, in a frenetic intensity that must have overwhelmed the students of this course” (1993, 292).

In conclusion, I want to highlight two issues that appear in this reading of Aristotle, issues that might have appeared minor in 1924, but that seem to be initial hints of how Heidegger’s politics would develop in the late 1920s until the decision of 1933. Let me clarify this. There is the potential to over-interpret, first of all. Words such as *Volk*, *Führer*, and *Entscheidung*—people, leader, and decision—scream off the page to contemporary eyes, but were largely untainted with their later connotations in 1924. Equally, though, there is much that is hidden. When Heidegger makes reference to the newspapers, for instance, we need to think of what would have been in them in 1924—the economic crisis, occupation of the Ruhr, and Weimar politics generally. It is therefore important to read Heidegger contextually, looking forward while understanding the moment of composition.

In that light, the two issues. First, in Plato’s *Gorgias*, Gorgias suggests that rhetoric “confers on everyone who possesses it not only freedom for himself but also the power of ruling his fellow-countrymen.” In response to a further prompt from Socrates, he defines this as the “ability to convince by means of speech a jury in a court of justice, members of the Council in their Chamber, voters at a meeting of the Assembly, and any other gathering of citizens whatever it may be” (452b). Socrates suggests that this means that “rhetoric is productive of conviction.” The Greek for
this phrase is “peithous demiourgos estin he retorike” (453a2). In a clarifying gloss Heidegger suggests that “the rhetor is the one that has the proper power [die eigentliche Macht] over Dasein. Proficiency in speech [Redenkönnen] is that possibility to have proper rule [eigentliche Herrschaft] of the self over the convictions of the people” (GA18, 108). This over-valorization of the speaker over those hearing is important in a political context. The hearing ability, the capacity to hear [Hörenkonnen], is continually stressed by Heidegger (see, for example, GA18, 104).

It is here that we can bring in a rather different perspective, uncited by Heidegger, but nonetheless relevant. The motto of the city of Dublin is Obedientia civium urbis felicitas. A standard translation would be “the obedient citizens make a happy city.” In Finnegans Wake—written between 1923 and 1938—Joyce continually returns to this phrase. We find it rendered as “the obedience of the citizens elp the ealth of the ole.” “Obedient civility in urbanious at felicity,” “Obeyance from the townsmen spills felixity by the toun” (2000, 76, 277, 540). But the most remarkable is the first take on this: “Thus the hearsomeness of the burger felicitates the whole of the polis’ (23). Not only is Joyce making the Latin Greek in the last word, but also in the notion of “hearsomeness” is opening up the precise issue Heidegger is stressing. Concrete being-with-another depends on the listener (GA18, 123). Obedire in the Latin is to give ear, bearing more relation to audire, to hear, than dicere, to speak. “Speaking with one another clearly involves listening to one another, as perhaps the most authentic possibility of being with one another,” as Kisiel puts it (1999, 26). But there are more worrying political implications than this ideal of a to-and-fro exchange of listening and speaking. Listening is hearkening, obeying. In a sense, then, Heidegger’s community of speakers is a community of listeners, with the speech reserved to a few, and the listeners in a position of obeisance. Similarly charged political possibilities emerge on rereading Being and Time §34 in the light of this lecture course (GA2, 160–210).

The second issue is that there is a recognition, following Aristotle in the Ethics (1097b8ff), that self-sufficiency includes relations with “parents, children and wife, friends and other citizens [politais], since the human is by nature of the polis [physsei politikon o anthropos].” But, counters Aristotle, this can go too far: “a limit has to be established in these relationships, for if the list be extended to one’s ancestors and descendents and to the friends of friends, it will go on for ever.” Miteinandersein has to be limited, Heidegger asserts. “Appropriate being-with-another loses itself, if it is an undisciplined or unruly with-all-humans [ein wil des Mit-allen-
Menschen]. It is only genuine [echtes] therefore if it has a determined border [bestimmte Grenze] around it” (GA18, 96–97). What is important about this is that the limits drawn to a political community—both actual and figurative—are related to speech, linguistically determined. Although anything but the most utopian cosmopolitanism requires an exclusion to make the inclusion viable, this is in no sense insignificant or neutral. As has been argued insistently if not always entirely convincingly, Heidegger’s nationalism was based much more on language than race.37

For that reason, and given the stress the later Heidegger gives to language, as, most fundamentally, the “house of being,” understanding the source of Heidegger’s meditation on language is important. Heidegger’s reading of logos as speech helps us to understand Aristotle’s parallel definitions of the human as the zoon logon echon and the zoon politikon, as well as the rhetorical politics of Heidegger himself. When read with a view of the political as founded upon speech, logos, Rede, the Rectoral Address he gave in 1933, the Rektoratsrede, can be seen in a new light. His reading of Aristotle in the early 1920s therefore both shows the hermeneutic skill he brought to bear on ancient texts and anticipates his fateful political decision that ultimately clouds his philosophical reputation.38

Abbreviations to Works by Martin Heidegger

The majority of Gesamtausgabe translations have the German pagination at the top of the page, allowing a single page reference. Exceptions noted below.

GA Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975ff.


Notes
1. GA19, 17–18, see also 27–28. A key to abbreviations is located at the end of the paper.
2. For a thorough discussion, see Dunne (1985; 1993). This is discussed at length in Elden (2006).
3. Such a division plays a fundamental role in Arendt (1958). Indeed, she states as much: “The book had its origin in my first Marburg days and in every way owes just about everything to you” (Letter to Heidegger, 28 October 1960).
4. This study, as the notes attest, is indebted to Kisiel’s work of accumulating the data, even if I would not follow him on all points of interpretation. For a critique of Kisiel, see Kalariparambil (2000, 189–220); and for a discussion of Kalariparambil’s work, see Sheehan (1995), McEwan (1995), and Kisiel (1995).
5. “To” Aristotle, rather than “of” Aristotle as the recent English translation has it.
7. The source for all this course information is Appendix B of Kisiel (1993, 461–76); see also van Buren (1994, 220–22).
8. See also Dahlstrom (2001, chap. 1).
11. We should note here the opening line of the *Metaphysics* (980a22), usually translated as “all men naturally desire knowledge.” In Summer Semester 1922 (GA62), Heidegger renders this as “the urge to live in seeing, the absorption in the visible, is constitutive of how the human being is.” This means *phasis* is translated as “how being” and *eidesai* by “seeing.” Quoted in Kisiel (1993, 239).


13. References to works by Aristotle are given in the text by page and line number of Aristotle (1831). Unless otherwise noted, in-text references are to the *Rhetoric*. Subsequent notes document where I’ve referenced translations or other editions.


15. We should note that in a note to his 1931 course on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, Heidegger refers to the discussion of *logos* in the *Sophist* course, but declares it “insufficient” (GA33, 2 n.1).

16. This is a move that Heidegger makes regularly. See for example GA19, 8; GA20, 110–22; GA2, 34–35.

17. Aristotle (1938).


19. For a lengthy discussion of hearing, see *De Anima*, 419b4–421a7.


21. Letter of 19 March 1924, reported in Kisiel (282, 540 n. 2).

22. For an early hint of how this will become the discussion of *Gerade*, idle talk, in *Being and Time*, see GA19, 306–7. See also Dahlstrom (2001, 283).

23. For other references to the *Rhetoric* in this course, see GA19, 219, 350–51.


25. On Heidegger on language, old but still helpful are Kockelmans (1972) and Bernasconi (1985).


29. For a discussion of this claim, see Kraut (2002, 16–19).

30. On this, see above all the reading of Anaximander in GA5, 321–73.

31. See Kisiel (1999, 294–95). We should note that in GA33, 103, Heidegger translates *logos* as *Kundschaft*, conversance.

32. This paragraph is indebted to Gross (2000, 24–37, 27).

33. See Kisiel (1999, 27). On *phronesis* in this course see also GA18, 193, and more generally GA19.

34. See Arnhart (1981, 183).


36. Tindall (1969, 48), notes the motto as the basis for Joyce’s phrase.

37. See GA38, and for a discussion, Elden (2003, 35–56).

38. I am grateful to Theodore Kisiel and Allen Scult for instructive discussions concerning GA18, as well as to Michael Eldred for the same reason, and for pointing me to the last Joyce quote. The paper has benefited from the careful reading of the two reviewers for *Philosophy and Rhetoric*.

Works Cited


