The past decade has seen somewhat of a renaissance of interest in the work of Henri Lefebvre. Somewhat perversely, given that his long life came to an end in 1991, it has been in the 1990s that the English-speaking world has finally had access to some of his most important works. The Critique of Everyday Life series has begun to appear in translation, and The Production of Space, Introduction to Modernity and a collection of some of his work on urbanism have all appeared in recent years (Lefebvre 1991a, 1991b, 1995, 1996). These are the first translations of his books since those published in the 1960s and 1970s (Lefebvre 1968a, 1968b, 1969, 1971b, 1976c). Along with this new availability of material in English has come a small explosion of critical material, some—such as Edward Soja’s Postmodern Geographies (1989)—acting as a prelude, much more following in its wake. As the title of Soja’s book suggests, much of this recent attention to Lefebvre’s work has been in the field of geography, or related areas such as urban sociology or cultural studies. Little attention at all has been paid by political theorists or philosophers. This should be cause for inquiry, given that Lefebvre described himself, not just as a Marxist, but as a Marxist philosopher on several occasions. It is also cause for concern.

It is cause for concern because there is a great danger that this important and complex thinker is reduced to being yet another appropriated either to theoretically reinvigorate geography or to lend support to another “postmodern” project. Postmodernism often seems to be an intellectual “pick ‘n’ mix”, in which disparate thinkers are lumped together without due regard for their theoretical basis or political differences into a great melting pot that is stirred once, seasoned with invective, half-baked and served up to the various disciplines. With
many of these synthesised works, there is a danger that they will be taken as gospel and, worse, that future work will be conducted along these lines. Errors created in theoretical work are perpetuated in applications of it. This is perhaps especially true with a thinker like Lefebvre, who produced a wide range of works (some 60-odd book-length studies and numerous articles), of which, even with recent translation, little is available in English. Rather than return to the complete range of works, much of the recent work on Lefebvre has, understandably, worked with the few English translations available—particularly The Production of Space—and relied greatly on work such as Soja’s. I shall argue that this does Lefebvre a great disservice: his political edge is blunted and his philosophical complexity denied. As the title of Kofman and Lebas’s (1996) important introduction to Writings on Cities suggests, there may be much “lost in transposition”.

This article, therefore, critically engages with some of the recent Anglo-American literature on Lefebvre—specifically the work of Soja and of Rob Shields—and seeks to illustrate their strengths and weaknesses. It does not seek to examine the work of those who, like Kristin Ross, make use of Lefebvre (see Ross 1988, 1995). Rather, the concern is with the representation of Lefebvre in the English-speaking world. I suggest that Lefebvre’s work needs to be understood in the context of his Marxism and of philosophy more generally. This is especially true for his work on space, although not least among the contemporary problems is that his work on space is seen as his crowning achievement, and other interests as subordinate to it. One key area of importance lies in Lefebvre’s relationship to Heidegger, which remains to be explored adequately. This more constructive agenda will be pursued in a future piece (Elden forthcoming). Understanding Lefebvre’s work on space within this wider context returns to this thinker the subtlety, complexity and radical nature he deserves.

A Life in Theory

The publication of Rob Shields’ Lefebvre, Love and Struggle: Spatial Dialectics is certainly to be welcomed. Shields’ earlier book, Places on the Margin: Alternative Geographies of Modernity (1991) developed a social theory of space, which was then applied to a number of case studies. It contained little direct discussion of Lefebvre, though his mark was felt strongly throughout the analysis of marginal places. Lefebvre, Love and Struggle represents, not only Shields’ engagement with Lefebvre in detail, but also the first full-length work on Lefebvre in English. Shields (1999:viii) suggests that “Lefebvre has been
dismissed by his detractors” and, I would suggest more importantly, “too narrowly understood by those who championed his ideas”. He (1999:6) argues that “English-language translators and scholars make glaring errors in their reception of Lefebvre”, and that “misunderstandings of Lefebvre are rife in Anglophone geography”. Therefore, this book is seen as “a contribution to the development of a more radical understanding of Lefebvre’s ideas than orthodox Marxism ever allowed” (1999:viii).

It should immediately be noted that there is much to be commended here. Shields’ book raises a number of issues neglected in the existing material, covers works not available in English translation in varying amount of detail, attempts to understand Lefebvre’s work as a whole and includes a lot of biographical pointers to an understanding of his thought. This last point is particularly useful: the excellent biography of Lefebvre by Rémi Hess (1988) is unavailable in English translation, and though David Harvey summarizes it in an “Afterword” to The Production of Space, English readers will surely benefit from Shields’ integration of the biographical into the textual exegesis. However, at times this can detract from the analytical flow of the argument, as some books are presented as seemingly more important in their biographical situation than in their theoretical import. This is particularly the case with Lefebvre’s work on existentialism and structuralism, where the fact that he engaged with these movements appears to be more significant than what he actually said about them (see Lefebvre 1946, 1971a).

As Shields (1999:6) wisely notes, Lefebvre’s “applied work appears nonsensical if [his] theoretical works are not read”. To remedy this, Shields comments on the importance of a number of early texts, particularly La Conscience Mystifiée (co-written with Norbert Guterman), Dialectical Materialism (1968a) and Logique Formelle, Logique Dialectique (1982). His analysis of the last is perhaps especially useful, showing how Lefebvre made a distinction between analytical, formal logic, with its concentration on the form of statements, and synthetic, dialectical logic, with its emphasis on both the content of such statements and the possibility of contradiction, negation and transformation (1999:112; see Lefebvre 1982). The argument is on shakier ground when Shields (1999:119) asserts that Lefebvre “shifts the ground of dialectical materialism from time to space”, and when he (1999:120, 160) presents a very confusing picture of Lefebvre’s work on the dialectic, trading on the notion of the dialectique de triplicité. Shields suggests that, through his refutation of Hegelian historicity, Lefebvre places space in the dialectic; this is why Shields’ study is subtitled Spatial Dialectics.
Soja (1996:5) also makes much of this notion, seeing it as part of an argument designed to supplant the modernist binarism of the either/or with a much larger logic of both/and also. He (1996:60) claims that this is explicitly taken from Lefebvre, and develops a notion he calls “critical thirding” or “thirding-as-Othering”. To introduce a third term into static binarisms is seen as a postmodern critique of modernism’s dichotomies, leading Soja to propose a notion of trialectics. Although Soja claims this is derived from Lefebvre, he is rather sketchy in his use of textual evidence to support this.

The main reference for both of these writers is Lefebvre’s notion of the dialectique de triplicité, but this is neither a replacement of dialectical reasoning with trialectics or the introduction of space into the dialectic. Lefebvre’s problem with dialectical materialism is its tendency toward a linear, teleological picture of historical change. With its nonlinear Nietzschean take on progress, his La Fin de l’histoire (1970) allows the dialectic to be, not simply the resolution of two conflicting terms, but a three-way process, where the synthesis is able to react upon the first two terms. The third term is not the result of the dialectic: it is there, but it is no longer seen as a culmination. This is a much more fluid, rhythmic understanding. Lefebvre’s (1970:214–215) notion of dépassement (overtaking) translates Nietzsche’s Überwinden (overcoming, overwinding) more than the Hegelian or Marxist Aufhebung (subsumption—abolition and preservation). As Lefebvre (1976b:171) notes, “in Nietzsche, überwinden (to surmount) outweights aufheben (to carry to another level)”. The fact that Lefebvre uses this understanding to rethink the question of space—a point to which I shall return—does not mean that the dialectic is spatialized. Rather, the nonteleological dialectic is brought to bear on the issue of space. Shields (1999:150–152) suggests that this is confusing in Lefebvre’s work; I would claim that this is increased by his and Soja’s own presentations.

Space
The subtitle of Postmodern Geographies is The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory, and this succinctly summarises Soja’s aim: he (1989:8) seeks out those thinkers that pioneered the development of postmodern geography, including Foucault, Berger, Jameson and Lefebvre in this group. It is Lefebvre above all from whom Soja takes his inspiration, suggesting (1989:16) that “the most persistent, insistent and consistent of these spatialising voices belonged to the French Marxist philosopher, Henri Lefebvre”. The commendations continue,
as Soja (1989:41–42) describes Lefebvre as the “perhaps least known and most misunderstood of the great figures in twentieth-century Marxism ... the original and foremost historical and geographical materialist”.

Though his treatment of Lefebvre is scattered through the book and interwoven with discussions of other thinkers, Soja recognises many of the key aspects of Lefebvre’s thought: the role of Hegel and the retention of an objective idealism in Lefebvre’s historical materialism; his criticism of Sartre and Althusser; the way his work on everyday life prefigured the interest in space; and his experiences of rural and urban life. What is not always clear is how all this works together. Despite its title, Postmodern Geographies is largely framed around an engagement with Marxism. Soja suggests that classic Marxism often neglects the importance of space, for a number of reasons. Historical materialism, like bourgeois social science, left little room for space. As many of the commentators on Lefebvre have pointed out, Marxism is not particularly noted for its attendance to questions of space. Soja (1989:32) attributes to Marx the view that history was important and geography an “unnecessary complication”, though, like David Harvey (1982:xii), he fails to give a reference for this quotation. Similarly, Richard Peet (1991:178–179) suggests that “Marxism has little to say about relations with nature and sees events occurring on top of a pin rather than in space”. The fairness of these claims is moot—we might suggest such critics look at the second volume of Capital on the circulation of capital, passages on the scarcity of space, the analyses of the town/country relation and the military, amongst others3—though it is certainly true that the analyses never claim centre stage. As Lefebvre (1972:245) argues, “although space is not analysed in Capital, certain concepts, such as exchange value and use value, today apply to space”.

In part, Soja suggests, the texts of Marx that did examine spatial forms—the projected later volumes of Capital, or the Grundrisse (1973c)—either never appeared or were made available only late in this century. As Soja rightly asserts, early attempts to marry Marxism with geography, such as those by Manuel Castells (1972) or David Harvey (1973), looked at the interlinked nature of spatial forms and social processes: they applied a radical political economy to the themes of modern geography. These were largely structuralist readings, Althusser being the principal focus for Castells (1972) and Piaget for Harvey (1973). For a number of reasons, not least the spatial metaphors so prevalent in structuralism (see, eg, Althusser, Rancière and Macherey 1965:28–31), structuralism seemed useful in the development of a Marxist geography.
However, Marxist geography was just that: a geography informed by Marxism. The standard themes of geography were given an explicitly Marxist reading, with attention being paid to the distinction between exchange and use value, the role of class struggle and the superstructural forms resulting from the changes in the mode of production. Whilst this had many benefits and helped to explicitly politicise work in geography, it was for some only an initial step. Soja (1989:59) suggests that, in the 1980s, a problem began to arise: “Marxism itself had to be critically restructured to incorporate a salient and central spatial dimension”. It was all very well to apply historical materialism to geography, but some of the problematics of geography fundamentally challenged historical materialism itself. It was not enough to make geography Marxist; Marxism needed to be spatialised (Soja 2000:104).

Soja (1989) suggests that this is what Lefebvre was able to do. However, the problem is that in Postmodern Geographies he never explicitly states how this is the case. A number of his formulas—the creation of a historical and geographical materialism, the nebulous concept of postmodern geographies—hint at this, but they lack detail. If this was indeed Lefebvre’s intent, then he was criticised by Castells and Harvey for elevating space to the level of causal efficacy, rather than being an expression of the relations of production. As Soja notes, in attempting to be good Marxists, Castells and Harvey established boundaries beyond which spatial analysis should not pass. For them, Lefebvre fell foul of the charge of spatial fetishism. There was a danger of spatial or territorial conflict replacing class conflict as the mover of social transformation. Soja (1989:77–78) suggests that Castells’ and Harvey’s criticisms miss the (dialectical) point. The choice is not an either/or—either space as a separate structure affecting the social, or space as an expression of social relations—but space as a component of the relations of production, simultaneously social and spatial.  

Whilst this is a useful point, Soja himself neglects the historical dimension, which is, of course, central in historical materialism. Though he has been at pains to dispute this, Postmodern Geographies marginalises the question of history with the theoretical reassertion of space. In terms of the stated project, Soja (1989:71) invokes “the postmodern proclamation that it is now space more than time, geography more than history, that hides consequences from us”. And yet, though he marginalises it in theoretical terms, his argument is in practice a clearly historical analysis, essentially a history of geography as a discipline, from its positivist moment in the 1960s to the Marxist geography of the 1970s to the geographical Marxism or postmodern geography of the 1980s and beyond. Contrary to his avowed intent, then, geography
becomes yet another subject for historical analysis, rather than a central tool of the research itself. We can see this in his emphasis on *The Production of Space*, rather than the work on the urban and rural from which it developed. This is paralleled by the interest of geographers in the history of space that Foucault provided in “Of Other Spaces” (1986)—the key piece of his upon which Soja draws—rather than the spatial histories Foucault wrote about madness, medicine and discipline (see, amongst others, 1961, 1963, 1973, 1975, 1976).

If *Postmodern Geographies* was a groundbreaking work, full of complexity, making approximations and sketching out a programme for future work, its follow-up *Thirdspace* was a massive disappointment. Instead of the careful, detailed, inspirational and programmatic treatment of *Postmodern Geographies*, here the pronouncements were unveiled as banners; subtle distinctions were turned into new orthodoxies, and a strong polemics pervaded the whole work. In essence, Soja retrod much of the ground covered in *Postmodern Geographies*, but without the tact of that work.

The book’s overarching argument centres around the term “Third-space”, which, Soja suggests, is prefigured by Lefebvre’s “spaces of representation” and Foucault’s “heterotopias”, amongst others. Leaving aside the problematic relationship between Lefebvre and Foucault—which remains to be properly understood—what does Soja mean here? He argues that geography as a discipline has tended to work with two main conceptualisations of space. What he calls First-space is the space of concrete materiality, things that can be empirically mapped. Secondspace is ideas about space, mental and cognitive forms. Soja labels Firstspace as real, Secondspace as imaginary. Thirdspace is real-and-imaginary; it is the fusion of First and Secondspace, spaces that are material and mental, but also more. Soja makes much of this notion of Thirdspace, and critical thirding generally, which—as I noted earlier—he sees as carrying forward Lefebvre’s notion of dialectique de triplicité (1996:5).

Soja suggests that these three spaces can be found in Lefebvre, especially in the opening chapter of *The Production of Space*. Here, Lefebvre (1974:42–43, 1991b:33) talks of spatial practice, representations of space and spaces of representation (*les espaces de représentation*). Space is viewed in three ways: as perceived, conceived and lived—l’espace perçu, conçu, vécu. This Lefebvrian schema sees a unity between physical, mental and social space. The first of these takes space as physical form, space that is generated and used. The second is the space of savoir (knowledge) and logic, of maps and mathematics, of space as the instrumental space of social engineers and urban planners.
The third sees space as produced and modified over time and through its use, spaces invested with symbolism and meaning, the space of connaissance (less formal or more local forms of knowledge), space as it is lived, social space. The application of the three-way dialectic to space owes much to Nietzsche (as Shields recognises; see also Merrifield 1995), but also to Heidegger, particularly in the notion of the “lived” combination of the “perceived” and “conceived”.

Whilst this is certainly the situation in the opening chapter of The Production of Space, Lefebvre moves beyond this way of thinking in the rest of the book. Richer than the previous dualism of geographical thinking, this is nonetheless a reductive schema in terms of the work as a whole. Soja (1996:8) explicitly states that he finds The Production of Space a bewildering text and that he therefore reads it through the lens of the initial chapter. The confusion Soja finds is shared by other writers. Neil Smith (1990:91) even goes so far as to suggest that “Lefebvre does not discard or even qualify the absolute concept of space. He uses the concept in all ways—as social space separate from physical space, as absolute space, as theoretical space and so forth—and seems to make little distinction between them. Metaphor is mixed indiscriminately with reality”. Lefebvre may open with an initial schema, but this is a laying of ground for future work, rather than a framework within which he must operate (see Merrifield 1995:298; Unwin 2000:13–14). To see this schema as an absolute reduces Lefebvre’s thinking to a new orthodoxy; indeed, Mike Savage (2000:48–49) even suggests there is a constant tendency to reification. Soja’s aim of marshalling Lefebvre to the cause of critiquing Anglophone geography risks losing his inventiveness.

Soja deserves due credit for promoting Lefebvre’s work in the English-speaking world, and his Postmodern Geographies has been rightly hailed as one of the most challenging and stimulating books ever written on the social use of space. However, the major problem is that Soja is so intent on focusing on the postmodern and on Los Angeles that he develops a programme from the work of Lefebvre and others for precisely this intent, rather than sketching a framework approach that could be applied to other times and places. Whilst Soja claims that criticisms such as “what about Huddersfield?” miss the point, in that his conceptual tools can be used in other areas, in his own work he continually focuses on one place, with only a cursory nod toward its history.

Criticisms of Soja’s approach seem to have affected how he now works. For example, in his recent Postmetropolis, Soja (2000:xiv) claims that he is not neglecting social and historical approaches, but...
merely putting space first. Postmetropolis is certainly orientated around a history, in this case one of urbanism and of Los Angeles. However, these historical analyses of already spatial topics are rather obvious and make use of an uncritically adopted historical approach. In many places, the history is of the academic study of these topics, rather than of the topics themselves. This is strikingly illustrated by the huge amount of quotation in the text.

Soja’s reassertion of the importance of space hopes to spatialise history and put time “in its place”, but, as has been noted, he seems largely unaware that Lefebvre’s work is a historicism of sorts (Stewart 1995:617). Rather than spatialising history, then, Soja often simply spatialises an ahistorical sociology or—as in Postmetropolis—historicises space. This leads to a key issue: does Lefebvre spatialise history, historicise space or simply spatialise sociology? Whilst I believe that Lefebvre, working with three continually relating terms, was attempting to do all these and more, it can appear that he is writing a history of space, and not a spatial history (Lefebvre 1974:57, 130–131, 144, 1991b:46, 110, 122). Many of those commenting on him seem to have followed these leads in historicising space without due attendance to the converse (see Unwin 2000:21). The crucial point appears to be a radicalising of the notion of history so that it becomes spatialised. Despite appearances to the contrary, Lefebvre was well aware of this. We can see it in his analysis of the events of May 1968, which accords special status to “urban phenomena”, his work on the Paris commune, his analysis of contemporary capitalism and various other places (Lefebvre 1965, 1969, 1972, 1973).

It should also be noted that Lefebvre’s criticism of structuralism with regard to space is that it does not accord due status to the historical (1973:92–93). As Kofman and Lebas (1996:47) note, there is a danger of crowning space at the expense of an impoverished historical understanding. Similarly, I do not believe that simply adding a second adjective to the phrase “historical materialism” is adequate.

Progress toward a rethinking can be made if we note that Lefebvre, like Nietzsche and Heidegger, was concerned with rethinking the standard understandings of time as well. We can see this in Lefebvre’s early Dialectical Materialism, with its claim that clock time is as restrictive as geometric space (1940:130; 1968a:133), and the comment toward the end of The Production of Space that “[a]t the conclusion of this analytical and critical study, the relationship between time and space would no longer be one of abstract separation coupled with an equally abstract confusion between these two different yet connected terms” (1974:405, 1991b:351).
Lefebvre’s work on rhythmanalysis and his theory of moments (1959, 1992), which bears close comparison with the Nietzschean moment [Augenblick] that Heidegger discusses at such length, shows other important links between these thinkers. Soja’s failure to critically rethink history and time blunts the critical edge of his aim: the reassertion of space in critical social theory. Shields’ work provides some valuable corrections to Soja and is possibly the best English-language presentation of Lefebvre’s work on space. He criticises the incomplete nature of Lefebvre’s work, in that Lefebvre does not spatialise entirely (Shields 1999:158) and that much of The Production of Space is turned into a history of space (1999:170), which “suggests that time is the ultimate ordering system of space” (1999:172). In this his work can be profitably contrasted with that of Soja, who, as noted above, tends to read the whole of this work in the light of the first chapter. Shields recognises the work as a whole; though he is critical of Lefebvre’s schema, his discussion of absolute, sacred, historical, abstract, contradictory and differential space is particularly useful.

**Alienation**

However, Shields’ presentation of the notion of alienation is much more confused. Shields makes a number of useful points about how the French alienation is a compression of various German words used by Marx, and about how Lefebvre located alienation, not just in the workplace, but in every aspect of life. This analysis allows the critique of everyday life. However, Shields claims that there are three forms of alienation in Marx (Shields 1999:40), and that it is important that Lefebvre finds four forms (Shields 1999:42). This is confusing, because the “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts”, to which both Lefebvre and Shields refer, explicitly notes four forms of alienation (Marx 1975:322ff). The reason for the confusion is that Shields conflates the first two forms of alienation Marx outlines, the alienation of humans from the product and the process of their work, thereby reducing Marx’s schema to three, and splits Lefebvre’s presentation of the alienation of humans from their species being into two distinct forms of alienation. Whilst this may help to summarise the various issues at stake, it is not sufficiently different to suggest that Lefebvre outlines a new form of alienation. Rather, Lefebvre is simply being faithful to Marx’s text.

The concept of alienation provides us with an important example of why Lefebvre’s work has been misunderstood in the Anglophone world. Alienation is a philosophically complex concept, and Marx’s
work gives it an explicitly political emphasis. Lefebvre uses the concept politically as well, to inform his understanding of everyday life. Too often these concepts have been misappropriated without due regard for their theoretical complexities or political implications. For example, within Lefebvre’s concept of everyday life lies a clear use of Marx’s notion of alienation, fused with Heidegger’s understanding of Alltäglichkeit. This notion of “everydayness”, criticised by Heidegger in Being and Time (1962), is important to an understanding of Lefebvre’s work; he is both inspired by and critical of it. The philosophical lineage of the “everyday” is complicated, involving work by Husserl and Lukács and later appropriations by Habermas, de Certeau and Heller. In addition, there is a danger that everyday life will become a tool of an apolitical cultural studies. However, little of this is developed in English language work on the subject.

Thus, alienation and everyday life help to highlight the lack of understanding of philosophy and politics within English-language scholarship on Lefebvre. The treatment of Heidegger in this scholarship is particularly problematic. Kofman and Lebas (1996:8) note that Heidegger was the 20th-century philosopher with whom Lefebvre most engaged, and a great deal of useful work remains to be done in comparing and contrasting these two figures. Heidegger is important in understanding Lefebvre’s work on everyday life, on space, on presence and absence, on metaphilosophy and even perhaps on the relation between politics and location (see Elden 2000). Perhaps understandably, given their disciplinary backgrounds, Shields and Soja’s comments on Heidegger are dubious at best. If Lefebvre is to be understood as an important philosopher, rather than just as a spatially minded sociologist, these relations and criticisms need to be better understood. Similarly if Lefebvre is to be considered as someone with something to say to political theory, his important four-volume book on the state (1976a, b, 1977, 1978), his work on the survival of capitalism and his explicitly political analysis of the rural, the urban and the production of space need closer analysis. Little has been written on this, and thus the other pieces in this issue of Antipode are an important move (see also Brenner 1997, 1998, 2000).

I have used the work of Soja and Shields to highlight some of the problems within the existing scholarship. This is not to say that these interpreters are in any way equal. Shields’ book is by far the best work in the English language on Lefebvre’s work. For all its flaws and oversights, it is a very valuable contribution; it opens up a number of new avenues for exploration and should be required reading as a supplement to Lefebvre’s own works. However, what it, along with
Soja's work, does show is that to read Lefebvre solely through the lenses of certain disciplines does him a great disservice. Whilst in the past there have been some valuable studies that relate Lefebvre's work to other thinkers (Kelly 1982; Kurzweil 1980; Poster 1975; Schmidt 1972), his recent rediscovery by disciplines such as geography, urban studies and cultural studies has come at the cost of neglect of the political and philosophical aspects of his work. This can be seen in both the lack of recent translations of his more explicitly political and philosophical texts and the marginalisation of these issues in the commentaries. Lefebvre's polymath qualities require interdisciplinary work, and, though I am not suggesting that politics and philosophy are the only disciplines in which his work has been neglected, they are perhaps two of the most important.

It would therefore be harsh, but not perhaps unfair, to suggest that Lefebvre's work has suffered as a result of being read in English and appropriated for a certain type of academic work by certain types of scholars. Lefebvre's Marxism was open to many possibilities; he (1988:76) saw Marx's thinking as “a nucleus, an effervescent seed, the ferment of a conception of the world that develops without being able to avoid confrontation with entirely different works” (see Lefebvre and Kolakowski 1974). However, his work only makes sense if the arguments of Nietzsche and Heidegger are understood along with those of Marx and Hegel. To comprehend the modern world, we need to retain some of Marx's concepts but also to add new ones: “the everyday, the urban, social time and space” (Lefebvre 1988:77). A residual Hegelian idealism, Heidegger's understanding of the everyday and experiencing space, Nietzsche's comments on the will to power and buildings and “the emphasis on the body, sexuality, violence and the tragic and the production of differential space and plural times” (Kofman and Lebas 1996:5) are all found in Lefebvre's work. Recognising these debts and the political and philosophical aspects of his work would make a valuable contribution to returning this thinker to the mainstream of 20th-century European thought. It would also mean that the contemporary reassertion of space was much more theoretically sound, and that it touched disciplines other than those already open to such concerns. As Lefebvre (1978:164) notes, “space belongs to the geographers in the academic division of labour”. Space is far too important to allow this division to continue.

Endnotes
1 An important study that I do not treat here is Gregory (1994).


4 Smith (1990:91) praises Soja for having “endorsed, refined and developed the basic ideas in Lefebvre’s vision; at the same time he attempts to correct what he sees as a systematic misinterpretation of Lefebvre in the Anglo-American [tradition].”

5 For an alternative and more explicit history of geography, see Peet (1998).

6 This last translation is modified from the English “representational spaces”, which has become standard practice. See Soja (1996:61) and Shields (1999:161).

7 Soja discusses these criticisms in a conference paper (1995). However, see my review of Thirdspace in light of this (Elden 1997).


9 However, see Maycroft (1996). Shields (1999:67–69) does discuss the relation of Lukács and Heidegger to Lefebvre, but shows his poor grasp of philosophical complexities. Other recent work includes Featherstone (1992) and, for an application of this concept, Silverstone (1994).

10 I will give two examples, one for each author, though many more could be provided. Soja (1996:73) suggests that “all excursions into Thirdspace begin with this ontological restructuring, with the presupposition that being-in-the-world, Heidegger’s Dasein, Sartre’s être-là, is existentially definable as being simultaneously historical, social and spatial”. As I have argued at length in chapter 1 of Elden (2001), Heidegger goes out of his way to deny this predominantly spatial understanding of Dasein (literally “being-there”) or being-in-the-world. Understanding the Heideggerian attitude to space is a much more difficult and delicate task than Soja allows.

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Shields (1999:68–69) draws some relations between Lukács, Heidegger and Lefebvre on the issue of everyday life, but makes the peculiar claim that “Heidegger and Bergson separated individual consciousness from the body and experience”. A reading of Being and Time (1962) and Heidegger’s later lectures on Nietzsche would show that such a claim simply cannot apply to H eidegger. The notion of “individual consciousness” is explicitly problematised, the Cartesian mind/body dualism abandoned and lived experience (Erlebnis) linked to existence. As H eidegger notes, “we do not ‘have’ a body (Leib); rather, we are’ bodily (leiblich)” (1985:117; 1991a:98–99). “Lie life lives in that it bodies forth (Das Leben lebt, indem es leibt)” (1989:152–153; 1991b:79). These lines hint at the notion that as beings-in-the-world we are bodily—that embodiment mediates our existence. See Elden (2001, chapter 2).

11 It is a shame that the book is marred by a series of problems of a stylistic nature and with its critical apparatus. There are a number of dead-end cross-references, inconsistent, misleading or missing references, repetition—sometimes of whole sentences.
or references—and an overabundance of citations from secondary sources that could have been usefully traced to Lefebvre’s own work. The book is clearly assembled from a number of conference papers, which show signs of being poorly integrated.

12 More promising is Burkhard (2000). The thesis on which this was based was heavily utilised by Shields (1999).

13 The forthcoming collection of Lefebvre’s writings seeks to redress this to an extent. See Lefebvre (forthcoming).

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