INTRODUCTION

One of the key themes of *De l’État* is the question of the world. The world, le monde, figures both in the notion of l’échelle mondiale—the worldwide scale—and in that of mondialisation, which can only imperfectly be translated as globalization. Instead, mondialisation is the process of becoming worldwide, the seizing and grasping of the world as a whole, comprehending it as a totality, as an event in thought. The spread of economic and political phenomena across the surface of the globe, which English-language readers have known as globalization since the 1980s, is a development that is made possible by this prior comprehending of the world mondialisation. This chapter seeks to understand Lefebvre’s notion of mondialisation, suggesting that it provides a philosophical and practical account, theoretically grounded and politically aware. In addition it seeks to account for the genesis of the term in Lefebvre’s writings, opening up a perspective on the philosophy of the world more generally.

In thinking about the question of the world, as with his work more generally, Lefebvre is seeking to develop claims from within what is generally called Western Marxism. His reading of Marx is to see his works as a whole, neither privileging the earlier “humanist” writings nor the later “scientific” ones. But for Lefebvre the single most important line from Marx on the question of the world is from an earlier work, his doctoral dissertation. In this dissertation, Marx declares that “the
world’s becoming philosophical is at the same time philosophy’s becoming worldly, that its realization is at the same time its loss.” What this means for Marx is that in its actualization or realization, philosophy is transcended and overcome. Lefebvre regularly cites this line from Marx, and his work as a whole can be understood as an attempt to understand the relation of philosophical thought to its realization, a development he calls metaphilosophy. For Lefebvre, the concern is with a critical reflection on philosophy, seeing how philosophy can be transcended or overcome. This is as much a Nietzschean or Heideggerian überwinden—to overcome or twist free from—as a Hegelian or Marxist aufheben—a word Lenin glossed as “to supersede, put an end to, but simultaneously to conserve, to maintain.”

In understanding the world, Lefebvre thinks that Heidegger also has an important role to play, particularly in the suggestion he makes in the 1929 essay “On the Essence of Ground” that the “world never, but worlds.” This phrase is often reduced to the shorthand the “world worlds,” die Welt weltet, and is intended to understand the way in which the world operates independently of an external cause or trigger. The standard French translation is “le monde n’est jamais, le monde se mondifie”;

The world-wide [le mondial] conceives itself in and by itself and not by another thing (history, spirit, work, science, etc.). The world becomes world, becoming what virtually it was. It transforms itself by becoming worldwide. In it discovery and creation converge. It does not exist before it creates itself, and yet, it proclaimed itself, possible-impossible, through all the powers, technology, knowledge, art.

But the heritage goes back much further, and it is therefore no surprise that Marx’s doctoral dissertation was on pre-Socratic thought, and that Heidegger’s reflections often return to such ancient sources. Indeed, the spur for Lefebvre and Heidegger here is Heraclitus, and in particular his fragment that suggests that eternity, or time (aion), standing as a cipher for the world, is “like a child playing a game.” In a 1973 piece Lefebvre declares that this fragment is the first beacon or marker; the second is Heidegger.

A number of themes thus arise: the distinction between globalization and mondialisation, and the way in which the latter may be said to provide the conditions of possibility for the former; the internal logic of the process of becoming worldwide; and the role of play or the game in understanding this. It is at this point that juxtaposition of Lefebvre’s work with another thinker is useful. This thinker is Kostas Axelos, a Greek émigré who arrived in France in 1945, fleeing from the Royalist victory in the civil war, who studied at the Sorbonne before meeting and befriending both Heidegger and Lefebvre. Lefebvre and Axelos met in 1955 at the
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), when the former was in charge of the sociology division and the latter was a researcher. They took part in a couple of interviews together, and, as will be discussed below, Lefebvre wrote a number of short pieces on Axelos’s work. Lefebvre’s admiration for Axelos is somewhat unusual, given how critical he was of most of his contemporaries, but Lefebvre particularly liked the way in which Axelos analyzed Marx and brought his thought into conflict with contemporary problems. This respect goes deeper than a shared approach to reading Marx. Indeed, for Lefebvre, Axelos is the only thinker who has really come close to thinking the question and distinction of thought in the world and thought in the world, as initiated by Heraclitus. Lefebvre regularly refers to Axelos’s writings in his own works, and indeed at one point refers to him as the “new Heraclitus.”

KOSTAS AXELOS AND THE PLAY OF THE WORLD

Axelos, born in 1924, is a generation younger than Lefebvre, and, although still largely unknown in the English-speaking world, has been a major intellectual figure and facilitator in his adopted homeland of France. He edited the important journal Arguments between 1958 and its close in 1962, and still runs the book series of that name with Éditions de Minuit, in which three of Lefebvre’s books—Introduction à la modernité, Métaphilosophie and La fin de l’histoire—appeared. Many other key figures in French and European thought had volumes appear in that series, including Gilles Deleuze, Maurice Blanchot, Georg Lukács, Herbert Marcuse, and Karl Jaspers. In his own writings, notably Le jeu du monde, influenced by Marx, Heidegger, and Eugen Fink, Axelos discusses the process of becoming worldly, and provides some valuable insights into this question that are of interest both in their own right and because of their impact on Lefebvre’s work. For Axelos, reflecting in 2004 on the advent of thought of globalization, mondialisation has a connection to the notion of the “world” that the more recent term no longer preserves. In part this is a nuance of translation, and one that can be understood through the lens of Anglo-American cultural imperialism as Derrida suggested toward the end of his life. Axelos claims that mondialisation, which was extensively discussed in the pages of the Arguments journal as early as the late 1950s, is worth preserving precisely because it retains the notion of the “world”:

Globalisation names a process which universalises technology, economy, politics, and even civilisation and culture. But it remains somewhat empty. The world, as an opening is missing. The world is not the physical and historical totality, it is not the more or less empirical ensemble of theoretical and practical ensembles. It deploys itself. The thing that is called globalisation is a kind of mondialisation without the world.
The world is an object of thought in its own terms, rather than understandable through other means or ciphers; and is a necessary prerequisite before thinking the extension of other phenomena over it, taking into account the material and conceptual basis of the world and the understanding of space upon which it relies. Indeed, Pierre Fougeyrollas’s “Thèses sur la mondialisation,” published in Arguments, suggests that “to themondialisation of problems we must respond with themondialisation of thought and action.” For Axelos, the human is not in the world but of the world, a relation that cannot be reduced to an identification.

Axelos is concerned with overturning the vulgar materialist reading of Marx, suggesting that it was precisely this realist, objectivist, material understanding that idealism was developed to avoid. For Axelos, just as Lefebvre, the key to an unorthodox, truly Hegelian Marxism is to recognize the dialectical relation between the ideal and the material. Again, like Lefebvre, Axelos recognizes that we must seek the answer to this relation through the problematic of alienation, but not through an exclusive reading of this in the early works. Axelos declares that “Marx’s starting point is economic alienation, the splitting of the world into the world of the structure (real) and the world of the superstructure (ideological). His work consists in reducing the ideological, idealistic, and ideal world to its profane foundation.” Axelos wants to undertake this move, but also its reverse, to recognize the ideological underpinnings of the foundation. For Axelos, the key is to situate the questions of human being, economic production, and concrete society within the wider problematic of the world. Indeed, his detailed study of Marx, profoundly influenced by Heidegger, is, in the original French title, explicit: Marx as a Thinker of Technology: From the Alienation of Man to the Conquest of the World. For Axelos, while Marx and Heidegger do not say the same things, they are both thinkers of great crisis: “one speaks of the alienation of man and the other of the darkening [obscurcissement] of the world.”

As the 1959 interview Lefebvre and Axelos undertook with Jean Beaufret and François Châtelet demonstrates, this is a relation they considered of crucial importance. Lefebvre declares that there is “no antagonism between the cosmic-historic vision of Heidegger and the historic-practical conception of Marx” in terms of conceiving of the relation of humans to technology, but merely that their work approaches it from different directions. Axelos adds that in order to think about these figures historical-political issues need to be considered, including German idealism and the failure of romanticism. And of course the question of National Socialism looms large. Lefebvre notes that his initial rejection of Heidegger was before the latter’s support of the Nazis, and Axelos and Beaufret add some detail to the picture of that support. If those details are now somewhat more complicated by newly released writings and documents, what is clear is that the encounter they staged between Heidegger and Marx was not politically naïve. Instead Heidegger could be used to shed light on Marx himself, to understand Marx better, particularly
in terms of Heidegger’s sustained discussion of things that Marx treated only in summary fashion, such as, for Axelos and Lefebvre, technology and the world. None the less, as Axelos states in this interview, “neither Marx nor Heidegger exhausts the problem of the totality of the world.”

How then are we to understand the world? For Axelos the world deploys as a game (joue). He suggests that this a central question of Western metaphysics: “Being becoming totality, the supreme game.” The 1969 book Le jeu du monde, Axelos’s most important work, can thus be translated as “the game of the world,” but also as “the play of the world,” and my translations from it and other works use “game” and “play” interchangeably for joue, depending on context. There are other related words in Axelos’s conceptual armory, particularly l’enjeu, stake, and jouet, plaything. Le Jeu du monde is a profoundly challenging book, written in a fragmented, almost aphoristic style. Yet, like Nietzsche’s works, these are fragments of a whole, and can only be separated from the totality with violence. Other writings are presented in a more traditional and accessible way, such as Systématique ouverte, which re-presents many of the ideas from the earlier work. Axelos’s key claim is that the world can only be understood on its own terms, or rules, an internal logic of interplay, rather than on the basis of anything exterior to it:

The play of the world attempts to think the game inside of which all games and all rules, all transgressions and all calculations, all significations and all interpretations (global and particular) appear, disappear, are reborn . . . which moves the pawns and figures, figurative or not, on the chessboard of the world, according to contingency or necessity. The pawns and figures are only parts of the game, just as truth is only the triumphant figure of errancy, corresponding to it. Thus a polyvalent combination of theoretical and practical games opens up, which from including the play of the world, remains contained and crushed by it.

The world as a game develops claims made in brief summary form by Heidegger—“the essence of being is the game itself [das Spiel selber]”—and in much more detail in works by Eugen Fink. Fink wonders if “play can become the symbolic theatrical enactment of the universe, the speculative metaphor of the world.” Fink is perhaps best known in the English language for his work continuing the studies of Husserl and for his seminar on Heraclitus with Heidegger; although he is an important phenomenological thinker in his own right, several of whose works would merit English translation. This is perhaps especially true of Spiel als Weltsymbol, a complex analysis of the notion of play in myth, ritual, and philosophy which explores the relation of the play or the game to the world. If a detailed analysis of this book is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to note its crucial role in a mediation between ancient, French, and
German sources for thinking these issues. Its final chapter, “The Worldness of the Human Game,” is particularly important.

The making worldly of phenomena through a logic implicit only to itself, without external cause or purpose, also draws upon Heidegger’s echo of Angelus Silesius’s line about the rose, suggesting that the child of the play of the world “plays, because it plays.”44 The ‘because’ is subsumed [versinkt] in the game. The game is without ‘why’.”45 For Heidegger, the play of the world is the ”sending [Geschick] of being”; for Axelos, it means that the world in a much more tangible sense can be understood only through this continual process of becoming. This is what he means in the idea that the world “deploys itself [se déploie],” the world unfolds and unfurls itself “as a game. That means that it refuses any sense, any rule which is exterior to itself.”46 Deployment is an important term in Axelos, forming the unifying theme of the three trilogies he saw as the architecture of his principal works. Each of these trilogies was given a title: the unfolding, unfurling, or deployment [déploiement] of errance, of the game, and of an inquiry.48

Within this architectonic, which Axelos calls an “open systematic,”49 the question of the world, the play or the game, and the relation of the human to that world of which they are both part and creator is the central theme. For Deleuze, Axelos’s notion of errance, errancy, is a substitution for the “metaphysical opposition of true and false, error and truth,” just as the play of the world between fragment and whole replaces the “metaphysical relation of the relative and the absolute.”50 In this we can see the way in which the process of becoming worldwide is both in opposition to, and the foundation of, philosophical notions of totality and globality, and a challenge to the equation of universality–rationality–totality.51 Being is in the process of becoming a fragmentary totality, precisely through this notion of mondialisation.52 This is the sense of his claim that “being becoming totality” is “the supreme game.”53 Totality is an aspiration rather than an intellectual step in the process of thought.

THE WORLD SCALE AND THE PROBLEM OF THE STATE

Lefebvre’s interest in Axelos’s work is pronounced, something that can be found in a number of pieces he wrote on his work, and in references elsewhere in his corpus. Two of his most explicit analyses are found in reviews of Axelos’s Marx, penseur de la technique and Vers la pensée planétaire for the journal Esprit, another is found in a long 1986 essay devoted to him which first appeared after Lefebvre’s death.55 Lefebvre praises the way that Axelos is able to shed new light on well-known texts of Marx, and brings this reflection on technology to bear on the history of the world.56 He reads technology, in part through Axelos, as not merely a cause of alienation, but also as a potential liberation, as through technology humans are in the process of “becoming worldwide and planetary [devenu mondial et planétaire],” and then may “finally be able to enjoy or command [jouir] the Earth.”57 Yet this ability to command, or truly to
“enjoy,” the earth comes at a profound cost. Rendering the world amenable to control and command is at the root of a number of contemporary phenomena that are injurious to communal well-being and to the health of the earth itself. There is therefore an important distinction between the earth—le terre—and the world—le monde. The earth is the foundation, “a unity [ensemble] of cycles, stable systems, self-regulation: waters, winds, air light, soils, sediments.” The world is “the whole of the devices [l’ensemble des dispositifs] assembled by man beginning to cover the earth.” Thus, the earth, the Planet Earth, becomes the world through our intervention:

Technology unifies the terrestrial world only while plunging the man of this earth into anguish.

Tragic vision? Yes and no. Because this drama of stability, this stability in errancy, is a “game.” The tragic contradiction is the contradiction (the antagonistic unity) of the play and seriousness [gravité]. Man is a serious being [un être sérieux], but nothing is more serious than the game. Man plays his destiny seriously, and the universe plays with the planet earth, man, gravities and human games. Appearance and apparition play with reality, because reality is only the play of appearances. Being? Nature? The absolute? Let us not speak of these. When we play, without speaking of them, we are there. “It” is an eternal child, collecting his dice to launch them into the infinite.

Although this is not always recognized in his contemporary Anglo-American reception, Lefebvre distinguishes between the level and the scale. Level is a mode of understanding that takes into account the range from the private, the realm of habitation, to the global or total, via the mixed, meditating level of the middle. When Lefebvre talks of scale, the largest is not the global, but the world. The world scale, l’échelle mondial, or the simple notion of le mondial, the “worldwide,” which is neither fixed nor accomplished, needs to be introduced as a third term in the conflicting relation of the country and the city. Thus the distinction: “the total, the global, is the totality of knowledge and the world as a totality.” Like Axelos, then, Lefebvre wants to understand totality both as an aspiration of revolutionary praxis, but as something that cannot be grasped through totalizing thought. As Lefebvre notes, “when taken in isolation, in other words speculatively, outside of praxis, the theories of alienation and totality become transformed into systems which are very remote from Marxism—into neo-Hegelianism.” In distinction, in practice totality comes to us in fragments, out of partial determinisms, and is an ongoing process rather than an accomplishment.

At the world scale, the system of states introduces the worldwidenss [mondialité] against historicity; it delineates the contours of planetary space, which does not result from the historical past but from new factors (energy, techniques, strategies, productive forces).
This relation between the questions of spatiality and temporality is revealing. For Lefebvre, talk of the worldwide is tied more to spatiality than to temporality, yet the crucial analysis will be of their overall interrelation. In *De l’État*, which is where Lefebvre most thoroughly treats these relations, the state seeks to transcend both history and to exploit the past. The notion of the state mode of production, where the state takes responsibility for the creation and development of markets, is an inherently spatial issue. Lefebvre argues that the conflict between the worldwide and historicity, the limits of the political, is resolved “in and by the production of worldwide space, the work of a historical time in which it is realized.”

In this understanding we can gain a number of insights. First, the world scale or the notion of the worldwide in no way implies a transcending of spatial, territorial problematics. Rather it requires a thinking of the scale to which they are applied, and a reflection on the remaking of spatial relations. Lefebvre argues that Marx sees the world as first and foremost the world market, a worldly form that pre-dates others. But this too is a “spatial configuration,” of which Marx himself offered only initial indications. As Lefebvre notes: “The world market world involves a territorial distribution . . . of productive forces, flow and stocks . . . The world market is not detached from space; there is no ‘deterritorialised’ abstraction, even if some extra-territorial forces (the heads of some so-called supra-national businesses) operate there.”

Second, the process of mondialisation requires an acceleration of the homogenization of space and time, a process that, ontologically, began in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the advent of the scientific revolution and modern physics. For Lefebvre, following much of the analysis of Heidegger, the key figure in this story is Descartes, whose casting of material as *res extensa* paves the way for a particular way of grasping the world. To see extension as the primary characteristic of matter is to make it amenable to science through geometry and the notions of measure and calculation. Nature becomes controllable as resource, stock for the disposition of technology; a Heideggerian claim that is radicalized through a twofold process—first the recognition of the role of capital and second the refusal to entertain a regressive, reactionary return. Lefebvre was always interested in transforming the mode of urban life, and of the understanding of the world, rather than a retreat to the rural or the local. Thus, for Lefebvre, the notion of the worldwide, *le mondial*, is important but it is not without both conceptual and political problems:

*sometimes it obscures, sometimes it illuminates: global by definition, it does not just deal with the economic, nor the sociological in isolation; neither demography separately, nor traditional historicity taken as criteria of direction. It implies the criticism of separations, especially if they have had their moment and their need. Here we try to grasp it through a process of becoming worldwide, of the State, which supposes the world market, world technicality, etc. but which goes beyond these determinations.*
CONCLUSION

As well as illustrating the connections between Lefebvre and Axelos on a theoretical level, this chapter has sought to document their intellectual friendship through the lens of a topic of shared interest, the question of the world and its impact on the full range of spatial scales, from the global to the local and the urban. Axelos provides the intellectual and conceptual apparatus, developing from Fink and Heidegger, although, for Lefebvre, he is still prone to lapse into speculative metaphysics. In distinction, Axelos’s view of Lefebvre was that he was a more concrete figure, and that ultimately the differences were profound:

With Lefebvre I had many productive discussions. Three of his books were published in the Arguments collection. Bonds of friendship united us. But I consider Lefebvre, if not exclusively, as above all a theorist of Marxism, of society, the city, everyday life. What I have tried to do is different. This became clear in the course of our long conversation.

Undoubtedly the two approaches are necessary together, and this is why a dialogue between Axels and Lefebvre, and further back involving Heraclitus, Marx, Heidegger, and Fink is useful. The principal insight that such analysis provides is that the phenomena that we have taken to discuss as globalization is the political and economic outcome of a prior grasping and comprehending of the world as a globe, of the world seen as a totality or a whole. Lefebvre’s analyses of the notion of mondialisation, developing from the abstract theorizing of Axelos, provide some insights into how that came about. The process of mondialisation is one that requires further study, but for Lefebvre this is tied in two ways to a historical investigation. On the one hand we should think about how globalization is dependent on mondialisation; on the other the conditions of possibility of mondialisation itself, without a lapse into either linear causality or mechanistic determinism, the vulgar historical idealism or materialism he had done so much to challenge throughout his career.

Such a shift to the abstract, the thought, is a necessary, and a necessarily political, move in understanding the contemporary. In this context we would do well to consider the eleventh of Axelos’s “Theses on Marx,” which declares that technological operations require thought; and Lefebvre’s view of the eleventh thesis of Marx himself:

Technologists only transform the world in different ways in universalised indifference, what matters now is to think it, and to interpret the transformations in depth, by grasping and experiencing the difference which unites being to nothingness.
Philosophy makes itself world: it makes the world and the world is made through it. The world is produced to the exact measure whereby philosophy is realized, and realizing, becomes world. Philosophers have interpreted the world: now it must be changed; can this change be accomplished without philosophy?78

What matters now is to think the world, and the process of becoming worldwide, the notion of mondialisation, in order that we may better understand globalization. Perhaps then, and perhaps only then, will we understand how to change or transform it for more radical, progressive, political goals. Radical politics requires a radicalization of the political, as we need to ask how revolutionary thought is rendered possible.79 As Lefebvre puts it, “Kostas Axelos opens the horizon, shows the way.”80

NOTES
1. I am grateful to the editors of this volume, Neil Brenner and, above all, Kostas Axelos for their comments on and enthusiasm for this essay. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the author.
2. This can be particularly seen in his Dialectical Materialism, trans. J. Sturrock (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968). See Stuart Elden, Understanding Henri Lefebvre: Theory and the Possible (London: Continuum, 2004), ch. 1, for a fuller discussion of Lefebvre’s position within Marxism and his reading of Marx.
5. Lefebvre, Métaphilosophie; see Elden, Understanding Henri Lefebvre, 83–5.
10. Lefebvre, De l’État, IV, 416; Key Writings, 200.
11. See also Martin Heidegger, Heraklit: 1. Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens 2. Logik: Heraklits Lehre vom Logos, Gesamtausgabe, Band 55 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979) and Der Satz vom Grund, Gesamtausgabe, Band 10 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997); trans. R. Lilly as The Principle of Reason (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).
31. Ibid., 94.
32. Ibid., 96–8.
44. See ibid.
48. Axelos’s principal writings can be schematized as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Le déploiement de l’errance</th>
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<td>Vers la pensée planétaire (1964)</td>
<td>Pour une éthique problématique (1972)</td>
<td>Problèmes de l’enjeu (1979)</td>
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49. Axelos, Systématique ouverte.
50. Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts, 76.
51. See Lefebvre, Le retour de la dialectique, 135.
52. Axelos, Le jeu du monde, 157. The original projected subtitle of this book was “fragments de la totalité.”
55. Lefebvre, “Le monde selon Kostas Axelos.”
56. Lefebvre, “Marxisme et technique,” 1025.
57. Ibid., 1026.
59. Ibid., 1115–16.
60. Lefebvre, La révolution urbaine (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), 135; Key Writings, 148.
61. Lefebvre, Qu’est-ce que penser?, 110; see De l’État, II, 67.
63. Lefebvre, foreword to the 2nd edn, Dialectical Materialism, 77.
65. Lefebvre, De l’État, IV, 95.
66. Ibid., 326.
67. Ibid., 94. Lefebvre links these broader arguments to those of his better-known The Production of Space in “Le mondial et le planétaire,” Espaces et Sociétés 8, February (1973): 15–22.
68. Lefebvre, De l’État, IV, 435; Key Writings, 203.
69. Lefebvre, De l’État, IV, 418–19; Key Writings, 201.
70. Lefebvre, De l’État, IV, 29; see ibid., III, 134.
71. Ibid., III, 133.
72. See Elden, Speaking against Number, especially ch. 3.
73. Lefebvre, De l’État, III, 133.
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77. Axelos, Vers la pensée planétaire, 177; “Theses on Marx,” 69.
78. Lefebvre, De l’État, IV, 420; Key Writings, 201–2.
79. Lefebvre, Une pensée devenue monde, 180. For a more detailed discussion, see Elden, Understanding Henri Lefebvre, 241–4.