At the heart of French intellectual life for over half a century, Kostas Axelos remains a largely unknown figure in the English-speaking world. He was born in Greece in 1924, quickly became a communist, and was active in the National Liberation Front against the Nazi occupation. After Greece was liberated in 1944, and the country descended into civil war, he was sentenced to death by the Royalist government and left on the same ship as Cornelius Castoriadis.1 Almost immediately on arriving in France he got in touch with the Parti communiste français [PCF].2 He studied at the Sorbonne, taught at the University of Paris, and researched at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique. Axelos had a wide range of intellectual contacts, including Jacques Lacan, Jean Beaufret, and, through them, Martin Heidegger; Pablo Picasso, whose partner Françoise Gilot, the subject of the 1996 film *Surviving Picasso*, ended up living with Axelos; André Breton and Georges Bataille.3 He attended seminars by Karl Jaspers and had his thesis examined by, among others, Paul Ricoeur and Raymond Aron.4 He is cited approvingly by Jacques Derrida in *Of Grammatology*, and his books were reviewed in *Critique* by Gilles Deleuze and in *Esprit* by Henri Lefebvre.5 Approaching his eightieth birthday, Axelos continues to be active: his most recent book was published in 2001, and he participated in a conference to celebrate fifty years of conferences at Cerisy-la-Salle in August 2002 and in one on Heidegger’s thought in France in November 2002.6
Little of his work—nineteen books and numerous articles—is available in English. The only book-length translation is of the 1961 study, *Marx penseur de la technique*, which develops a version of Heideggerian Marxism, also pursued in the German-language collection *Einführung in ein künftiges Denken: Über Marx und Heidegger*, which would prove important in the non-Sartrean appropriation of Heidegger’s ideas in France. This article will discuss one of his ideas, the notion of “world,” in some detail, but Axelos is perhaps most important in his role as a facilitator and node in an intellectual network, a world of another kind. This took a range of forms, including his work with the journal *Arguments*, and a book series of the same name with Éditions de Minuit. Axelos is also known for his French translations of Georg Lukács’ *History and Class Consciousness* and Heidegger’s *What is Philosophy?*, a lecture originally given at Cerisy-la-Salle in 1955 where Axelos acted as Heidegger’s interpreter. Over the next few years, Axelos also did this for Heidegger’s meetings with René Char and Georges Braque, and spent several days at Lacan’s country house in the company of Beaufret, Heidegger, and Lacan.

In English-language critical scholarship on Marxism in France, it is only really in Mark Poster’s *Existential Marxism in Postwar France* (1975) that Axelos has received substantial treatment. My own *Understanding Henri Lefebvre* (2004) traces some of the interrelations between Lefebvre and Axelos; Michael Kelly’s *Modern French Marxism* (1982) simply makes reference to the “greatly overestimated ‘Arguments’ and ‘Socialisme ou Barbarie’ groups,” the latter being founded by Castoriadis and Claude Lefort. In France there has been more interest, including a biography, a book by Lefebvre and Pierre Fougeyrollas, and an edited collection of essays. This is not to say that the French reception has been all positive. A similar downplaying of the importance of *Arguments* to that of Kelly is found in Richard Gombin’s *The Origins of Modern Leftism* (1971), for example. Indeed, Lefebvre’s biographer Rémi Hess has recently suggested that Axelos’s work merits being rediscovered, suggesting that even in his adopted homeland he is largely ignored. In a sense, though, the Anglophone neglect is a circular problem—the lack of translations means lack of knowledge and interest in his writings; the absence of that interest means translations would be unlikely to find an audience. While the Pluto series on Modern European Thinkers includes a study of his fellow *Arguments* editor, Edgar Morin, there has been almost no attention paid to Axelos even in Anglophone journal articles. In fact, aside from Poster, the most detailed treatment of Axelos is Ronald Bruzina’s introduction to his translation of *Alienation, Praxis, and Techne in the Thought of Karl Marx*. 
THE ARGUMENTS JOURNAL

Axelos's role as a facilitator of debate, after his work with Heidegger, was initially in the *Arguments* journal, which he edited between 1958 and 1962, and whose contributors included Lefebvre, Maurice Blanchot, Deleuze, and Lefort.\(^1\) Morin, Roland Barthes, Colette Audry, and Jean Duvignaud were the original figures behind the journal, with Morin the key figure. Barthes was involved for the first five and last six issues.\(^2\) Other figures were part of a fairly fluid editorial team, including François Fejtö and Fougeyrollas. Despite some suggestions, Lefebvre was never an editor of *Arguments*.\(^3\) The journal was linked with and modeled on the Italian journal, *Ragionamenti*, whose editors included Franco Fortini and Roberto Guiducci.\(^4\) As well as sharing intellectual content and aims, *Arguments* borrowed the typographical and stylistic characteristics of *Ragionamenti*: a rather muted and unassuming format. As Morin suggests, the aim was for the impact to come from the content rather than design.\(^5\) The journal also had links with other European publications, such as *Praxis* in Yugoslavia and *Nowa Cultura* in Poland, and directly inspired the German *Das Argument*.\(^6\) The British journal *New Left Review*, which though not formally connected shared some characteristics and had contact with Morin, was launched in 1960.\(^7\)

The date of the first issue was December 1956–January 1957. This is significant, 1956 being the year of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin to the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, and events in Hungary, Poland, and Suez.\(^8\) It was, the editors declared, launched at the time of the *éclatement*, the explosion or destruction, of Stalinism.\(^9\) *Arguments* was a journal for those who had left the PCF, such as Morin, or those who were about to, such as Lefebvre. Morin's *Autocritique* and Lefebvre's *La Somme et le reste*, both published in 1959, are classic accounts of the struggle to rid themselves of the accumulated baggage of party membership—in Lefebvre's case lasting almost three decades.\(^10\)

The journal tried very hard to be non-sectarian, including Stalinists, Trotskyists, and even Sartreans among its contributors.\(^11\) But there was a danger that this open Marxism would involve going beyond Marxism, a not-inaccurate description of the tension in the journal as a whole.\(^12\) Taking a lead from some of the ideas proposed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, especially following his resignation as political editor of *Les Temps modernes* in 1952, *Arguments* was interested in what Western Marxism might be without the Leninist element.\(^13\) Although Kevin Anderson has shown how some of Lenin's work—particularly the notebooks on Hegel—opened up alternatives to orthodox
Marxist-Leninism, this post-Leninist move was part of a reshaping of the French, and more broadly European, left. Kofman notes that by the end of its run Arguments had “drawn contributions from almost all of the leading names of the non-communist left in France with two significant exceptions: Castoriadis and Sartre.” Indeed Kofman suggests that Les Temps modernes was “almost as much ‘the enemy’ as was the PCF.”

Axelos’s first involvement was as a co-translator of Lukács in number three, and then as a contributor in issue number four. He was involved in the editing from number five and quickly established his mark on the journal. Morin recalls his arriving “like a meteorite.” Although he did not take over as Chief Editor until 1961, issue twenty-one, Arguments was changed quite dramatically by his presence. Instead of its previous form as a research bulletin, originally conceived by Morin as a forum for debate and the exchange of ideas, under Axelos it became much more of a standard journal. The opening lines of the original manifesto, at the head of the first issue, had proclaimed that “Arguments is not a review but a bulletin of research, discussions, and clarifications, open to all who place themselves in a scientific and socialist perspective.”

Axelos recalls the transition somewhat differently, being a move from a concern with communism and the rupture with the PCF to more general questions concerned with life, love, the universe, and language.

Axelos’s recollection shows the wide-ranging interests of the journal. Listed at the end of issue number seven, the subject groupings of previous articles are revealing. As well as “Marxist Thought,” “Economy and Society,” “The Problems of Socialism,” and “Lukács,” a number of articles had been published on “The Third World,” “Culture, Language, and the Theatre,” and “The Contemporary Novel.” Barthes’ piece in the first issue was one of the first discussions of semiology. Subsequent issues would look at a wide range of other concerns: from historical issues, the arts, politics, cosmology, the world and the planet, and, as mentioned by Axelos, love. Indeed, Axelos himself contributed an essay entitled, “L’Errance érotique” to the seventh issue of Arguments, a piece later collected in Vers la pensée planétaire, and then published as a book in its own right. He had also written the piece “Les marxistes et l’amour” under the pseudonym of Jean de Leyde.

As Axelos recalls, putting together Arguments was a very social occasion, with much of the discussion moving from the offices of Éditions de Minuit to meals at the editors’ homes. He also notes that it was impossible to estimate how much time he spent on the journal, as the social aspects meshed with the work aspects. He describes the work as “free militancy [un mili-
tantisme gratuit] but with a lot of pleasure. As Eric Haviland notes, Axelo's recollections of this period are predominantly happy. It is also worth noting that the managing editor for much of the time was Axelos's wife, Réa Karavas. In a retrospective interview Axelos was asked whether he agreed with the idea that many of the pieces in the journal were sketches or works in progress, rather than finished pieces. He agreed, but denied that this indicated an absence of work on them. Articles were worked on, reworked and re-reworked, but the point was to show thought in movement rather than sedentary positions, hence the appearance of sketchiness.

According to Axelos, around the time of number five or six about one thousand issues were produced, although circulation eventually climbed to four thousand, and some issues had to be reprinted. Morin notes that this was in large part a Latin Quarter phenomenon, four hundred copies being sold on the boulevard Saint-Michel alone. However, its impact cannot simply be measured in figures. As Rémy Rieffel phrased it, “the existence of Arguments was short (1956–1962), but its influence was felt for a long time.” Arguments not only published some of the key intellectual figures of postwar France, it also introduced the French public to a range of writers in translation. Foremost among these was Georg Lukács, several of whose essays from History and Class Consciousness appeared in the journal. These translations drew a fairly harsh response from Lukács, who suggested, via Emile Bottigelli, that “for twenty years, I have, several times, publicly declared that I consider my book History and Class Consciousness, published in 1923, as outdated [pour dépassé] and, in many respects, wrong.” The Arguments response was bullish, continuing to publish chapters and then the full text, which also drew a criticism from Lukács, “not for formal reasons concerning author’s rights,” but because the book was erroneous and “dangerous,” being part of Lukács’ transition from “the objective idealism of Hegel to dialectical materialism,” and therefore only likely to “provoke confusion with readers today.” Axelos also played a major role in making other German writers known to a French audience, including Theodor Adorno, Karl Korsch, and the later work of Heidegger.

One of the other things that is notable about the journal is that it was keen not to outstay its welcome. Its end was not due to lack of money or readers. As noted above, the journal had changed from its original format, and it was in danger of being just a collection of papers, without a coherent purpose. Equally, as Morin notes, the team behind the journal were further and further apart, in some cases literally: Duvignaud in Tunisia, Fougeyrolles in Senegal, and Fejtö and Barthes occupied with their own work. In 1962, then, Axelos and Morin closed the journal, Axelos declaring that “with
and without joy and sadness, the Arguments review is scuttled by its captains.” Axelos saw the demise of Arguments as inevitable given the end of its intellectual project, which was to open up an intellectual space for variants with French leftism. For Morin, because Arguments had been formed just as Khrushchev’s secret speech had opened up the possibility of plural Marxisms, its demise signaled the end of that project. For Kofman, “if Axelos said farewell with the passing sorrow of a wanderer, Morin burst into a lament for a lost love.”

In 1963, the Internationale Situationniste [IS] published a tract entitled, “Into the Dustbins of History,” which both mocked the demise of the journal they despised and particularly condemned what they saw as the plagiarism of their work on the Paris Commune, in an article by Lefebvre which appeared in the final issue of Arguments. In the pamphlet, reprinted in a later issue of their own journal, the IS laid their own “Theses on the Paris Commune” alongside the offending text of Lefebvre’s. The details of the particular case are less important than what it says about the in-fighting of the French Left in this period. Accordingly to the IS, Arguments was France’s “purest expression” of “the fraudulent carnival of modern thought.” Sometime later, the IS accused Axelos of having invented “Jacques Darquin,” a writer supposedly “briefly a member of the Internationale Situationniste,” in order to pen a positive article about himself. The IS coined the derogatory epithet “Argumentist,” which Morin dryly observed was “the nicest compliment that they gave us.”

After Arguments folded, the Socialisme ou Barbarie journal tried to take on its subscribers, if not its ideas, writing a letter suggesting that “we know your subscription to Arguments testifies to similar preoccupations.” Although this is cited critically by the IS, according to Lefebvre, Guy Debord told him that “our journal, the Internationale situationniste, has to replace Arguments.” It did not take long before these journals similarly folded, Socialisme ou Barbarie three years later, Internationale situationniste in 1969. René Lourau has called this the self-dissolution of the avant-gardes, although he sees the break-ups as important for the group-based politics of 1968 and beyond.

The end of Arguments was certainly the end of an era, and yet certain aspects of its project continued, both in the book series that bore its name and in the work of its organizers. Axelos has noted that Arguments had an important impact on his subsequent career and work, suggesting that it “was a great laboratory or fusion of ideas.” As Axelos’s ex-wife Réa Karavas suggests, several ideas tried out in the journal went on to be “discovered” many years later. Others went in different directions. Morin moved closer to
Castoriadis and Lefort of *Socialisme ou Barbarie*; and as Olivier Corpet notes, it is interesting that a number of those involved with *Arguments*, including Lefebvre and Duvignaud, were involved in the launch of the journal *Autogestion* in 1966. Sometime collaborators Alain Touraine, François Châtelet, and Fougeyrollas all went on to produce important works. But perhaps most interesting, French Marxism found new stars. Sartre’s *Critique of Dialectical Reason* was published in 1960, and, as Kofman notes, just as *Arguments* folded, Althusser’s articles began to attract attention.

**THE ARGUMENTS BOOK SERIES**

Just before the journal was terminated, Axélos launched a book series of the same name with Éditions de Minuit. Although Kofman suggests that the series was everything Morin feared the journal would become, Axélos claimed that it both “continued and began a same and different history” [poursuit et inaugure une histoire même et autre]. Éditions de Minuit was at the forefront of the publication of French thought, along with the *Critique* series, also paralleling a journal of the same name, edited by Georges Bataille. Its catalogue reads almost like a who’s who of French postwar intellectual life, with the *Arguments* series including Deleuze’s *Spinoza et le problème de l’expression* and his presentation of Sacher-Masoch’s *Venus in Furs*, Bataille’s *L’Érotisme*, and Blanchot’s *Lautréamont et Sade*. The series also published several books by contributors to the journal, including three by Lefebvre, Edgar Morin’s work on cinema, and almost all of Axélos’s own works. Jean Beaufret’s four-volume *Dialogue avec Heidegger*, crucial in understanding the French reception of Heidegger’s thought, since Beaufret was the recipient of Heidegger’s *Letter on Humanism*; René Lourau’s analyses of the state and institutions; and Didier Franck’s important studies of Husserl and Heidegger, are some of the other highlights in an extensive backlist. Also important, as with the journal, was the program of translations. A whole range of studies, both within and outside Marxism, appeared in this series: for some writers this was the first time they had appeared in French. Lukács’ *Histoire et connaissance de classe* (1960), already mentioned, was the inaugural book, with an important preface by Axélos himself. This translation preceded the English translation, which did not appear until 1971, and therefore served as an early way into the ideas of Lukács. Works by a range of other thinkers, including the dissident Marxism of Karl Korsch and Herbert Marcuse; Louis Hjelmslev and Roman Jakobson’s pioneering work on linguistics; and the phenomenology of Karl
Jaspers and Eugen Fink were also included in the series. It is worth noting that if the journal was always a collaborative venture, the book series was almost entirely the work of Axelos.

One of the recurrent themes of the journal, and continued in detail in the book series, was the question of the notion of “world.” This seems to me to be the enduring legacy of their work. The fifteenth issue of the journal, in 1959, had a large number of articles devoted to the theme of “the worldwide problem [le problème mondial],” including a brief, but suggestive article entitled, “Thèses sur la mondialisation,” by Fougeyrollas. In this piece Fougeyrollas discusses how the tensions between capitalism and socialism are masking the opportunity of deploying the world’s resources to deal with the world’s problems, for example starvation and malnutrition. A new universalism, a universalism of the world [universalisme mondialiste], must replace the universalist ethics, law, and social structure of, respectively, Christianity, democracy, and Marxism. “To the mondialisation of problems we must respond with the mondialisation of thought and action”; the West “must propose or offer [proposer] to the East and South to make a unity of the human world.”

The following issue had a theme section on “the planetary era”; the 1960 manifesto of the journal explained one of its purposes as understanding the “second half of the twentieth century: a planetary age of technology; iron age of a new industrial civilization; new age of the human”; and the Arguments book series was divided into two divisions, one of which was entitled “The Becoming-Thought of World and the Becoming-Worldly of Thought.” This phrase undoubtedly trades on a line from Marx’s doctoral thesis, where he suggests that “the world’s becoming philosophical is at the same time philosophy’s becoming worldly, that its realization is at the same time its loss.” Both Axelos and Lefebvre regularly cited this as an aphorism, and for Axelos, it could be said to serve as a guiding theme for his entire work. Marx’s point is that in its becoming worldly, that is in its actualization, philosophy is transcended and overcome. What is interesting here, in relation to the book series, is that “philosophy” is replaced by “thought,” a very Heideggerian move. So, here, as will become apparent in much of Axelos’s work, we have a Marxist theme transfigured through Heidegger. Two books translated in the Arguments series particularly contributed to this thinking of the relation between world and thought: Eugen Fink’s Le Jeu comme symbole du monde—play, or the game, as symbol of the world—and Wilfrid Desan’s The Planetary Man, to which Axelos contributed an “Afterword.” Fink had been Husserl’s assistant for many years, and was the co-organizer, with Heidegger of a 1966–67 seminar on Hera-
The famous fragment 52, Heraclitus had declared that time, the world, or the universe “is like a child playing a game.”

The world and technology

It is in this theme of thinking the world that perhaps that we can see the greatest contemporary relevance of Axelos and the Arguments circle. The “world” thematic has the potential to act as a valuable correction to current lazy thinking on globalization. The issue of the world, particularly in relation to the notion of play or the game—le jeu—was a recurrent concern of Axelos’s own writings. In numerous works, notably Vers la pensée planétaire, Horizons du monde, and Le Jeu du monde, Axelos sketched a number of key themes. In the last, which Jacques Soicher has called his “masterbook,” and which apparently took fifteen years to write, he pursues the question in considerable detail. In the second half of this chapter I therefore offer some thoughts on Axelos’s work in this regard.

The argument is that the 1960s saw a new era of planetary technology and mondialisation, a term that can only be loosely translated as “globalization.” The stress is on the process of becoming worldly, the seizing and comprehending of the world as a whole, as an event in thought, rather than on the spread of phenomena of economics and politics across the surface of the globe. In other words, the second process, globalization, is in a sense only possible because of this prior comprehending of the world, mondialisation. Although the distinction between the two terms has been blurred in more recent French writings, it is important in understanding the concepts in their usage at the time. This issue is explored in much detail in Axelos’s writings, and was picked up, for example, in Lefebvre’s work on the state and production on the world scale. These are some of the earliest usages of the term in French literature, and predate the discussion of the notion of globalization in English-language scholarship. As Axelos suggested much later, when globalization was much more widely discussed, the term globalization—affecting the globe—misses the “world” and so-called world history.

Axelos suggests that when we talk of an atomic or nuclear era we do so without knowing what we are naming. Both of these designations trade upon the wider context of planetary technology, which is seen as the new destiny of the world. Axelos describes this as the “becoming-worldly of technology, and the becoming-technological of the world,” in another twist to the phrase. It is to the world that the crisis facing humanity has risen: if Nietzsche discussed European nihilism, Axelos saw it on the worldwide
Like Heidegger, who discussed this aspect of Nietzsche’s work in his lecture courses, by technology [technique] Axélos means something much broader than tools or techniques; he addresses their underlying logic. Technology founds, undoubtedly, the possibility and effectiveness of machines, industry, the exploitation of atomic energy and of all other energy, but it goes far beyond apparatuses and machinery. And it is global technology which orders the new worldwide politics, the planetary politics.

Axélos therefore works through in detail the “encounter between global technology and modern humans.” The quoted phrase is, of course, Heidegger’s, where he uses it to describe the “inner truth and greatness of national socialism,” that is the so-called “private” version of national socialism that he yearned for in the face of the distortion he saw ruling in Germany. For Axélos, the thinking of this encounter is of considerable importance, though his political inclination was a form of dissident, albeit Heidegger-influenced, Marxism. “World” does not simply signify the totality of all that exists; it is concerned with relations, interplay, and the game—le jeu. Axélos claims, just as Heidegger does, that the human and world are not one, but neither are they two: “Neither of them is the other, but they cannot act [jouer] without the other.” Rather, they are something that requires their being thought together, what Heidegger calls being-in-the-world, which should not be understood in a primarily spatial sense, but rather as an integration of the human and the environment. As Axélos puts it, “there is not the human and world. The human is not in the world.” What this means is that we are not so much in the world but of the world, just as the world is not in space-time, but is spatio-temporal. Our relation with the world is the crucial issue; it is both something within and outside our control: “The human is the great partner of the play of the world, yet the human is not only the player, but is equally the ‘outplayed’ [déjoué], the play-thing [jouet].”

As well as this thinking of the relation of the human and the world, clearly Axélos’s thought on technology is indebted to Heidegger’s work in this area. What we have is the interesting contrast between a Nazi party member and someone who was sentenced to death for their role in the Greek resistance.

It is worth noting here that, although Axélos would remain Heideggerian, he did not shy away from the political aspects of Heidegger’s career. According to Haviland, he questioned Heidegger about his allegiance to the Nazi party, but never got much beyond straightforward explanations: that
Nazism was not the same at the beginning as it became and that we should not judge 1933 events on the basis of what we think of Nazism now; that “I committed an error, and must pay for it”; and that “but in my work, there is no trace of Nazism.” At least the last is palpably false, as Axélès realized. Then, in 1959, Axélès, Beaufret, Châtelet, and Lefebvre debated numerous aspects of Heidegger’s work, including his relation to Marx and his Nazi past. This should give the lie to any suggestion that French Heidegger scholarship was woken from its dogmatic slumbers in 1987 by Victor Farías’s book: the question had also been discussed in Les Temps modernes in the 1940s. Axélès, just as some of the more intelligent recent discussions of Heidegger and politics have realized, knew that you could be a Heideggerian without being on the political Right, but that this could not be at the expense of a detailed and careful interrogation of the relationship between his politics and his thought.

Axélès interrogates Marx and Marxism through this question of technology. For Lefebvre, this is one of the important characteristics of Axélès: he is “one of a rare breed, if not the only one” who studies, criticizes, and situates Marx within the history of thought. In his book on Marx, Axélès shows how alienation, that great concern of Marx that dominated so much French discussion of his ideas in the twentieth century, has relations to Heidegger’s notion of the “forgetting of being.” Alienation in Marx, according to Axélès, can be found not only in ideology and economics, but also through technology. In Marx’s own writings we find this thought particularly in his work on the labor process, and Axélès reads Marx widely to interrogate this problematic. One of the key passages is found in The Poverty of Philosophy:

Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist.

Technology therefore affects the way in which we deal with nature, the world, and the entirety of our social relations. Axélès describes modern technology as an échafaudage, a scaffold or a framework. In Contribution à la logique he talks of the “worldwide technical échafaudage.” Such a metaphor becomes clearer when we recognize that this is the term Axélès suggests be used to translate the Heideggerian notion of das Ge-stell, usually translated as “en-framing,” or, in French, as arraissonnement or dispositif. Like Heidegger, Axélès thinks
that the way that we conceive of the world is founded upon a particular ontological determination of it as calculable, measurable, and therefore controllable and exploitable. “Modernity leads to the planetary era. This era is global and worldwide, errant, leveling and flattening, planning, calculating and combinative” [Cette ère est globale et mondiale, errante, aplanissante et aplatisante, planificatrice, calculatrice et combinatoire]. The framework which makes modern technology achievable precedes it as a condition of possibility. It follows that Marx’s critique of political economy is based upon trying to comprehend the reduction of phenomena to value—use or exchange—a numerical measure of productivity and power. For Axelos therefore:

The world cannot be reduced either to an ensemble of intraworldly phenomena, nor to “creation,” or to the Cosmic Universe, to which is adjoined a social and historical world, nor to the totality of that which human representation understands [de ce que saisit la représentation humaine], nor to the total scope of technical activity.

But Axelos, as well as reading the examination of a Heideggerian problematic in Marx, reads Marx in much the same way as Heidegger reads Nietzsche, as the final figure of Western Metaphysics, in whom the most radical challenge and the exhaustion of possibilities comes together. Heidegger only briefly acknowledges the role that Marx plays in the final stages of metaphysics. It is interesting to note that the two places where Heidegger does deal with this theme are in relation to French promptings—in the “Letter on Humanism” to Beaufret, and in the “What is Philosophy?” lecture Axelos had translated for the Cerisy-la-Salle audience. When Axelos suggested that Heidegger has not sufficiently dealt with the thought of Marx on technology, or indeed Marx at all, Heidegger replied that he should do it himself. Marx therefore plays the same role for Axelos as Nietzsche does for Heidegger, as the “last philosopher,” where “a great epoch of Western metaphysics, that is, of Greek, Judeo-Christian, and Modern metaphysics, reaches a culmination.” Like Heidegger, Axelos turns to the pre-Socratics, particularly Heraclitus. As already mentioned, Axelos’s secondary thesis was on him, and he translated and edited a collection of his writings. For Lefebvre, against the new Eleatics, the Zeno’s of structuralism, Axelos is the “new Heraclitus,” because Axelos, like Heraclitus, is a dialectical, historical thinker. Lefebvre thinks that Axelos is the most important thinker to have grasped Heraclitus’ teaching of thought of the world and thought in the world.
As Poster intimates, Axelos was only able to make Marx seem tangled in metaphysics in this way by reading him simply as a philosopher. But Axelos’s point is that the way in which Marx thinks various issues—value, alienation, and technique, for example—depend on metaphysical notions. Axelos argues that although Marx wants to “abolish philosophy in a radical way so that it can realize itself in real, material action,” to change the world rather than merely interpret it, he remains within the system he seeks to reverse, just as Heidegger claimed with Nietzsche. For Poster, the question of the transcendence of philosophy, and in particular Marx’s role in it, especially in an age of technology, was a theme of Fougeyrollas, Lefebvre, Axelos, and François Châtelet: “Looking at their work as a whole, we can say that Axelos and Fougeyrollas tended to be more critical of Marx, while Châtelet and Lefebvre saw less urgency in revising Marx’s basic propositions.”

**TRILOGIES, SYSTEMS, ISOLATION**

Axelos viewed most of his output in terms of trilogies. He discusses the relation between them in a number of places, particularly in *Problèmes de l’enjeu*. The books on Marx and Heraclitus, his primary and secondary theses, were partnered by *Vers la pensée planétaire* in the first trilogy. His works on logic and ethics were the first and third volumes of the second trilogy, joining *Le jeu du monde*. The final trilogy comprised *Arguments d’une recherche*, *Horizons du monde*, and *Problèmes de l’enjeu*. Each of these trilogies were given an overall title: the unfolding, unfurling, or deployment of errance, of the game, and of an inquiry. *Le Jeu du monde* is therefore the central book in the central trilogy.

Axelos was nothing if not ambitious, and the brief summary of his own work here cannot do justice to the range of his concerns. He describes the first trilogy as a certain grasp of the play of the history of thought and the thought of history; and the second trilogy as presenting, the...

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**Table 5.1. The Trilogy of Trilogies—Axelos’s Principal Writings**

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without representing, "a systematic of thought: a logic and a methodology; a questioning and encyclopedic ontology, fundamental, and animating regional ontologies; an anthropology and an ethic." Grand themes indeed, and the three trilogies and his other writings are extremely self-referential and have the impression of an almost Kantian architectonic. He was keen, however, to resist the idea that he was building a system. Instead he pursued an "open systematic." Within this systematic the overarching theme had been the question of the world, the play or the game of the world, and the relation of the human to that world of which they are both part and creator.

Axelos is therefore extremely important in terms of his network of contacts and because of the way in which he brought into print a range of texts showing disparate interests. His importance as a facilitator of translation alone is worthy of note. In his own writings the principal interlocutors are Heraclitus, Marx, and Heidegger. Other figures—Hegel and Nietzsche for example—are mentioned, and there are studies of Pascal, Freud and Rimbaud, but these three are the central ones. His critical reflections on their thought led him to the important thinking through of issues around the notion of world, something which has relevance to contemporary thinking on these issues. What is striking, particularly for someone so well-connected, is the paucity of references to his contemporaries. I opened by listing some of the people who had referred to his work or written about it. Axelos rarely repays the compliment. In *Problèmes de l’enjeu*, for example, he writes about madness without mentioning Foucault and the city without reference to Lefebvre. In fact his engagement with other contemporary writers—with the exception of Heidegger—was usually at the beginning of his career and often in the form of short reviews. He says of Heidegger that he “was not a man of discussion. He debated with texts from the history of thought and poetry, but he did not debate in his seminars.” This might almost be said of Axelos’s own writing. What we have is the curious paradox of a writer in exile who is both adopted by and helps to fundamentally shape the intellectual and cultural landscape of postwar France, and yet who, in his work, retreats more and more into intellectual isolation. As the world of which he wrote dominated the intellectual horizon, his own world closed in around him.

NOTES


7. Of these books, two were published in Greek, one in German, and the remainder in French. There are numerous translations of his writings, in over fifteen languages, notably in Italian and Spanish.


29. See Poster, _Existential Marxism in Postwar France_, 212.
30. See Kofman, _Edgar Morin_, 44.
42. Haviland, _Kostas Axélos_, 70.
46. Rieffel, _La Tribu des clercs_, 288.
47. Georg Lukács, “Qu’est-ce que le marxisme orthodoxe?”; “Rosa Luxembourg, Marxiste,” Arguments 5 (December 1957): 20–31; “Le phénomène de la reification,” Arguments 11 (December 1958): 14–30. These were all translated by Jacqueline Bois and Axelos, who also published other parts in La Nouvelle Réforme and Socialisme ou Barbarie, and who eventually published a full version of the book.


54. See Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France, 213.

55. Kofman, Edgar Morin, 12, 43.


68. Kofman, Edgar Morin, 8.
75. The English translation, *History and Class Consciousness*, cites the Axelos and Bois translation as useful in the preparation of the English version.


88. In his Identität und Differenz (Pfulligen: Neske, 1957), 64, Heidegger suggests that “the essence of being is the game itself [das Spiel selber].” This is cited by Axelos in Vers la pensée planétaire, 22.


90. See Axelos, Arguments d’une recherche, 162.

91. See, in particular, Lefebvre, De l’État, 4 vols. (Paris: UGE, 1976–78); and for a commentary, Elden, Understanding Henri Lefebvre, Chapter Six.

92. Axelos, Ce Questionnement, 40.

93. On this in detail see “La question de la technique planétaire,” in Axelos, Ce Questionnement, 15–35.


97. Axelos, Vers la pensée planétaire, 297.

98. Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe Band 40 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), 208. As well as the texts mentioned by Axelos, see also Pour une éthique problématique (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1972), 26–27; Arguments d’une recherche, 169.


103. Axelos, Ce Questionnement, 56.


107. Heidegger's thought of the world is important in a whole range of appropriations of his work for radical purposes. See, among others, Lefebvre, and the work of Jean-Luc Nancy. In a recent lecture, André Tosel suggested the Nietzschean/Heideggerian understanding of the world is the most interesting of the four alternatives he offered—economic, political/Habermas, and Hardt and Negri being the other three. Tosel, “Les philosophies de la mondialisation” (public lecture, Université René Descartes, Paris V, 7 July 2003).


116. See, for example, *Problèmes de l'enjeu*, 16, 66.


121. Axelos, *Arguments d'une recherche*, 168; Marx penseur de la technique, 2: 120–21; and *Alienation, Praxis, and Techne*, 246.

122. For the acknowledgement of Marx, see Heidegger, *What is Philosophy? Was ist das–die Philosophie?* [English-German edition], trans. William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde (London: Vision Press, 1963), 89; and “Letter on Hu-

123. Axelos and Janicaud, “Entretiens,” 15; and Haviland, Kostas Axelos, 56.

124. Axelos, Marx penseur de la technique, 2: 270; and Alienation, Praxis, and Techne, 331.

125. Axelos, Marx penseur de la technique, 2: 120–21; and Alienation, Praxis, and Techne, 246.


128. Lefebvre, Qu’est-ce que penser? 13; see also “Au-delà du savoir,” 24–6.


130. Axelos, Marx penseur de la technique, 1: 13; Alienation, Praxis, and Techne, 7; and see Arguments d’une recherche, 100–1. The allusion to Marx is the famous eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, but also the eighth, regularly quoted elsewhere by Axelos: “All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.” See “Theses on Feuerbach,” in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, ed. C. J. Arthur (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1970), 121–23. 122. Axelos’s Heideggerian “Thèses sur Marx” are found in Vers la pensée planétaire, 172–77.

131. Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France, 220.


133. Axelos, Contribution à la logique, 7.

134. See Axelos, Systématique ouverte, esp. 36.

135. In Axelos, Horizons du monde, 93, he talks of the “constellation Hegel-Marx-Nietzsche-Freud-Heidegger.” See also Axelos, Einführung in ein künftiges Denken, vii. In Notices “autobiographiques” (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1997), 34, he gives a longer list: “After Heraclitus, Sophocles, and Shakespeare, there are Pascal and Rimbaud, Dostoyevsky, Hölderlin, Hegel, and Marx, (Freud), Nietzsche, and Heidegger.” See also Contribution à la logique, 8. The studies of Pascal, Freud, and Rimbaud are found in Vers la pensée planétaire.

136. Axelos, “Le problème de la folie,” and “La ville problème,” in Problèmes de l’enjeu, 97–117, 118–34. The only reference to Lefebvre in his work as a whole is in Horizons du monde, 103 n. 1, but this merely cites the latter’s La Fin de l’histoire, without discussion.

137. An exception is his tribute, “Entre le marxisme, le freudisme, le structuralisme et le nihilisme: Lucien Sebag,” in Arguments d’une recherche, 114–19.

139. See, however, the collection of interviews Entretiens, where Axelos plays the role both of interviewee, interviewer (with Lefebvre and Fageyrollas), and sometimes both (in the "Imaginary Interview" and the "Interview with Himself").

140. We could also note the almost willful obscurity of Notices "autobiographiques", which, despite its title, gives almost nothing away and is rather a collection of aphorisms and short paragraphs, reminiscent of Nietzsche, concerning the themes of his work.