

Heidegger's animals

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Abstract. This paper provides a reading of Heidegger's work on the question of animality. Like the majority of discussions of this topic it utilises the 1929–30 course *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, but the analysis seeks to go beyond this course alone in order to look at the figure or figures of animals in Heidegger's work more generally. This broader analysis shows that animals are always figured as lacking: as poor in world, without history, without hands, without dwelling, without space. The article shows how all these claims are grounded upon the most fundamental distinction: that the human is the *zoon logon ekhon*. In Heidegger's analysis this is not the *animal rationale* of metaphysical thought, but the living being that has and is held by *logos*, speech. Looking at how the *logos* became *ratio*, the paper notes how the way that animals do not calculate is the sole positive accreditation of animals in Heidegger's work.

In 1999 Tom Regan declared that in the past twenty-five years, “Oxbridge-style analytic moral philosophers”, “have written more on ‘the animal question’ than philosophers of whatever stripe had written in the previous two thousand”.¹ The figure from the Greek past that did engage with these questions is, of course, Aristotle. But what is interesting is that Regan's essay is an introduction to a volume which seeks to bring perspectives from continental European philosophy to bear on the topic.

Why is it important to think the question of animals from within this tradition? Part of the reason can be found in the strategies of those writing on these topics. A key initial work was the collection *Animals, Men and Morals: An Enquiry into the Maltreatment of Non-Humans* in 1971, and then Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* in 1976.² But as Cary Wolfe has noted, the utilitarianism of Singer or indeed the neo-Kantianism of Regan are particularly humanistic ways of thinking the question of the animal, because they tend to begin with a comparison, “thus effacing the very difference from the animal other that animal rights sought to respect in the first place”.³ Wolfe's work is at the forefront of attempts to bring the elements of post-humanist thought to bear on these issues.⁴ Several volumes of essays and a number of monographs have elaborated these issues.⁵

Other disciplines have similarly taken account of the animal question. Geography, for example, has recently found this question of considerable interest, seeking to go beyond zoogeography or physical geographers'

mapping of animal distributions in the landscape. For example, in one of the most important works of the new, theoretically informed cultural geography, *Hybrid Geographies*, Sarah Whatmore, trading on work by Wolch and Emel, talks of “a belated recognition of the place of non-human creatures in the fabric of social life and of the legacy of their absence from social theory”.⁶ Several key articles and edited collections have developed these themes.⁷

For many of these writers, in both geography and other disciplines, a crucial reference is Heidegger. Discussions of Heidegger on animality have tended to focus on the remarkable course given in the winter semester of 1929–30, entitled *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. While the course undoubtedly contains some crucial analyses, which will be outlined here, my reading seeks to go beyond this course to look at the figure or figures of animals in Heidegger’s work more generally. The overall claim here is that animals in Heidegger are always figured as lacking – poor in world, without language, without history, without hands, without dwelling, without space. The article shows how all these claims are grounded upon the most fundamental distinction: that the human is the *zoon logon ekhon*. This phrase from Aristotle has become metaphysical in the notion of the *animal rationale*, but Heidegger argues that it should be understood as the living being that has and is held by *logos*, speech. Rendering *logos* as speech, instead of reason, *ratio*, is a crucial argument in Heidegger’s overall project, and leads to the conclusion that animals do not calculate. This is the sole positive accreditation of animals in his work.

Animals are poor in world

Poor animals. So poor in world [*weltarm*]. This is where most readings of Heidegger on animals begin. And it is also where most readings end. These readings base their argument on the extensive analysis Heidegger offered of the question of animality in the 1929–30 course, published in the *Gesamtausgabe* – Heidegger’s collected works – in 1983. This was a course which was delivered shortly after *Being and Time*, and shares much terminology and mode of approach with that major work. The course is remarkable for a number of reasons, notably concerning the amount of material devoted to the question, an analysis that goes beyond anything else in his thus-far-published *Gesamtausgabe*.⁸

In addition the range of animals discussed is extensive. Notably there is the bee and the lizard on the rock, and there are incidental mentions of frogs, chaffinches, the bird of prey, domestic pets like the dog, amobae and infusoria,

fish, glow worms, moles and worms, dogs and flies, the moth that flies into the light, and sea-urchins. Later there are great tits, squirrels, woodworms, and woodpeckers – a veritable bestiary. However, these animals are not merely tangential references, but part of an extensive analysis that draws on a number of works in contemporary biology.

Heidegger is concerned with the question of world, and though the analysis of the animal is the beginning point of the analysis, it logically functions as the middle, allowing Heidegger to look both ways toward the worldlessness of the stone and the world-forming of the human (GA29/30, 274).^{*} The world-poor nature of the animal is important, as poverty is defined as not being what we could have.

It is not simply a question of a *qualitative otherness* of the animal world as compared with the human world, and especially not a question of quantitative distinctions in range, depth, and breadth – not a question of whether or how the animal takes what is given to it in a different way, but rather of whether the animal can apprehend something *as* something, something *as* a being, at all (GA29/30, 383–4).

If it cannot make this crucial step of apprehending something *as* something, “the animal is separated from the human being by an *Abgrund*” (GA29/30, 384), the “abyss of the ontico-ontological difference”.⁹ Animals, as presented here, do not react to other things, in their presence, as either ready-to-hand or present-to-hand.¹⁰ Thus the lizard, for example, though it suns itself on the rock, does not understand the rock *as* a rock. Thus animals are deficient in this way of mediating their experience of the world, and are not *Dasein*.

It is worth noting that animals are poor, of course, in relation to humans.¹¹ Heidegger explicitly notes that “animal being is not a deprivation of world” (GA29/30, 270-1), and that “poor in world implies poverty as opposed to richness; poverty implies less as opposed to more” (GA29/30, 284; see also the schema at GA85, 16). This allows Heidegger to recognise the falcon’s great eyesight or the dog’s sense of smell (GA29/30, 286), but as Michel Haar has noted, “the phenomenology of animality teaches us more about man than about animals”.¹² While this is true, we should note Heidegger’s words at the end of the section of this course on animality which explicitly realises this: “Thus the thesis that ‘*the animal is poor in world*’ must remain as a problem, and one which we cannot broach now but which guides the further steps of our comparative examination, i.e. the proper exposition of the problem of world” (GA29/30, 396). In other words, as so often in Heidegger’s work, the topic of

^{*}A key to the abbreviations to Heidegger’s work will be found at the end of the paper.

examination is really a mode of access to a more difficult, more fundamental question.

The essential question is the question of being. This question is, of course, central to Heidegger's work throughout, but only occasionally does it become explicitly linked to the problem of the animal. One of the most explicit moments can be found in a lecture course given in 1934, where Heidegger delimits several different ways of being. Lots of things *are*, that is they are in the world, they exist, but not all in the same way.

Plants and animals are as well, but for them being is not existence, Dasein, but life. Numbers and geometrical forms are as well, but merely as resource [*Bestände*]. Earth and stone are as well, but merely present [*vorhanden*]. Humans are as well, but we call their being as historical existence, Dasein (GA38, 135).

Humans thus, in their being, have a particular quality of being, which is why Heidegger analyses this through the notion of Dasein. As de Beistegui clarifies: "All other beings *are*, naturally, but they do not *exist*. Why? Because they do not have this irreducible connection to the world, the openness to the world *as* world that defines the human being".¹³ This distinction is fundamentally based on the idea that humans, in their being, realise that their being is in issue. To compare the animal with the human runs through this particular distinction. Animals thus are not distinct from humans in any straightforward way in Heidegger's analysis, but only through a comparison to the particular mode of existence of humans.

Indeed, in an earlier lecture course Heidegger had discussed the world-structure of plants and animals, but suggests that this can only be done when "we have first understood this structure as it fits our own Dasein as such" (GA21, 215; see 2). He continues

We arrive at the biological basis – that is, the basic structure of the being that we call, in a narrow sense, biological – only if beforehand we have already understood this structure as a structure of Dasein. It does not work in reverse. We cannot derive this determination from biology; it must be acquired philosophically. That is, even biology itself, so long as it remains biology, does not have the possibility of seeing these structures in its specific objects, for *qua* biology it already presupposes these structures when it speaks of plants and animals. Biology can establish and define these structures only by transgressing its own limits and becoming philosophy. And in fact more than once in the course of the development of modern biology, especially in the nineteenth century, reference has been made to this structure (granted, only in quite general characterizations and with very vague concepts), to the fact that animals above all, and plants in a certain sense, have a world. To my knowledge the first person to have run across these

matters again (Aristotle had already seen them) was the biologist K. E. von Baer, who referred to these structures in his various lectures, but only in passing, never really thematically. More recently his suggestions have been taken up by von Uexküll, who now deals with this problem thematically, not, however, in a philosophical sense but in connection with specifically biological research (GA21, 215–6; see GA2, 58).

Heidegger thus wants to make use of the analysis of biologists, but for a philosophical purpose. Yet in doing this he wants to see his work in strict distinction from some of the ways in which biology and philosophy have been interrelated before: he is particularly scathing about *Lebensphilosophie*, a 'philosophy of life' as biological philosophy. For Heidegger "this title is a tautology, since philosophy deals with nothing but existence itself. 'Philosophy of life' is about as clever a title as the 'botany of plants'" (GA21, 216). But while Heidegger wants to distinguish himself in this twofold way, as Schatzki notes, Heidegger's understanding of animal life is indeed "closely tied to the biology of his day", in that he sees "animal existence is a series of blind, non-conceptually mediated, instinctual reactions activated by an animal's meeting up with certain entities in its environment".¹⁴ On this understanding, it is no wonder that the animal's existence pales in comparison with human Dasein. Schatzki continues to suggest that "it is true that, on a contemporary view of animal life, creatures such as dogs and baboons do share certain components of Dasein's way of being, for instance, conceptually mediated apprehension of the environment".¹⁵ The point, for Heidegger though is that unless animals share all of Dasein's way of being, the animal is not Dasein. Schatzki notes that Heidegger's main references are Hans Driesch and Jacob Johann von Uexküll. As de Beistegui explains, the former put forward an understanding of vitalism as a force within the organism, something of which Heidegger is suspicious; and equally he is suspicious of the mechanistic, calculative understanding of the animal as machine. "As far as biological problems are concerned, vitalism is just as dangerous as mechanism" (GA29/30, 381).¹⁶ In distinction von Uexküll is of interest because he opens up the possibility of a different, what might be called the metaphysical way of thinking this question.¹⁷

Animals thus differ from humans in the very mode of their existence, as well as in the secondary question of world. Equally they differ in their comprehension of space, and Heidegger devotes some very interesting pages to the bee and its navigation through its landscape and its sense of space. This discussion can be usefully related to the interest in Deleuze and Guattari on animal territoriality.¹⁸ As Ansell-Pearson has carefully shown, these writers can be related to Heidegger particularly through the common readings of von Uexküll.¹⁹ A key question which arises, but which cannot be explored here, is

whether it is possible to think human notions of territory based on an animal sense of territoriality,²⁰ or indeed the notion of deterritorialisation through animal behaviour. As well as a dangerous latent vitalism, it is worth noting Jean Baudrillard's remark that it is paradoxical "to take the animal as a model of deterritorialisation when he is the territorial being par excellence".²¹

In this regard we should note the dialogue between Heidegger and a participant in one of the seminars he ran at Zollikon for the psychoanalyst Medard Boss:

SP: Then how is it with an animal?

MH: Again, it is a different relationship toward space [*Raumverhältnis*]. The animal does not speak. The human being is a *zoon logon ekhon*. The animal does not experience space *as space*.

SP: What does this 'as' mean?

MH: The animal is acquainted with the ditch it jumps over as a simple matter of fact [*Sachverhalt*], but not as a concept [*Begriff*].

SP: The animal cannot reflect.

MH: Is language so essential? Surely there is also a way of communicating without language.

SP: Language and verbal articulation are confused with each other here.

MH: The human being cannot comport himself in any way without language. Language is not only verbal articulation. *Communicatio* is only one possibility. 'To say' [*sagen*] originally meant 'to show' [*zeigen*, or 'to indicate'].²²

The key, here, is of course, just as it was in the 1929–30 course, the 'as'. Animals are unable to grasp [*greifen*] the concept [*Begriff*], they are unable to understand the being of beings, the question of being *as* being.²³ But this is explicitly linked to language, not only in a restrictive sense of "verbal articulation", but rather in the wider sense of indication. The animal is different from the human, who is the *zoon logon ekhon*. It is for these reasons that animals do not dwell or abide; neither do they look [*blicken*], but rather they peer, glare, gawk or gape, because there is not "a self disclosure of being", nothing is disclosed to it (GA54, 158-9; see GA29/30, 319–20); equally the pet dog does not really 'eat', and does not really comport itself to the table it lies under or the stairs it runs up (GA29/30, 308).

Animals are without language

Throughout the 1929–30 course then, and in related discussions elsewhere, animals then are deficient in some sense, constituted through their lack, an absence. Such a claim is regularly made by Heidegger. In order to think this absence, in its essential form, Heidegger turns to Aristotle.²⁴ Although he does this in numerous places, the most important source are his lectures on Aristotle from the early 1920s.²⁵ As the excerpt from the Zollikon seminar indicates, Heidegger returns again and again to an analysis of Aristotle's suggestion that the human is the *zoon logon ekhon*.

For Heidegger *zoon logon ekhon* should not be understood as the *animale rationale* of Latin translation, but rather as the being with *logos*, speech. This means both the capacity of having language and being held by it. He particularly pursues this claim in a course on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, where his notion of being-in-the-world is being-in-the-*polis*, a political community constituted through language, speaking and listening. In these terms, as he will expand, the *zoon logon ekhon* can be seen as the *zoon politikon*, the 'political animal' of popular translation, but more accurately the living being whose nature is to live in the *polis* (GA18, 50, 56, 63–4, 134–5, etc.). The *logos* was a fundamental issue.

This *legein* [speaking] was for the Greeks so preponderant and such an everyday affair that they acquired their definition of the human being in relation to, and on the basis of, this phenomenon and thereby determined it as *zoon ekhon logon*. (GA19, 17).

Speaking, for Aristotle, was not mere voice, *phone*. While "the *phone* is a noise that pertains essentially only to a living being",²⁶ the *phone semantike*, that is noise that means or indicates, that is the *logos*, is particular to humans (see also GA85, 3). Language is thus a fundamental determination of human being-in-the-world, and it is this, fundamentally, that separates us from the animals way of being-in-the-world (GA18, 17–18, 49). Heidegger therefore gives some time over to an analysis of animality and its being-in-the-world, and what distinguishes it from the humans way of being-in-the-world in its particulars. The human is a living being [*ein Lebendes*], which must not be understood physiologically, but as one that has "its proper existence [*eigentliches Dasein*] in conversation and in discourse" (GA18, 108). The discussion of the difference between humans and animals here forges much of the conceptual terminology of *Being and Time*, including care, everydayness, the environment [*Umwelt*] and the one [*das Man*] (GA18, 53–64).

One of the key parts of this course is where he analyses the important passage from the *Politics* where Aristotle describes the humans as the *zoon politikon*.²⁷ What distinguishes the human from other animals that associate, such as bees, is that humans have *logos*, speech, while animals only have *phone*, voice or sound. Whilst animals can use voice to express pain or pleasure, speech is able to signify what is useful and harmful or just and unjust as well. This indication [*Anzeige*] is important. While animals have perception, *aisthesis*, in relation to pain and pleasure, humans have *aisthesis* in relation to good and bad, just and unjust. Animals and humans share something, but it is the question of speech and this notion of a particular type of judgment that sets them apart (GA18, 45–9). As he states later, the human being is the judgment making animal (GA87, 53). Glossing Aristotle, “it is the sharing of a common view [*koinonia* – association, i.e. being-with-another] in *these* matters that makes an *oikia* [a household] and a *polis*” (see GA18, 47).²⁸

Animals do not die, and are without hands or history

The animal is thus fundamentally *zoon alogon* (GA33, 124/106), without the *logos*.²⁹ Because of this, a number of other issues follow, including that the animal does not see into the open (GA54, 230-1), that they lack an understanding of being (GA34, 236), that they are never in the “clearing of being” (GA9, 326; GA39, 75). All of these aspects are tied to the mode of relation to the *logos*, and through this to the very mode of existence of animals. Human existence as *Dasein* is thus strictly demarcated from animal existence. Almost every category that Heidegger employs to gain access to the question of human *Dasein* is found in some kind of impoverished way in animals. For example, in early editions of *Being and Time* Heidegger asks “how and whether the being of animals. . . is constituted by some kind of time”, although in later editions this is modified to ask “how and where” (GA2, 346).³⁰

In another well known example from *Being and Time*, Heidegger suggests that though animals perish or expire, they do not die, because their demise is not the same as that of humans (GA2, 240–1, 246–7; see GA29/30, 388; GA7, 180) GA10, 203). Animals are thus not mortals, *der Sterblichen*, because they do not die, *sterben* (GA7, 180), and because they cannot speak, “the essential relation between death and language thus arises, but still remains unthought” (GA10, 203). Animals can thus be characterised as things, within the fourfold of gods, mortals, earth and sky, such as the examples of “heron and roe deer, horse and bull” (GA7, 184; compare GA2, 70).³¹ Although, again, here, the point is to try to get us to think human death in a fundamentally different way,³² animals are still constituted through their deficiency.

Continually the differences outlined come back to the *logos*. In a late lecture course which became the book *What is Called Thinking?* Heidegger makes the claim that “apes, for example, have organs that grasp, but they have no hand”. He continues to suggest that “only a being [*Wesen*] that can speak, that is think, can have the hand and be handy in achieving works of handicraft” (GA8, 18).³³ This claim, here relatively unexamined, seems to hinge on a yet more remarkable analysis, in the 1942–43 course on *Parmenides*. There Heidegger claims that because the human is the *zoon logon ekhon* it is the only being that has hands; more than that it is because it is the *zoon logon ekhon* that it must have hands. “The hand, along with the word, is the essential mark of the human. . . no animal has a hand, and a hand never originates from a paw or a claw or a talon” (GA54, 118).³⁴ As Heidegger elsewhere declares, “the human being is the animal with hands. . . the animal that uses tools” (GA85, 158). One of those fundamental tools is the instrument of writing.

Another important example comes from the most recently published course on Nietzsche, where Heidegger picks up and discusses Nietzsche’s suggestion in the second of his *Untimely Meditations* that the animal is distinguished from the human because the animal forgets or does not remember, that they live without time and history, that they are the ahistorical animal (see GA46, 15–17, 20, 31, etc.). One of the reasons that memory is important is made clear in Nietzsche’s *On the Genealogy of Morality*, where the human being is the promising animal, the one able to make promises. As Nietzsche declares: “to breed an animal which is able to make promises – is that not precisely the paradoxical task which nature has set herself with regard to humankind?”³⁵ What is relevant is not only that the reverse of this is the question of forgetting, but that the German word for promises is *versprechen*, which includes the term *sprechen*, speaks.³⁶

In this course Heidegger also discusses a distinction he will elaborate elsewhere in his lectures on Nietzsche, that of the difference between *der Körper* and *der Leib*, two words for the body. *Der Körper* is effectively the idea of the body as mass, and can be used for animals and humans; *Der Leib* is only humans, close to the idea of the flesh, or life [*das Leben*] and means body in a less tangible way (see, for example, GA47, 153, 158–9; and here GA46, 241–8).³⁷ How then, in Heidegger’s alarmed phrase, are we to reckon our “scarcely fathomable, abyssal bodily kinship with the animal” (GA9, 326)? There necessarily must be something that distinguishes the human *Leib* from the mere corpus or *Körper* of the animal, or the bodily being of humans from their simple bodily bulk. Yet what this distinction is remains unclear. This may be why the Heidegger of the *Heraclitus* seminar with Eugen Fink declared that “the body phenomenon is the most difficult problem” (GA15, 236).

But in the Nietzsche lectures there is a wider project at stake. They were delivered in the late 1930s and see a sustained attempt, as Derrida has put it, to withdraw Nietzsche “from any biologicistic, zoologicistic, or vitalistic reappropriation. The strategy of interpretation is also a politics”.³⁸ In what can be usefully related to Nietzsche’s position, where the human being is a bridge between the beast and *Übermensch* (see GA67, 183–5; GA69, 159), Heidegger contends that the human body is different from mere nature [*bloße Natur*] in its bodily constitution, because of its relation to being. “It is not the case that the human being is first a mere animal [*bloße tierische*] and then something further in addition. The human being can never be an animal, i.e. can never be nature, but is always either *over* the animal, or, precisely as human, *under* it, which is when we say they have been an ‘animal’” (GA34, 236). To read the human body as something other than a corporeal mass, and to separate human being from animal existence on the very material level was an important stage in Heidegger’s attempts to introduce some distance between his analyses and those of the Nazi readings of Nietzsche. Yet as with the important course of 1934 on the question of logic and speech, which seeks to understand the *Volk* through a non-racial set of categories, the distance is neither as far as Heidegger would have us believe nor is his critique as unequivocal.³⁹

Are animals without calculation?

It is therefore clear that Heidegger takes a number of examples to make what appears to be a series of rigid distinctions. Despite these coming from a number of periods in his career, there is a remarkable continuity of expression and argumentation. For Derrida, “the distinction between the animal (which has no or is not a *Dasein*) and man has nowhere been more radical nor more rigorous than in Heidegger”;⁴⁰ similarly Agamben describes Heidegger as “the philosopher of the twentieth century who more than any other strove to separate man from the living being”.⁴¹

In each of these cases animals are constituted through a lack, without this, without that – they are world-poor, ahistorical, they have the *phone* but not *logos*, and thus are unable to indicate, they do not die, they do not experience space *as* space, they neither dwell nor have hands. Carl von Linnæus defined the human, the *homo* “as the animal that *is* only if it recognises that it *is not*”,⁴² but in Heidegger the human seems only to be recognisable if it is described in relation to an animal that is not. *Logos* – language – is the distinction, time and again, in Heidegger’s work. It is because animals do not have the *logos* that a number of the other claims can be made. As Derrida notes, this is true

throughout the tradition, from Aristotle through “Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, and Lévinas” to Lacan.⁴³

The idea according to which man is the only speaking being, in its traditional form or in its Heideggerian form, seems to be at once indisplaceable and highly problematic. Of course, if one defines language in such a way that it is reserved for what we call man, what is there to say? But if one reinscribes language in a network of possibilities that do not merely encompass it but mark it irreducibly from the inside, everything changes. I am thinking in particular of the mark in general, of the trace, of iterability, of *différance*. These possibilities or necessities, without which there would be no language, *are themselves not only human*.⁴⁴

This may well be true. And yet there is something more in the fundamentally important notion of the *zoon logon ekhon*, and the animal as *alolon*. The benefit of rethinking the translation of *logos* as speech, discourse or conversation rather than reason means that though animals can have some kinds of exploring, perceiving, even a certain *phronesis*, a certain circumspection,⁴⁵ they are therefore inherently different from the human (GA33, 126–7/107–8). Animals are without the *logos*, which in Heidegger's rendering is speech, but for the tradition is first the Latin *ratio* and then reason, calculation and logic.⁴⁶ In translation then animals are without the *rationale*, they are not the *animal rationale*, they are equally therefore without *ratio*: *animals do not calculate*.

Earlier in this essay I cited an important passage from Heidegger's discussion of Aristotle in the course *Plato's Sophist*.

This *legein* [speaking] was for the Greeks so preponderant and such an everyday affair that they acquired their definition of the human being in relation to, and on the basis of, this phenomenon and thereby determined it as *zoon ekhon logon* (GA19, 17).

Yet this central claim is followed by one that Heidegger would only seriously develop much later in his career.

Connected with this definition is that of the human being as the being which calculates [*rechnet*], *arithmein*. Calculating does not mean here counting [*zählen*] but to reckon something, to be deliberating [*berechnend sein*]; it is only on the basis of this original sense of calculating [*Rechnen*] that number [*Zahl*] developed (GA19, 17–18).

As St. Isidore of Seville said in the 7th century: “Take away number in all things and all things perish. Take calculation from the world and all is enveloped in dark ignorance, nor can he who does not know the way to reckon be distinguished from the rest of the animals”.⁴⁷ For Heidegger this

is as true for the collective as the individual: “the being of the *Volk* is neither the mere presence of a population [*Bevölkerung*] nor animal-like being [*tierhaftes Sein*], but determination [*Bestimmung*] as temporality and historicity” (GA38, 157). There is more to the people than a calculative understanding of population; the introduction of *logos*, time and history disassociate them from animals.

Although Heidegger discussed issues around mathematics early in his career, notably in a long excursus in the *Plato's Sophist* course (GA19, 100–21), when he returns to these issues in the mid 1930s there is a new, political, urgency. Heidegger claims that determinations of the world have been reduced to measure and calculation, and he discusses a notion of *Machenschaft*, machination, which later becomes reformulated as the better known issue of *Technik*, technology. Thus notion of calculation becomes important, and potentially a positive, given Heidegger's critique of technology.

Heidegger talks of the human “*evolution to a technicised animal*, which begins to replace the instincts, which have already grown weaker and cruder by the giganticism of technology” (GA65, 98). The human is “set-up or posited as the working animal [*zum arbeitenden Tier fest-gestellt wird*]” (GA7, 70). The human as “*animal rationale* is the ‘animal’ that calculates, plans, turns to beings as objects, represents what is objective and orders it” (GA54, 232; see GA7, 52). Rationality, the *ratio*, has become mathematical, rather than being concerned with relation, balance or the originary sense of the Greek *logos*. *Ratio* is the triumph of number over speaking. The world becomes understandable through its prior ordering as something calculable, as extended in three dimensions of space. The implication of this Cartesian move is to make organic nature amenable to mathematical-geometrical theory. This was in particular a way of thinking about animals and plants, matter in motion, a mechanistic understanding (GA26, 91).⁴⁸

In other words, a distinction from animals becomes a way of ordering, regulating, controlling and exploiting them. Animals are part of the world, set-up or posited [*gestellt*] by the enframing of modern technology, available for disposal or use. The calculative casting of being, the reduction of the world to a problem or number is a useful way to analyse the political determination of the world. In terms of its impact, this is perhaps a way to start to relate this analysis to the question of animal rights. As Bentham said, “the question is not, can they speak? But can they suffer?”⁴⁹ This raises not just the questions of rights, but also of recognition. Indeed, some recent work on animal rights has noted the parallels between the meat production industry and the organisation of the extermination camps.⁵⁰ But what is significant about this way of putting the argument, is that it is a critique of the ontological casting rather than simply the ethical crime.

In Nietzsche's terms, the human being is the animal identified as the *Übermensch*, the animal that has its essence in the will to power, the look of the subject is the look of a being that advances by calculating, i.e. by conquering, outwitting, and attacking (GA54, 159).

The notion of *logos* – especially in the way it has been rendered by the tradition – is thus both positive and negative. The human as *animal rationale* means indeed that humans are what animals are not. “This means that the human being is also capable of what an animal can never achieve, that is, they can sink beneath the animal, because calculation and reason are involved” (GA51, 92; see GA29/30, 286–7).⁵¹

Conclusion

Heidegger's analyses therefore open up a range of ways of conceiving the human/animal relation. For Matthew Calarco, Heidegger's work on this distinction challenges metaphysical humanism (that the human is merely the animal plus some quality); but buys into a problematic metaphysical anthropocentrism (where “the essence of animal life” is determined “by the measure of, and in opposition to, the human”):

Perhaps the most fruitful way to read Heidegger's remarks on animal life is to see them as a resource for working through the two dominant approaches to animal issues within the Continental tradition. On the one hand, Heidegger's work prefigures the writings of a number of philosophers who seek, after the “death of God” and the closure of metaphysical humanism, to recover a definition and meaning for “the human” in opposition to its animal other. On the other hand, his work resonates with and creates the conditions for other figures who are trying to think through relation, ethics, politics, and ontology in radically non-anthropocentric and trans- or post-humanist terms. Which of these two approaches will prevail remains to be seen, but it is clear that any effort to work through the question of the animal from a Continental philosophical perspective must begin with, and will benefit greatly from, a *thinking* confrontation with Heidegger's analysis of animal life.⁵²

Thus we are back to the beginning of this essay. The thinking of the animal question in the continental tradition must pass through Heidegger's engagement or confrontation. Yet to do so requires us to pay attention not merely to *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, but to the much wider range of studies of animals that he undertakes throughout his career. Looking at these shows that Heidegger's work on the question of the animal can thus be

understood as central to a number of his most important claims. The analysis of the animal's way of existing sheds valuable light on human Dasein, and the question of animality is linked to the central questions of language, politics and calculation. If the conclusion of this essay is that Heidegger far more often tends toward the first of Calarco's two alternatives, where the animal is *not* and therefore the human *is*, we should note the general ambiguity of Heidegger's work. As Derrida says "the Heideggerian discourse on the animal is violent and awkward, at times contradictory".⁵³

Yet though Heidegger's problematic distinctions between the human and the animal are clearly open to question, in the understanding of *logos* and its evolution into a notion of *ratio* he may have opened up a profitable avenue of research. It is the reduction of the human capacity for *logos* to calculation that is at the root of modern politics, and though animals themselves may escape this capacity, they cannot escape calculative politics itself.

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Abbreviations to works by martin heidegger

GA *Gesamtausgabe*, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975ff.

German page references are found in the margins of the English translations, unless otherwise noted.

GA2 *Sein und Zeit*, 1977. Translated by Edward Robinson & John Macquarrie as *Being and Time*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1962.

GA7 *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 2000.

GA8 *Was heißt Denken?* 2002.

GA9 *Wegmarken*, 1976.

GA15 *Seminare*, 1986.

- GA18 *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, 2002.
- GA19 *Platon: Sophistes*, 1992. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz & André Schuwer as *Plato's Sophist*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- GA21 *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, 1976. (I have profitably used Thomas Sheehan's forthcoming translation of this course.)
- GA22 *Die Grundbegriffe der Antiken Philosophie*, 1993.
- GA26 *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, 1978.
- GA27 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 1996.
- GA29/30 *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit*, 1992. Translated by William McNeill & Nicholas Walker as *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
- GA33 *Aristoteles, Metaphysik-I-3: Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft*, 1981. Translated by Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek as *Aristotle's Metaphysics-I-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995. English pagination after /.
- GA34 *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet*, 1988.
- GA38 *Logik als Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*, 1998.
- GA39 *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein'*, 1980.
- GA44 *Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken: Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen*, 1986.
- GA46 *Zur Auslegung von Nietzsches II. Unzeitgemäßer Betrachtung »Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben«*, 2003.
- GA47 *Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis*, 1989.
- GA51 *Grundbegriffe*, 1981.
- GA54 *Parmenides*, 1982. Translated by André Schuwer & Richard Rojcewicz as *Parmenides*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- GA55 *Heraklit: 1. Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens 2. Logik: Heraklits Lehre Vom Logos*, 1979.
- GA65 *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, 1989.
- GA66 *Besinnung*, 1997.
- GA67 *Metaphysik und Nihilismus: 1. Die Überwindung der Metaphysik 2. Das Wesen des Nihilismus*, 1999.
- GA69 *Die Geschichte des Seyns: 1. Die Geschichte des Seyns 2. κouvov. Aus der Geschichte des Seyns*, 1998.

- GA79 *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*, 1994.
 GA85 *Vom Wesen der Sprache: Zu Herder's Abhandlung »Über den Ursprung der Sprache«*, 1999.
 GA87 *Nietzsche Seminare 1937 und 1944*, 2004.

Notes

1. Tom Regan: "Foreword", in H. Peter Steeves (ed.) *Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology and Animal Life*, Albany: SUNY Press, 1999, pp. xi–iii.
2. Stanley and Rosalind Godlovitch and John Harris (eds.), *Animals, Men and Morals: An Enquiry into the Maltreatment of Non-Humans*, London: Gollancz, 1971; Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals*, London: Cape, 1976, Second Edition, 1990.
3. Cary Wolfe, "Introduction", in Cary Wolfe (ed.), *Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, p. xii.
4. See also Cary Wolfe, *Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species and Posthumanism*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003; and for a discussion of Wolfe's work, Michael Lundblad, "The Animal Question", *American Quarterly*, Vol 56 No 4, December 2004, pp. 1125–34.
5. See, for example, Steeves (ed.) *Animal Others*; Wolfe (ed.), *Zoontologies*; Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco (eds.), *Animal Philosophy: Ethics and Identity*, London: Continuum, 2004. Of the monographs, see particularly David Farrell Krell, *Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992; Wolfe, *Animal Rites*; and Giorgio Agamben, *The Open: Man and Animal*, translated by Kevin Attell, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.
6. Sarah Whatmore, *Hybrid Geographies: Natures Cultures Spaces*, London: Sage, 2002, pp. 36–7. See Jennifer Wolch and Jody Emel (eds.), *Animal Geographies: Place, Politics and Identity in the Nature-Culture Borderlands*, London: Verso, 1998.
7. For valuable overviews, see Jennifer Wolch, "Anima Urbis", *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol 26 No 6, 2002, pp. 721–42; and Chris Philo, "Animals, Geography and the City: Notes on Inclusions and Exclusions", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, Vol 13, 1995, pp. 655–81. See also Ralph Acampora, "Oikos and Domus: On Constructive Co-Habitation with Other Creatures", *Philosophy and Geography*, Vol 7 No 2, August 2004, pp. 219–35. More generally, see Noel Castree, "The Nature of Produced Nature: Materiality and Knowledge Construction in Marxism", *Antipode*, Vol 27 No 1, 1995, pp. 12–48; and David Demeritt, "What is the 'Social Construction of Nature'? A Typology and Sympathetic Critique", *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol 26 No 6, 2002, pp. 767–90. Of the edited collections see notably Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert (eds.), *Animal Spaces, Bestly Places: New Geographies of Human-Animal Relations*, Routledge: London, 2000; Wolch and Emel (eds.), *Animal Geographies*; and more generally Noel Castree and Bruce Braun (eds.) *Remaking Reality: Nature at the Millennium*, London: Routledge, 1998; Noel Castree and Bruce Braun (eds.) *Social Nature: Theory, Practice and Politics*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.
8. For excellent readings of this course, see Didier Franck, "Being and the Living", in Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (eds.), *Who Comes After the Subject?*, New

- York: Routledge, 1991, pp. 135–47; Ingrid Auriol, “Situation de l’animal et statut de l’animalité”, *Heidegger Studies*, Vol 17, 2001, pp. 135–53; and William McNeill, “Life Beyond the Organism: Animal Being in Heidegger’s Freiburg Lectures, 1929–30”, in Steeves (ed.) *Animal Others*, pp. 197–248. See also Simon Glendinning, *On Being With Others: Heidegger – Derrida – Wittgenstein*, London: Routledge, 1998; and Michel Haar, *The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being*, translated by Reginald Lilly, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. More general, but still tied to texts in English is Matthew Calarco, “Heidegger’s Zoontology”, in Atterton and Calarco (eds.), *Animal Philosophy*, pp. 18–30. Even Agamben, *The Open*, does not go much further than this course.
9. Miguel de Beistegui, *Thinking with Heidegger: Displacements*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, p. 114.
 10. For Derrida, there is doubtless an abyss between the great apes and humans, but also between great apes and other animals. See Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, *De quoi demain. . . Dialogue*, Paris: Fayard/Éditions Galilée, 2001, p. 112.
 11. de Beistegui, *Thinking with Heidegger*, p. 106.
 12. Haar, *The Song of the Earth*, p. 29.
 13. Miguel de Beistegui, *The New Heidegger*, London: Continuum, 2006, p. 15.
 14. Theodore R. Schatzki, “Early Heidegger on Being, the Clearing, and Realism”, in Hubert L. Dreyfus & Harrison Hall, *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 81–98, p. 83.
 15. Schatzki, “Early Heidegger on Being, the Clearing, and Realism”, p. 83.
 16. Heidegger’s suspicion may be partly based on the way Driesch appropriated Aristotle to his cause. See Hans Driesch, *Der Vitalismus als Geschichte und Lehre*, Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth Verlag, 1905. For a discussion see Johannes Morsink, *Aristotle on the Generation of Animals: A Philosophical Study*, Washington D.C., University Press of America, 1982, pp. 161–2.
 17. de Beistegui, *Thinking with Heidegger*, pp. 110–12.
 18. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, translated by Brian Massumi, London: Athlone, 1988.
 19. See Keith Ansell Pearson, *Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition*, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 118–22; his *Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze*, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 185–89; and Agamben, *The Open*, pp. 39–40. The key references are Jakob von Uexküll, *Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere*, Berlin: J. Springer, 1909; and *Theoretische Biologie*, Berlin: Gebrüder Paetel, 1920.
 20. For a useful discussion see Dennis E. Skocz, “Wilderness: A Zoocentric Phenomenology – From Hediger to Heidegger”, *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol LXXXIII, pp. 217–44. For a discussion of territory, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation in Deleuze and Guattari, see Stuart Elden, “The State of Territory Under Globalization: *Empire* and the Politics of Reterritorialization”, in Maria Margaroni & Effie Yiannopoulou (eds.), *Metaphoricity and the Postmodern Politics of Mobility*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006, pp. 47–66.
 21. Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, translated by Sheila Faria Glaser, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994, p. 137. See also pp. 139, 140–1 n. 3 for a discussion of the relation between nomadism and territory.
 22. Martin Heidegger, *Zollikoner Seminare*, edited by Medard Boss, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987, p. 19; translated by Franz Mayr and Richard Askay, *Zollikon Seminars: Protocols – Conversations – Letters*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001, p. 16.

23. The phrase “being as being” comes from Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1031a22. For Heidegger’s most sustained discussion, see GA29/30, 416ff, and for an analysis, Michael Eldred, “As: A Critical Note on David Farrell Krell’s ‘Daimon Life’”, http://www.webcom.com/artefact/as_krell.html
24. For discussions of Aristotle on animals generally, see Martha Craven Nussbaum, *Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium: Text with Translation, Commentary, and Interpretative Essays*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978; Morsink, *Aristotle on the Generation of Animals*; Stefano Peretti, *Aristotle’s Zoology and its Renaissance Commentators (1521–1601)*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2000; and Michael Nolan, “The Aristotelian Background to Aquinas’s Denial that ‘Woman is a Defective Male’”, *The Thomist*, Vol 64, 2000, pp. 21–69.
25. For a much fuller discussion of the issues that arise from Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, see Stuart Elden, *Speaking Against Number: Heidegger, Language and the Politics of Calculation*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006, particularly chapter one.
26. Aristotle, *De Anima*, 420b6–7.
27. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a7–18.
28. See also GA85, especially 3, 8–9, where this is pursued through Herder.
29. For a caution, see GA33, 151/129, which recognises that this is still a question for Aristotle.
30. This point is indebted to the note by Macquarrie and Robinson in their translation. See also Jacques Derrida, “The Animal that Therefore I Am (More to Follow)”, translated by David Wills, *Critical Inquiry*, Vol 28 No 2, Winter 2002, pp. 369–418, p. 391.
31. The deer almost makes an appearance in GA21, 187–90, 208.
32. Stephen Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 116.
33. On this see Jacques Derrida, “La main de Heidegger (*Geschlecht II*)”, in *Heidegger et la question: De l’esprit et autres essais*, Paris: Flammarion, 1990, pp. 173–222; and John Sallis, *Double Truth*, Albany: State University New York Press, 1995, pp. 19–35. For an early discussion, see GA18, 253, discussing Aristotle’s *Parts of Animals*.
34. For a discussion, see John Sallis, *Delimitations: Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, Second Edition, pp. 146–51.
35. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, translated by Carole Diethe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 38; see Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)”, p. 372.
36. It is worth noting that there is a reading of Zarathustra’s animals (the eagle and the snake) in one of the other lectures, which recognises that they, alone, speak (GA44, 47–53).
37. See Stuart Elden, *Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History*, London: Continuum, 2001, pp. 54–6. More generally on animals in Nietzsche, see Monika Langer, “The Role and Status of Animals in Nietzsche’s Philosophy”, in Steeves (ed.) *Animal Others*, pp. 75–92; Christa Davis Acampora, Ralph R. Acampora (ed.), *A Nietzschean Bestiary: Becoming Animal Beyond Docile and Brutal*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003; and Richard Reschika, *Nietzsches Bestiarium: Der Mensch – das wahnwitzige Tier*, Stuttgart: Omega-Verlag, 2003.
38. Derrida, “De l’esprit”, in *Heidegger et la question*, p. 92. See especially GA47, 58–93, of which only the first ten pages was included in the version published in Heidegger’s lifetime.
39. See in particular Robert Bernasconi, “Heidegger’s Alleged Challenge to the Nazi Concepts of Race”, in James E. Faulconer & M.A. Wrathall (eds.), *Appropriating Heidegger*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 50–67; and Elden, *Speaking Against Number*, pp. 90–101.

40. Jacques Derrida, "'Eating Well', or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida", in Cadava, Connor and Nancy (eds.), *Who Comes After the Subject?*, pp. 96–119, p. 105.
41. Agamben, *The Open*, p. 39.
42. Agamben, *The Open*, p. 27.
43. Derrida, "The Animal that Therefore I Am (More to Follow)", pp. 383, 395–6.
44. Derrida, "'Eating Well', or the Calculation of the Subject", p. 116.
45. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 980b21.
46. See also the discussion in GA66, 140–1 on the way soul-body [*Seele-Leib*] are distinguished, and how a notion of *Geist* is put between these two animalistic ways of thinking.
47. Cited in Alfred W. Crosby, *The Measure of Reality: Quantification and Western Society, 1250–1600*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. v.
48. On this, see Michel Haar, *Heidegger and the Essence of Man*, translated by William McNeil, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993, which provides a wide-ranging discussion of calculation and animality. On calculation in Heidegger generally, see Elden, *Speaking Against Number*, chapter three.
49. Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, London: Athlone Press, 1970, p. 44. This is cited by Derrida in Derrida and Roudinesco, "Violences contre les animaux", p. 118.
50. Charles Patterson, *Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust*, New York: Lantern Books, 2002; Karen Davis, *The Holocaust and the Henmaid's Tale: A Case for Comparing Atrocities*, New York: Lantern Books, 2005.
51. See also the brief discussion of instinct, where instinct is a form both of animal behaviour and superhuman calculation (GA7 92–3).
52. Calarco, "Heidegger's Zoontology", pp. 29–30.
53. Derrida, "'Eating Well', or the Calculation of the Subject", p. 111.