Another Sense of *Demos*: Kleisthenes and the Greek Division of the *Polis*

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This article discusses the third Greek sense of the term *demos*. As well as meaning either the people as a whole, or a group within them, the term also meant the deme, a location. The relation between politics, democracy and location is examined through examining models for the division of land within the Greek *polis*. The main focus is on Kleisthenes’ reforms of Athens. Contrary to much of the literature, it downplays the rigid territorial aspects and emphasizes the reforms’ arithmetic, rather than geometric, nature. It then moves to a briefer discussion of Plato’s *Laws* and Aristotle’s *Politics*. The suggestion is made that for Plato, as for Kleisthenes, the model for mathematical politics is actually arithmetic, not geometry. However, for Aristotle, although the emphasis is much more on the people than the land, it is, paradoxically, geometry that is more important than arithmetic, because of the role of relation and balance. The word *demos* therefore relates to people and the land they inhabit. In modern terms these are the attributes of population and territory, yet we should be cautious about thinking modern notions back into classical Greek thought. So although the understanding of *demos* as deme, village or commune is not the principal sense of the term, it is worth keeping it in mind when considering ancient democracy, as well as in a broader sense when noting the role of location in determining the *polis*.

The meaning of the word *demos* is of course central to understanding the usage of the term ‘democracy’, *demokratia*, in ancient Greece. Discussions tend to be centred around the tension between its two meanings: the people as a whole, and a group within them, such as the mob or the poor. *Demos* was sometimes the whole community, particularly when assembled, and sometimes a particular section of that community. But the Greek *demos* had a third sense, that of the deme, a location. For example, in Homer’s *Iliad* the term *demos* sometimes means people, sometimes land. *Demos*, translated as deme, was a village, township or small community, but was also the name used for the units into which Kleisthenes divided Attica in the sixth century BC. In this sense, the deme was the smallest unit of civic space, although the neighbourhood of private life was naturally smaller. In modern Greek the term means commune. Whilst we should not think that is the principal sense of the term *demos*, we should note the importance of the demes to democracy, as well as recognizing the role of location in determining the *polis*.

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This article investigates the relation between politics, democracy and location in a limited way, through an examination of models for the division of land within the Greek *polis*. Its principal focus is on Kleisthenes’ reforms of Athens. Our sources for this are limited, primarily a few ambiguous and much disputed lines in the work known as *The Athenian Constitution*, attributed to Aristotle, but more likely by one of his pupils. These few lines are crucial in understanding the division of the Athenian *polis* promoted by Kleisthenes. Contrary to much of the literature, this article downplays a rigid territorial sense of these reforms, and emphasizes their arithmetic, rather than geometric, nature. A brief examination of Plato’s *Laws*, with its detailed mathematical model for the division of the *polis* into lots and tribes, follows. The standard view of Plato as a geometer is challenged, with the suggestion that here too, as for Kleisthenes, the model for mathematical politics is actually arithmetic. Finally, some key passages from Aristotle’s *Politics* are analysed with a view to showing that although the emphasis is much more on the people than the land, it is, paradoxically, geometry that is more important than arithmetic.

The argument therefore rests, in part, on an understanding of the difference between arithmetic and geometry. In Aristotle, this difference is summarized by bearing in mind that arithmetic is concerned with *monas*, the unit, geometry with *stigme*, the point. The *monas* is related to *monon*, the unique or the sole, and is indivisible according to quantity. The *stigme* is, like *monas*, indivisible, but unlike *monas* it has the addition of a *thesis* – a position, an orientation, an order or arrangement. *Monas* is *athetos*, unpositioned; *stigme* is *thetos*, positioned. *Monas* and *stigme* cannot be the same, says Aristotle, for the mode of their connection is different. Numbers have a sequence, the *ephekses*. On the other hand, everything perceivable has stretch, size, *megethos*, which should be understood as *synekhes*, the *continuum*. This is a succession, not only where the ends meet in one place, but where the ends of one are identical with the next. Points are characterized by *haptesthai*, by touching, indeed they are *ekhomenon* – a *ephekses* determined by *haptesthai*. But the units have only the *ephekses*. The mode of connection of the geometrical, of points, is characterized by the *synekhes*; the series of numbers – where no touching is necessary – by the *ephekses*.

In other words, geometry is not concerned with division, for this will never get to the heart of the matter. The higher geometrical figures for Aristotle are not simply made up of the lower ones – there is more, for example, to a line than a string of points. Arithmetic is concerned with number, with the possibility of division. Geometry, for Aristotle, is more concerned with place, position. Because everything tends towards its correct place it is therefore a measure of quality rather than quantity, and
with ratio, relation and balance more than division and calculability. On the other hand, for both Kleisthenes and Plato, division of the people and land is understood in a quantitative rather than qualitative way. Issues of number and calculation are crucial to their determination of the Greek polis. This does not accord with the conventional understanding of geometry at the time. Geometry, for Plato, was much more an abstract deductive science than the physical land measuring it had been for the Egyptians. In Aristotle however, where the polis and demos are concerned with qualitative measures – relation and balance – the programme is much closer to his understanding of geometry.

The Reforms of Kleisthenes

The reading of Kleisthenes’ reforms in *The Athenian Constitution* is partly based on Herodotus’ *Histories*. There are three key passages. In the first, the general scope of the reform is outlined. Kleisthenes divided the land [khoran] of Attica by demes [demous] into thirty parts – ten parts in the city [astu], ten in the coastal region [paralia] and ten inland [mesogeois] – and he called these parts thirds [trittyes], and allotted three to each tribe [phyle] in such a way that each tribe should have a share in all the areas [topon].

The second passage discusses the membership and naming. He made the men living in each deme fellow-demesmen of one another, so that they should not use their fathers’ names and make it obvious who were the citizens but should be named after their demes. He instituted demarchs with the same responsibilities as the old naucrari; for he named some of the demes after their areas, and some after their founders (not all were there any longer).

The third passage precedes the first two, and notes that Kleisthenes refused to utilize the existing four tribes:

He refused to divide the Athenians into twelve tribes, to avoid allocating them to the already existing thirds (the four tribes were divided into twelve thirds) as if he had used them he would not have succeeded in mixing up the people.

The four previous tribes had been named after the sons of Ion – Geleon, Aegeicones, Argades and Hoples – the new tribes were named after other heroes. A related point is made in Aristotle’s *Politics*: ‘the sorts of institutions used by Kleisthenes at Athens, when he wanted to enlarge the democracy … are useful … for one should make more and different tribes,
combine private rites into a few common ones, and use every sophism to mix people up as much as possible with each other and dissolve previous bonds of familiarity'.

A number of reasonably uncontested points can be summarized here: the division of Attica was by demes; these demes were grouped in trittyes or thirds, of which ten were in the city, ten on the coast and ten inland; and each newly created tribe had three trittyes, one from each area. There are however, a number of contested issues. Those that concern us here all hinge around the meaning of the term ‘deme’, and its characteristics. There is one main issue, that of the territorial nature of these reforms, that merits closer focus here. Several subsidiary issues arise from this, one – of passing interest – being the number of demes. If Herodotus is read literally, Kleisthenes gave ‘ten demes to each tribe’, which would give 100 demes. However, Whitehead suggests reading this as ‘the demes in ten groups to the tribes’, which seems more plausible. In his detailed study, Traill proposes 139 demes initially (twelve of which were upper and lower divisions), and two later additions. The best source from antiquity is Strabo, who gives a figure of 170 or 174, but this dates from after the reforms and so may reflect an increased later figure. For Traill, though, the discrepancy is explained by the fact that Strabo was referring to demes in their sense as villages and not as the political units of Kleisthenes’ reforms.

It is therefore clear that the meaning of the term ‘deme’ is essential. As noted, the term demos can be translated in a number of ways, one of them being ‘village’ or ‘land’. Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet note that before Kleisthenes the deme referred only to rural areas, but with his reforms it was applied to the urban wards of Athens. However, what the deme meant in Kleisthenes’ reforms is debatable. For a long time the consensus was that it was a geographical term of relatively fixed limits. As Whitehead notes, even before The Athenian Constitution was available, ‘it was regarded as self-evident that Kleisthenes’ procedure was indeed one of territorial division – in essence a task of cartography, with the fixing of boundaries between demes as the crucial exercise. For Francotte, the early organization of the city was based on gentilice, the family, the principle of birth, but combined with a territorial aspect; in Kleisthenes’ reforms the emphasis was reversed. And in his important book on the coastal demes, Eliot suggests that ‘a Kleisthenic deme was a fixed area of land with an inhabited centre from which the deme was administered’, and that ‘each rural deme possessed one or more inhabited centres or villages and an area of land around the settlement or settlements determined at the time of the Kleisthenic organisation’. For Eliot, therefore, a deme is both the village at the centre and surrounding areas, which are demarcated and divided.
Kleisthenes, Eliot suggests, established ‘the geographical extent of each deme’. But the term ‘deme’ also meant ‘village’ before and after Kleisthenes, so there is an ambiguity.

In their valuable study of these reforms, Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet suggest that the needs of administration required subdivisions of the polity, which they suggest were independent of the hereditary cadres of the tribes. They note the 48 naucraries, which had existed since the seventh century, but suggest that unfortunately we know almost nothing about them. However they do argue that with the system of naucraries Attica possessed a rudimentary spatial division, ‘for both laic and pragmatic ends, alongside the ancient system of tribes, phratries, gene, founded on birth and shot through with religious elements’. In other words, Attica had two kinds of division, one religious, tribal and concerned with the populace, and one secular and concerned with places.

Vidal-Naquet notes in a retrospective of this work that he and Lévêque had had an early suspicion that the figures within Kleisthenes’ reforms – 3, 5, and 10 – were also important in the contemporaneous thought of the followers of Pythagoras. These numbers are debatable in their significance for Kleisthenes’ reforms. Three is obviously important in the trittyes, there were ten tribes, but five is much less certain. Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet also interpret Herodotus to mean that there were ten demes in each tribe, which seems inaccurate. However, the conclusion of their work is that ‘it is not Pythagoreanism that illuminates Kleisthenes’ reforms but Kleisthenes’ reforms that allows us to grasp certain aspects of Pythagoreanism’, including his politics. ‘If Kleisthenes constructed the first geometric city, it was not Athens that had the first geometric philosophies’ – we should not therefore think that geometry created the city, or the city geometry. However, they suggest that ‘the intellectual atmosphere at the end of the sixth century was characterized by a certain coincidence between the geometric vision of the world, such as formulated by Anaximander, and the political vision of a rational and homogeneous city, such as realized by Kleisthenes’. But this assumption of a link between political and geometric conceptions of number and space requires the reforms to be territorial.

Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet suggest, though there were changes to Athens after Kleisthenes’ death, the essential feature of his reform, ‘the creation of a political space and time’ remained largely intact. One of their key points, as Curtis notes, is that ‘beyond showing that Kleisthenes’s reforms involve the creation of an egalitarian civic space and time’, they ‘highlight the resolutely artificial character of this space and time’. A number of issues about their study are potentially contestable, but the most significant is precisely this use of the term ‘space’ to describe the divisions.
Indeed, there is an important debate concerning these reforms, as to whether the demes had strict territorial boundaries at all.

As Kain and Baignet suggest, there is plenty of landscape and archaeological evidence of systematic and regular urban/rural divisions in the Greek colonies, but there is no evidence this was ever mapped. And yet, to have demes that were divided in the way Eliot, Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet suggest would have required an extensive land survey and mapping. It is no surprise, therefore, that these claims and the previous consensus have come under sustained scrutiny. The challenge to the consensus stems from the work of Wesley Thompson, who suggests that though the demes were local units, it does not follow that they had formal boundaries or that boundaries were important to Kleisthenes. For Thompson, demes were isolated villages rather than blocks of territory, and these villages were places where people might register. He suggests that there were not the resources, skills or time to conduct a proper cadastral survey. As Lambert notes, demes had personal and territorial characteristics: people registered at the deme centre nearest their abode, but the demes were unlikely to have been mapped. This would be an act of self-identification by residents of local communities. It follows from this that the trittyes were not units of land, because the demes were not contiguous.

A related challenge is found in the work of Lewis. He cites Victor Ehrenberg saying that ‘Cleisthenes was interested in people, not territory’, and suggests that ‘it should be clear that Cleisthenes did not just draw lines on the map. Such lines are difficult to draw, and break down notably in the city’. For Lewis, in distinction to Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet, the ‘stress on Cleisthenes the geometer conceals completely the difficulties of geography on the actual ground’. He pursues this reading in a criticism of Eliot’s book. Eliot thinks that the trittyes of the south had natural boundaries and were geographical units, but Lewis notes that ‘Eliot’s map of the trittyes is not fully argued’, so ‘it does leave it open to doubt whether geographical divisions were as strong as he thinks’. Lewis provides a succinct summary of the issues at stake:

Our fundamental difference of opinion seems to be whether Kleisthenes was interested in land or people. For Eliot, he was drawing lines on a map; I think he was drawing up deme-registers. Eliot thinks of a deme as a territory; for me, it is much more the group of people living in that territory. I do not think Eliot has thought enough about the purposes of the trittyes-system, about families, cults or politics. But he has convinced me that I have not thought enough about geography or the sizes of trittyes.
Although initially this challenge was not well received, as Whitehead notes, ‘its attractions have grown more compelling; and the traditional geographical trivities … may have to be modified, even discarded’. Indeed, though most recent studies now agree with Thompson and Lewis, a counter-challenge has been mounted. Merle Langdon suggests that while historians cannot believe that the survey could have been conducted in the time, and therefore downplay the territorial nature, topographers tend to think that a geographical, and therefore territorial division is entirely possible.50 His argument is that most demes already had some kind of territorial division, and therefore there was ‘no need for elaborate surveying or map-making. Notes recording the physical features which each community regarded as defining the limits of its territory sufficed. There were probably few disputes.’51 Langdon argues that in both those demes that existed before Kleisthenes’ reforms, and in those created by them, ‘the end result was the same: units composed of villages plus land within official boundaries’. This reform would have taken months, not years.52 The centres of the demes would have been well-known, and did not need confirmation, but the territory of each community would have had to be catalogued by means of natural geographic features. Langdon concedes that if the negative evidence is given its full value ‘we must conclude that it was not part of the plan to mark deme boundaries by means of any artificial device’,53 but that there is a ‘strong, albeit circumstantial, case for deme boundaries’.54

In the asty within the city-walls, Langdon argues that the majority of scholars, including Thompson, admit the need for boundaries.55 For Langdon the boundaries could be streets, or the limits of the acropolis or agora, neither of which were in demes themselves.56 He cites a much-disputed scholium to Aristophanes, Aves, which says ‘as is written in the Horismoi of the city’.57 He argues that this implies that written records were kept of the boundaries of the urban demes, and that ‘the situation in Athens is likely to reflect that in rural Attica’.58 However, back in the 1950s, Finley had argued against the reading of horoi as boundary stones in any simple sense. Through a reading of inscriptions on stones, Finley argued that geographical considerations took second place to legal and property aspects.59 Although he retains the Greek term horos in his text, he suggests ‘hypothecation stone’ or ‘stone marking legal encumbrance’ may be more accurate than ‘boundary stone’.60 Horos certainly does mean limit or boundary, and came to mean an object that marked such, but this can be understood in a legal sense of limitation rather than a geographical delimitation.61

In this context a passage of Strabo is pertinent:

> For if there be no accurate boundaries [akribon horon] of stone posts [stolon], for example, or enclosures [perubolon] – take the case of
Colytus and Melite [two Attic demes] – we can say only ‘this is Colytus’ and ‘that is Melite’ but we should not be able to point out the boundaries \[horous\], and this is the reason why disputes often arise concerning districts.\[62\]

This seems to imply that there are no stone posts or enclosures, but that local people would roughly know where Colytus and Melite were. Strabo – writing later than these reforms – seems to be recognizing the limits of indistinct districts.\[63\]

A number of issues arise from this debate. The first of these is whether Kleisthenes distributed the \textit{trittyes} to the tribes by lot. I have translated the passage in \textit{The Athenian Constitution} as ‘allotted three to each tribe’, though a more common translation is ‘gave three to each tribe by lot’. For Eliot, it is clear that the distribution would have needed a great deal of time, and that it was ‘in no way entrusted to the lot, but skilfully designed by the mind of Kleisthenes’.\[64\] This rests on Eliot’s assumption that the \textit{trittyes} had clear natural boundaries and were essentially geographic units. As Lewis notes, were this true, ‘geographical units will differ in size, and therefore, to a varying extent, in population’. It would follow, he suggests, that for Kleisthenes to have produced equal tribes he must have matched large \textit{trittyes} to small, small to medium, and so on. Therefore, ‘Aristotle’ cannot be believed.\[65\]

But even if the geographical basis of the demes is disputed, it is still difficult to see how the demes could be allocated to the \textit{trittyes}, and the \textit{trittyes} to the tribes in any simple way. If the distribution were by lot then it is hard to imagine how the tribes could in any way be equal. Rhodes suggests that division by lot may have been Kleisthenes’ original intention, but ‘if equal tribes were to be obtained from unequal trittyes we may doubt if that was what was actually done’.\[66\] As Andrewes argues, ‘the results presented on our maps become steadily more intricate’.\[67\] There have been various attempts to map the distribution of demes, \textit{trittyes} and tribes,\[68\] but as Rhodes suggests, the ‘regional boundaries are purely schematic’.\[69\] For Andrewes, ‘the natural assumption that \textit{trittyes} would be blocks of continuous territory began to crumble some while ago’.\[70\]

The second is in the suggestion that Kleisthenes ‘named some of the demes after their areas, and some after their founders (not all were there any longer)’.\[71\] Again, the author’s translation preserves the ambiguity. The issue rests on the parenthetical ‘not all were there any longer’. What is the subject of that clause? It could either be the \textit{demoi} or the \textit{ktisantes}, the founders. The phrase has been variously translated as ‘for not all were still connected with a particular locality’, ‘for there were no longer founders in existence for all the places’,\[72\] or ‘not all the founders of the demes were known any
longer’. Rhodes suggests that the most acceptable reading is one which emphasizes the founders – this certainly fits better with the preceding clause – but even this, he suggests is not clear.

For Langdon the implication of this is that either ‘the people who constituted some demes were no longer living in the places associated with the eponymous founders of their villages, in which case the artificial territorial nature of the demes newly created by Kleisthenes is demonstrated, or else not all places had people who still remembered or honoured their founders, in which case there is nothing opposing the conclusion that the demes had definite territorial identity’. He suggests that the latter had better support, but that the sentence is so ambiguous that it cannot work as evidence for either side. This is of course disingenuous, because his interpretation supports his argument in either a strong or a weak form. But it is this weak form which is most persuasive. It is entirely consistent with either of the readings to suggest that the primary purpose of Kleisthenes’ reforms was to catalogue people, and that a rough territorial division was the easiest way to do this. As Rhodes suggests, a deme for this purpose ‘could be a village and the land around it (or perhaps better, a village and its inhabitants)’. This does not imply that the demes had fixed boundaries, much less ones that were rigidly established and fixed in public records.

Indeed, and this brings us to the final consequential point, the territorial nature of these reforms, such that it was, was only temporary. The membership of the previous four tribes had been hereditary, based on kinship. Despite the attempt to ‘mix up’ the population, and redistribute the people among the ten new tribes, it is certain that Kleisthenes also made membership of his tribes hereditary, just as membership of the individual demes was. The new division may have been geographical in some sense at the moment of the reform, but subsequently even if a person moved he still belonged to his father’s deme. By making deme-membership hereditary Kleisthenes undid the shift to territory, even in a loose sense, and brought it more closely back to kinship. However, the name of the deme, the demotic, started to replace the patronymic. In other words, there was a mix-up of the previous situation, for which location was important as a distributive principle, but the underlying rationale remained largely unchanged. Rather than looking for a fundamental shift in the logic of governing the polis, Stanton’s suggestion that the replacement of the four Ionian tribes with ten artificial tribes was a partisan reform which benefited Kleisthenes himself is worth consideration.

Notwithstanding the disputed nature of the reforms, three key points should be noted. First, it is clear that the term demos – like that of polis – has both a meaning of a particular place, and the community within it.
Second, the mechanisms of division of the polis into demos may relate to the conceptions of mathematics current at the time. No direct causal link, but a relation nonetheless. The key point however, contrary to Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet’s interpretation, is that the quantitative division accords more with understandings of arithmetic rather than geometry. Third, and finally, these were actual reforms, rather than philosopher’s schemes. It is interesting therefore to examine how Plato’s plans for the design of a polis relate to this previous political situation. Although the designation of ‘geometer’ is questionable it is worth noting Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet’s admonition that ‘long is the path traversed in a century and a half from Kleisthenes the geometer to the geometer of the Academy, from reality to utopia’.

Plato’s Laws

Whilst Plato’s Republic is his most often cited political text, for a more concrete analysis the late dialogue The Laws is actually more constructive. This is especially the case with the question of the division of the polis, because unlike the Republic’s utopian ideal The Laws contains the plan for the design of an actual polis. Although the Republic has some important discussions of mathematics, it is in The Laws that the direct application of mathematics to politics is found. The Laws are a dialogue between three old men – Kleinias from Crete, Megillus from Sparta, and an Athenian stranger, who is effectively Plato himself. In Book Three, after some initial preliminaries, Kleinias reveals to the others that Crete is attempting to found a colony and he asks them to help him – initially in theory – to set out its laws (702c–e). A colony was usually founded by a group of settlers from an existing polis, who then enjoyed autonomy in the new polis. Though separate they would have closer links to the original polis than to others.

As Strauss notes, ‘the first serious question … concerns the location of the future city or, more generally, the nature of its territory’. The key passage here is the discussion about the division and distribution of the land. Plato’s suggestion is that the land be divided into equal portions and distributed by lot. The land, ge, must therefore be measured and divided. The land dividers, geonomoi, are charged with working out an equitable way of doing this. In designing a new polis the Athenian Stranger suggests that they are fortunate, because they can avoid vicious and dangerous disputes about land and cancellation of debts and distribution of property. Older states that are forced to legislate to solve these problems encounter difficulties as both leaving them as they are and reforming them are both equally impossible (736). The solution is proposed, and essentially combines a sense of justice and a need of indifference to wealth (737a),
because poverty is a matter of increased greed rather than diminished wealth (736e). Though the new *polis* proposed does not need to solve an already existing problem, it should adopt this broad policy in its establishment, to avoid such problems later. There are assumed to be no problems between the people to inhabit this *polis*, so a distribution that created ill-will would be criminally stupid (736b).

In order to avoid these problems, the number of people ought to be derived from the land available, and then that land distributed equally. The land obviously needs to be great enough to support the people in modest comfort, but no more is needed. Equally the number of people should be sufficient to defend themselves, and to help out neighbouring communities. An actual survey of the land is not attempted here, and the Athenian stranger assumes a figure of 5,040 adult males and their families. These men are farmers and, as Lacey notes, also soldiers, and the number is chosen because of its large number of divisors – 59 in total, including one to ten. This facilitates division of the number for the various purposes of the military, administration, contracts and taxes (737e–738a). The division of the land must also include provision for sacred sites for gods or spirits, or heros (738c–d).

Whilst an ideal society would share everything, Plato considers this unrealistic, and even suggests that farming in common is beyond the sort of people these legislators have to deal with (739d–740a). There is therefore a division of land between the 5,040, but though each man receives this parcel of land, he is supposed to consider it as the common possession of the *polis* as a whole. The law of succession will be to the favoured son, and the intention is to keep to the number of 5,040 at all costs (740a–c). What is important is that for Plato the *polis* is not a collection of detached citizens, but a ‘union of households or families’. (We should note here that citizen, as a translation of *polites*, is essentially as problematic as city is for *polis*.)

The qualification for citizenship is not ownership of land, because many others might own land, and because women are described as citizens too, though they do not own land (see 814c). There will be strict punishment for those who trade in this distributed land, property in land will be inalienable (741b–c). Equally those who seek to move boundaries, that is to acquire land unjustly, can expect severe punishment (842e–843b). And there are clear prohibitions of overstepping the boundaries, allowing cattle to graze outside the boundaries, planting trees or burning wood too close to someone else’s land, and somewhat bizarrely, attempting to attract another man’s bees (843c–e). However, Plato does not think that land should be distributed equally, but rather at four levels or classes depending on how they are initially measured. This is grounded on the argument about indiscriminate equality leading to inequality (see 757a–b). It will however
be possible for people to move through these different classes, as they become richer or poorer (744c–d), but it is not quite clear how this would work. What is clarified is that the value of the holding alone should be the lower limit of wealth, and four times as much the upper limit. People holding wealth above that level should be required to hand it over to the polis, and the polis should ensure that no-one drops lower than the worth of the holding (744d–745a). As Morrow notes, in the Republic (416d–417b) there is no private land for the guardians, and he wonders if this constitutes a significant departure.

The polis as a whole should equally be divided. The polis itself should be at the centre of the khora, or as near as convenient if the site is not suited. A central point of the polis should be designated the acropolis as a sacred place for Hestia, Zeus and Athena. As Cartledge notes, ‘spatially, the civic agora, the human “place of gathering” and the acropolis, the “high city” where the gods typically had their abode, were the twin, symbiotic nodes of ancient Greek political networking’. The whole area should then be divided into 12, with the boundaries radiating from the centre, which Morrow notes will mean ‘each division will be a continuous area from the acropolis of the city to the borders of the state, including land within the city proper and the country outside’. Each of the 12 divisions will have a village, in which there will be an agora and shrines for Athena, Zeus and Hestia, as well their own patron deity (848c–d). These divisions should then be subdivided into 5,040 lots, which should be equal in value, with those having poorer soil larger areas and so on. These lots should be further divided into two, which each man having one lot near the centre and one toward the periphery. The twelve divisions would be given roughly equal rich and poor men, and separate gods. They will be called the tribes, and comprise 420 citizens (this number too has plenty of divisors, including one to eight, twelve, fifteen and twenty). Each tribe would be made up of sections [meron] (738d), which Thompson suggests is the parallel of Athens’ demes. This fascination with numbers is continued for other aspects of administration. All sorts of measures and divisions of the citizenry can be derived from this (746d–747a, see 771).

Aristotle’s Politics

Whereas Plato was concerned with outlining a design for the polis, Aristotle’s intent was much more to catalogue its manifestations and to derive some more general rules. Indeed Aristotle’s Politics contains discussions of Plato’s Laws and (more briefly) of Kleisthenes’ reforms, as well as the lesser known plans of Phaleas and Hippodamus, and the constitutions of Sparta, Crete and Carthage. Because of its wide ranging
analysis both of practice and of theoretical models, and because of the concrete proposals that follow from them in Books VII and VIII, the *Politics* is often taken as the classic definition of a *polis*. It should of course be supplemented with the argument of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, with which it forms a continuous inquiry.

Aristotle suggests that people join together in associations or communities, the first of which is the family [*oikos*] in order to improve life, and that these associations are the foundation of the larger political community [*politikes*], the *polis*, which too is an association of some kind (1160a10–30; 1252a1–7). It is when the congregation of village sized associations reach a limit of self-sufficiency [*autarkeia*] that the association can be called a *polis* (1252b27–31). All these associations seem to be parts of the political community [*politikes*], and people come together with something useful in mind, to supply something for life. For Aristotle, the political community originally came together for the sake of what is useful, and continues for the same reason (1160a10–30, 1252a1–7, 1280b38–1281a1). Because the first associations exist by nature, and it is natural for them to congregate in the interests of living well, the *polis* exists by nature. The human is therefore – in the oft-cited phrase – by nature a political animal [*anthropos physei politikon zoon*]. However, in more appropriately Aristotelian language, the human is defined as that living being whose nature – that is, whose highest purpose, or goal, *telos* – is to live in a *polis*. As Aristotle continues, anyone who is without a *polis* [*apolis*], not by bad luck but by nature, is ‘either a poor specimen or else superhuman’ (1252b27–31, 1253a1–3).

Aristotle notes that ten people do not make a *polis*, nor do 100,000, rather the right number is somewhere within a certain range (1170b31–1171a1). He uses a parallel with a ship to describe the ideal size of a *polis*. A ship that is one span, that is seven and a half inches, or one which is two stades, that is 1,200 feet, will not be a ship at all. The size therefore relates to a possible range. Too small and it will not be self-sufficient; too large and it might be a nation [*ethnos*], but will not easily have a constitution, the multitude will be hard to command, and the herald will find it hard to be heard (1326a39–b6). His summary is therefore that the ideal *polis* will have ‘the greatest size of multitude that promotes life’s self-sufficiency and that can be easily surveyed as a whole’ (1326b22–24). For Aristotle, similar things hold for the land [*khoras*] (1326b26).

Indeed, at one point Aristotle suggests that in Plato’s *Laws* ‘it is stated that a legislator should look to just two things in establishing his laws: the land [*khoran*] and the people [*anthropos*]’ (1265a19–20). Aristotle does not hold to this equal valuation, but emphasizes the people over the land. However he does make some important points about land which are worth
discussing here. The land or location of a *polis* must be of sufficient size, but equally not too vast. Like the multitude of people, it should be easy to survey as a whole, because a land which is easy to survey is also easy to defend. Defensive troops should have easy access to all parts of the land. Its layout is, he suggests, not difficult to describe, because it should be difficult for enemies to invade and easy for the citizens to leave. However, on some points the advice of military experts should also be taken. Essentially, for a *polis* to be ideally sited, its location in relation to the sea and the surrounding land should be considered. ‘The remaining defining principle is that the *polis* should be accessible to transportation, so that crops, timber, and any other such materials the surrounding land [*khoras*] happens to possess can be easily transported to it’ (1326b39–1327a10).

In Book VII, Chapter 11, Aristotle goes into some more detail about the situation of a *polis*. There are, he says, four factors, though the list can be read in a number of ways. Health is a necessity, and this includes fresh air and clean water, there are political and military requirements – it should be ‘easy for the citizens themselves to march out from but difficult for their enemies to approach and blockade’, and questions of order or beauty (1330a34–b17). Aristotle notes that the land ‘should belong to those who possess weapons and participate in the constitution’ and that he has explained why the class of farmers should be different from them. He has also outlined how much land there should be and of what sort. He therefore thinks a subsidiary task is to discuss the distribution of the land, who the farmers should be, and what sort of people they should be. He suggests that he does not agree ‘with those who claim that property should be communally owned, but it should be commonly used, as it is among friends, and no citizen should be in need of sustenance’ (1329b36–1330a2). Therefore, ‘the land must be divided into two parts, one of which is communal and another that belongs to private individuals. And each of these must again be divided in two: one part of the communal land should be used to support public services to the gods, the other to defray the cost of communal meals. Of the private land one part must be near the border, the other near the *polis*, so that, with two allotments assigned to each citizen, all of them may share in both locations [*topon]*’. The reason for this is not simply justice and equality, but because it would be beneficial in the case of war with neighbours. Those who live far from the border may otherwise be unconcerned at the prospect of war, those near overly concerned (1330a9–20).

Therefore for Aristotle, the qualification that the citizens must in the first instance ‘share their location [*topo*]; for one *polis* occupies one location [*topos*], and citizens share that one *polis*’ (1260b40–1261a1), is central. Aristotle discusses the identity conditions for a *polis*, and suggests that ‘the
most superficial way to investigate this problem is by looking to location [topon] and people’. The people of a polis can be split, and ‘some can live in one place and some in another’ (1276a15–23). Nor is it sufficient to say that people inhabiting the same location should be thought of as a single polis (1276a24–32; see also 1280b12–15; 1326a5–10). Equally for the constitution of a polis it is not sufficient that they share their dwelling place, as others such as foreigners and slaves do too (1274b32–1275b20):

Evidently then, a polis is not a sharing of a common location [topo], and does not exist for the purpose of preventing mutual wrongdoing and exchanging goods. Rather, while these must be present if indeed there is to be a polis, when all of them are present there is still not yet a polis, but only when households and families live well as a association whose end is a complete and self-sufficient life. But this will not be possible unless they do inhabit one and the same location and practice intermarriage [chromenon epigamiais] (1280b29–36).110

The essential definition of a polis for Aristotle is therefore that it is a ‘sort of association, an association of citizens [koinonia politon] sharing a constitution [politeias]’ (1276a40–b4). The link between the association of the family and the polis is not insignificant. In the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle suggests that the human is not only a political but also a householding animal [oikonomikon zoon], that is the human is also a being whose nature is to live in a household (1242a22–3). As Aristotle continues, ‘in the household lie the primary origins of friendship, politeia and the just’ (1242a40–b2). At the beginning of Book III of the Politics, Aristotle recognizes that the first real question concerning constitutions is what a polis is. The first question needs to be further divided, because a polis is a composite, and the first part of this is the citizens, for ‘a polis is some sort of multitude of citizens’. As noted, it is not enough to say that a citizen is such by residing in a place, because foreigners and slaves might share this dwelling place. Rather a citizen is someone who is eligible to take part in the offices of a polis; and that a polis is therefore a multitude of such people, adequate for self-sufficiency (1274b32–1275b20).

The Politics of Division

Aristotle’s understanding of the polis can therefore be profitably compared with that of Plato or Kleisthenes. Whilst in both of these earlier plans there was a strong emphasis on the numerical division of the land and inhabitants, in Aristotle there is a contrary emphasis on the need for relation and balance. While Plato provides numerical requirements and chooses numbers precisely because they admit of a large number of dividers, Aristotle is more
interested in the range of possible sizes. Concerning the land he is more concerned with issues of balance than a quantification. Just as Aristotle’s understanding of geometry is distinct from that of arithmetic, because of the difference between the unit of arithmetic, and the point of geometry, here too his understanding of political space admits of no easy division. Where Plato’s understanding of civic land is shot through with a crude quantification – a reduction of geometry to a mode of arithmetic, and Kleisthenes’ reforms owe much to mathematical models at the time, Aristotle is providing an understanding based on qualitative measure. As Vilatte puts it, for Aristotle, ‘all quantitative definition of the city, of men and space, is defective’.¹¹¹

We find this distinction in a number of places in Aristotle’s work. In the *Politics*, Aristotle suggests that all *poleis* can be measured by either qualitative measures [*poion*] such as freedom, wealth, education and status, or by quantitative measures [*poson*], by the greater number (1296b17–20). This means that in a *polis* the poor may outnumber the rich, but the rich may outweigh the poor on a qualitative measure. Consequently there are two types of equality, of number [*arithmoi*] and worth [*axian*]. ‘I use “number” to cover that which is equal and the same in respect of either size or quantity, and “worth” for that which is equal by ratio [*logoi*]’ (1301b29–32).

The problem with democracy for Aristotle, is that it works on a crude type of equality, where all are treated equally, instead of a more relational or proportionate [*analogian*] type of equality where only equals are treated equally (1301a25–30, 1280a7–34). This is why he argues that voting should combine both a numerical weighting and a qualitative balance (1318a27–40). Effectively this means that some votes should count more than others.¹¹² He makes a similar argument about justice in the *Nicomachean Ethics* – justice is in accordance with proportion [*analogon*] rather than crude equality, geometric equality rather than arithmetic equality (1131a10–1132a32).

What we have then is an interesting paradox. In Kleisthenes’ reforms, with the parallels of Pythagorean number somewhere in the background, there is perhaps the first concerted attempt to think the *polis* as divisible, controllable, demarcatable. In Plato’s *Laws* this calculability of land and people is taken to a symbolic, yet still rather crude, level. And yet in Aristotle’s *Politics* this quantitative understanding is eclipsed by a more qualitative understanding of relation and balance. While Plato’s partition of the land appears to be geometric, because of the emphasis on division it is actually closer to arithmetic. The same argument can be made for Kleisthenes, whose reforms are certainly concerned with a division of land, but are nowhere near as rigidly territorial as the literature often suggests. Like Plato his quantitative division is more arithmetical than geometrical,
and the actual measurement of land is limited. Yet in Aristotle, where the
importance of land and location is downplayed, it appears that geometry –
understood as something concerned with qualitative rather than quantitative
measure, with relation, ratio and balance rather than calculation – is more
important than arithmetic.

The word *demos* therefore relates to people and the land they live within.
In modern terms these are the attributes of population and territory, yet
cautions should be shown in thinking modern notions back into Greek
thought. In both Kleisthenes and Plato there are early attempts in practice
and theory for the systematic division of the *polis*, though it seems clear that
in terms of the division of land this was not taken to the modern level of
land surveying. In Aristotle there is a move toward relation and balance,
which would dominate understandings of territorial politics until the early
modern period. It is not inconsequential that the move to a modern sense of
territory parallels shifts in the philosophical and mathematical
understandings of space. Various readings of Aristotle by the scholastics,
through to breaks in thinking about geometry by Descartes in the
seventeenth century contribute to that broad development. But that is a topic
for another time. The claim being made here is that whilst the understanding
of *demos* as deme, village or commune is not the principal sense of the term
*demos*, it is worth bearing it in mind when ancient democracy is considered,
as well as in a broader sense noting the role of location in determining the
*polis*.

NOTES

1. See, for example, John Dunn, *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future*
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994); M.I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World*
2 Vols, 1924, III.50, where it means ‘people’, and XVI.437, where it means the land of Lycia.
   See Raphael Sealey, *A History of the Greek City States ca. 700–338 B.C.* (Berkeley, CA:
   University of California Press, 1976), p.91; Charles W. Fornara and Loren J. Samons II,
   *Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991),
   p.48.
   sexes* (Paris: François Maspero, 1981), p.162. On the term ‘deme’ see also P.J. Rhodes,
4. For this point more generally, see Sealey, *A History of the Greek City States*, p.301; David
   Whitehead, *The Demes of Attica 508/7–ca. 250 B.C.: A Political and Social Study*
   and the Development of the Theory of Democracy at Athens’, in Milton R. Konvitz and
   Arthur E. Murphy (eds), *Essays in Political Theory: Presented to George H. Sabine*
5. This seems to be the general consensus. See P.J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian
have written it, but that he does not believe he did; C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century B.C. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952), pp.29–30.
8. Aristotle, Physics, 231a24.
15. Herodotus, V.66.
17. However, see David M. Lewis’ account of Siewert, in ‘Review of Die Trittyen Attikas und die Heerereform des Kleisthenes’, by Peter Siewert’, in David M. Lewis, Selected Papers in Greek and Near Eastern History, edited by P.J. Rhodes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). For Siewert, according to Lewis, p.102, Aristotle’s account is ‘unequivocally false, a very casual fourth-century deduction from the names of the trittyes without inspection of their actual nature’.
24. Whitehead, p.27; for a survey of earlier scholarship, see pp.xviii–xx.
25. Henri Francotte, L’organisation de la cité Athénienne et la réforme de Clisthènes, Studia
KLEISTHENES AND THE GREEK DIVISION OF THE POLIS


27. Ibid., p.3.

28. Ibid.


30. On genos and phratria, see Sealey, A History of the Greek City States, p.22.


34. Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet, Clishtène l’Athénien, p.107; see p.10.

35. Ibid., p.78.

36. Ibid., p.123.

37. Ibid., p.109.


42. Whitehead, p.67.

43. Thompson, ‘The Demes in Kleisthenes’ Reforms’, p.76; Andrewes, p.245.


46. Lewis, ‘Lévêque (P.) and Vidal-Naquet (P.)’, p.223.


49. Whitehead, p.xxxi.


51. Ibid., p.6.

52. Ibid., p.7.

53. Ibid., p.10.

54. Ibid., p.9.
55. Ibid., p.11. But see Andrewes, p.244.
56. Langdon, p.12.
der Griechischen Historiker (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1964), Vol.3, B No.375, which gives the
classical element ‘horismoi tes poleos’.
60. Ibid., pp.5–6.
61. Ibid., pp.3–4.
62. Strabo, I, 1.4.7.
63. Though the meaning of this passage is of course disputed. See Thompson, ‘The Deme in
64. Eliot, Coastal Demes, p.147.
67. Andrewes, p.245.
68. The best example is found in John S. Traill, Demos and Tritis: Epigraphical and
69. Rhodes, A Commentary, p.763.
70. Andrewes, p.245.
72. These two variants are offered by Rhodes, A Commentary, p.258.
73. Aristotle, Constitution, 21.5. On the deme names, see Lewis, ‘Kleisthenes and Attica’,
pp.26–7.
74. Rhodes, A Commentary, p.258.
75. Langdon, p.7.
76. Rhodes, A Commentary, pp.251–2.
77. Sealey, A History of the Greek City States, p.151; on the reforms generally see pp.150–55.
78. P.J. Bicknell, ‘Kleisthenes as Politician: An Exploration’, in Studies in Athenian Politics and
Genealogy, Historia Einzelschriften Heft 19 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972), pp.1–53,
p.18; see Eliot, Coastal Demes of Attika, pp.3–4.
pp.1–41; see Jean-Pierre Vernant, ‘Préface’, in Pierre Lévêque and Spyros Spattius (eds),
Clisthène et la Démocratie Athénienne: Actes du Colloque de la Sorbonne tenu le 15 janvier
1994 sous le présidence de Jean-Pierre Vernant (Paris: Annales Littéraires de l’Université de
Franche-Comté, 1995).
83. Pierre Lévêque, ‘The “Da- Root: Repartition and Democracy’, in Lévêque and Vidal-
Naquet, Cleisithenes the Athenian.
84. Vilatte, p.67.
85. Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet, Clisthène l’Athénien, p.146.
86. I have used the Greek text of Leges, in Platonis Opera, Vol.V; and mainly utilized the
numbers are given with the text from here on. On the Laws generally, see Glenn R. Morrow,
University Press, 1960); Leo Strauss, The Arguments and Actions of Plato’s Laws (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1975); R.E. Stalley, An Introduction to Plato’s Laws
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983); Trevor J. Saunders, ‘Plato’s Later Political Thought’, in
Richard Kraut (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992); André Laks, ‘The Laws’, in Christopher Rowe and Malcolm
Schofield (eds), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).


94. Lacey, p.179. Note also Claude Mosse’s suggestion that ‘on the one hand the army is nothing if not the city itself; but on the other it is the city which is nothing but a troop of warriors’, cited in Jean-Pierre Vernant, Mythe et société en Grèce Ancienne (Paris: François Maspero, 1974), p.56.

95. Morrow, p.118.


102. See the note by Saunders in Plato, The Laws, p.218 n.27.


105. Citations of Aristotle are given in parentheses by the pagination and line numbers of the Bekker edition, already cited, from now on. I have based quotations on Reeve’s translation of the Politics, and Roger Crisp’s of the Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), modified through comparison with the Greek. For a reading of the relation between these texts, see Richard Kraut, Aristotle: Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.16–19.


108. The metaphor of the ship of state is commonly found in Greek authors. See, for example Plato, *Laws*, 758a; 945c; and Sophocles, *Antigone*, ed. Mark Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).


111. Vilatte, p.33.


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